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3Abstract
This study examines the determinants and implications of the information disclosed
in interim reports submitted to the Helsinki Stock Exchange in the period 1985-93.
The determinants part of the work is based primarily on prior literature, firm
attributes, and the development of the institutional regime. Specifically, nine classes
of determinants of disclosure are derived. These are: (1) governance structure, (2)
business risk, (3) market risk, (4) capital structure, (5) stock valuation, (6) firm
growth, (7) growth potential, (8) firm size, and (9) yearly dichotomy variables
representing the legislative climate. Disclosure was measured by two index classes:
(1) overall, including both mandatory and voluntary disclosures; and (2) purely
voluntary disclosures. The findings show that, besides the year in which an interim
report is published, overall disclosure is related to the measures of business risk,
growth potential, and firm size. In addition to these four factors, a firm’s governance
structure is significant in the purely voluntary context. 
In the implications part of the study, the markets’ assessment of various combinations
of unexpected earnings and unexpected levels of disclosure was analyzed via (1)
cumulative abnormal returns, (2) earnings response coefficients, and (3) bid-ask
spreads. The principal finding is that disclosure enhances the communication of
earnings information to the market. This is particularly evidenced when the level of
disclosure is as expected. 
The results add to the existing understanding of determinants and the use of
accounting information in general and intrayear reporting in particular. Besides that,
the findings have both managerial and legislative importance. 
Key words: Investor communication; Interim reports; Disclosure expectations;
Earnings quality; Disclosure index; CAR
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Preliminaries 17
1.  Synopsis and outline of the study
1.1.  Synopsis
The corporate form of business organization usually separates ownership from
management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This induces a principal-agent problem, due
to the incongruence of the participants’ aims. As a result, the authenticity, degree, and
frequency of disclosure of management practices have been a long-standing subject of
investigation. Disclosure provides an important means for managers to communicate
their superior, firm-specific and potentially industry-specific knowledge to outside
investors (Healy & Palepu, 1993, p. 1). Management disclosures in the face of
earnings surprises are of interest (Kasznik & Lev, 1995). In addition, financial
innovations create new challenges for reporting (Lee, 1992, September). The
discretionary reporting environment is found to influence the earnings information that
is disclosed by managers (Sivakumar & Waymire, 1993). This is, in part, because the
incentive to hide substandard performance exists. 
This study has two main research questions:
1. What are the major determinants explaining the financial and
nonfinancial information disclosed in interim reports? 
2. What are the market consequences of the financial and nonfinancial
information disclosed in interim reports?
The first research question is studied in the determinants section of the work and the
second in the implications section. The general research questions stated above can be
Preliminaries18
expressed as testable hypotheses. The hypotheses in the determinants part are as
follows:
HD : Number of shareholders is positively related to the level of disclosure,1
HD : Degree of institutional ownership is related to the level of disclosure,2
HD : Degree of non-institutional ownership is positively related to the level of 3
  disclosure,
HD : Business risk is positively related to the level of disclosure,4
HD : Market risk is positively related to the level of disclosure,5
HD : Capital structure is related to the level of disclosure, 6
HD : Mispricing of a firm’s share is positively related to the level of disclosure,7
HD : Firm growth is positively related to the level of disclosure,8
HD : Growth potential is positively related to the level of disclosure, 9
HD : Firm size is positively related to the level of disclosure, and10
HD : Matureness of market is positively related to the level of disclosure.11
In the implications section of the work the hypothesis is as follows:
HI : The degree of disclosure has an impact on the market.1
A useful feature of HI  is that it links the relation between the market’s use of1
disclosure and the actual disclosure and does so without the need to explicitly specify
a particular model for the relationships in question.
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This study contributes to existing research in several ways. First, the thorough
construction of a disclosure index was performed after an extensive literature review
spanning over 30 years and covering both pioneering works and the most recent
research. 
Second, this study focuses on a very important element of business communication:
interim reports. During the research period of 1985-93 interim reporting practices in
Finland have undergone enormous change. Therefore the data should contain
information relevant to the research questions stated above. 
Third, this study extends conventional earnings response coefficient (ERC) research,
which limits itself mainly to earnings and its components, in that the study also
examines the level and quality of the financial and nonfinancial information disclosed
in interim reports. Besides the influence of disclosure on the returns/earnings
relationship the study contributes to the literature on post-earnings-announcement
drift. There is a wealth of evidence that abnormal returns exist for a short time after
earnings announcements (Ball, 1992). Both the database and the design of the present
work make it possible to study whether differences in disclosure are related to the
post-earnings-announcement drift which has also been reported in the Finnish context
(inter alia Schadewitz, 1992).
Fourth, the institutional domain and its development are described for the entire
research period of 1985-93 for Finland. In addition, in order to help compare the
results with other studies and institutional frameworks, also the development of the
institutional regimes for interim reporting in Sweden and the U.S.A. are described.
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This should be of interest to those who seek to identify and compare features of
disclosure regimes and how those differences affect actual disclosure (see also Frost
& Pownall, 1994). Mindful of the regulatory background, two disclosure indices were
constructed here: an overall disclosure index, which includes the regulatory
developments, and an index of purely voluntary items. 
Finally, the interim report database that is constructed should facilitate future research
endeavors related to Finnish interim reporting. 
Because many of the business communication issues remain unresolved, both
researchers and practitioners continue their quest. The Association for Investment
Management and Research (AIMR, 1993) addresses such issues as the form, content,
and frequency of financial disclosures. 
Some findings, however, are generally accepted.  Among these is the fact that the
annual and interim financial statements are the primary, systematic publications that
communicate information to a firm’s interest groups. One reason for this is that
financial reporting diminishes the information asymmetry problem between managers
and all other interest groups. 
Expanded public disclosure is of use in reducing the cost of determining corporate
value (Porter, 1992, p. 79). It is estimated that information that is reported more often
than annually comprises 30 to 40 percent of the total financial communications effort
(AIMR, 1992, p. 110).  Thus, interim financial statements have become an integral
part of corporate management’s reporting of stewardship. 
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Some Finnish firms began to publish interim reports as early as the 1970s.  This is
many years before regulation made interim reporting standard practice. Interim reports
for firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE) have been mandatory since
January 1986. Because interim reporting is a relatively new practice, it offers the
prospect of studying the impact of the development of reporting policy in a recent
context.  
In its search for the appropriate degree of regulation, the HSE has created a fluid
reporting environment. Because the regulation has allowed a wide degree of
discretionary latitude, the determinants of corporate disclosure strategy can potentially
be identified through interim reports. The policies that give rise to the reported results
may reasonably be implied from statistical analyses of such results.  
This study focuses on both the determinants of disclosure, which are reported in
chapter 7, and their implications, which are reported in chapter 8. 
Although systematic financial reporting has obvious advantages, some of its
side-effects are the subject of critical debate. An example of such debate is the fact
that certain groups are calling for corporate disclosure to be curbed. It is their hope to
extend the investment horizon by providing information no more often than the
required annual reports. It is argued that the abolition of interim financial reports
might lengthen investors’ investment horizons (Porter, 1992, p. 76). 
A related argument for the abolition of interim financial reports is that their existence
may induce myopic behavior by managers. For example, in trying to maximize
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short-term earnings-based bonuses, a manager might concentrate on current-period
earnings, at the expense of the firm’s longer-term development. 
The growing number of interim financial reports published by firms listed on the HSE
provide a database for the investigation of the impact of varying corporate disclosure
policies. Some of these policies are a direct response to regulation, while others may
be viewed as an indirect response to the context of current and expected regulation.
Seven of the specific factors affecting Finnish interim disclosure are listed below.
First, the information content of interim reports is increasingly comprehensive. This
research attempts to determine whether this tendency is due entirely to regulatory
requirements or whether there is an autonomous increase in voluntary disclosure in
interim reports. Dye (1986) develops theoretically established conditions in which
increasing mandatory reporting requirements increase corporate incentives for
voluntary disclosure.     
Second, interim financial statement regulations offer firms alternative interim
reporting periods.  A firm can, for example, choose to publish one report after a six-
month period or two reports: one after four months and another after eight months.
The choice of reporting periods might be influenced by a mixture of: (1) general
economic, (2) industry-specific, and (3) firm-specific factors. Highly seasonal
operations, for instance, might be better communicated to interest groups by applying
the interim results of the four-month/eight-month reporting option. 
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Third, there are no known Finnish contracts in which managerial remuneration is
based on interim results. The absence of such explicit contracts offers the prospect of
greater managerial objectivity in interim reporting as compared to annual reporting.
Fourth, dividends and taxes are calculated on a firm’s annual earnings.  No second set
of books is kept for tax purposes, as is the case in several other countries. Without
direct  dividend or tax consequences, managers may objectively report the firm’s
actual operating results in interim financial statements.  
Fifth, a firm quoted on another stock exchange is allowed to submit its interim report
according to international accounting standards, if that standard is approved by the
other stock exchange. This flexibility offers firms quoted on another stock exchange
three alternative accounting standards in their domestic interim reports: (1) Finnish
accounting (FA) standards, (2) international accounting (IA) standards, or (3) both FA
and IA standards. The accounting standard that a corporate applies in its domestic
interim report may indicate managers’ intentions in terms of targeting particular
interest groups. All of the three alternatives (FA alone, IA alone, both FA and IA) are
in fact used in Finnish interim reports (Adams, Weetman, & Gray, 1993).
Sixth, sometimes corporations publish interim reports subject to the examination of
the company’s auditors. Management’s decisions vis-à-vis the choice of the release of
audited interim reports is an interesting topic for investigation, subsequent to this
research.
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Finally, in Finland, corporations typically announce preliminary annual results.
Therefore, much of the information content of the final annual report is anticipated
before its announcement. With interim reports the practice is opposite. There is
virtually no pre-announcement of interim reports (Schadewitz & Vieru, 1993, p. 12).
The nonexistence of preliminary announcements of interim results gives interim
reports a somewhat different position relative to that occupied by annual reports.
Interim results have the potential to contain new, previously unpublished, information.
This point stresses the importance of the content of every single interim report.  
This study investigates the major determinants and implications of the information
disclosed in interim reports. From a determinants perspective, it is hypothesized that
the level of disclosure is a function of a firm’s: (1) governance structure, (2) business
risk, (3) market risk, (4) capital structure, (5) mispricing, (6) growth, (7) growth
potential, (8) size, and (9) market maturity. From an implications viewpoint, it is
assumed that the markets’ assessment of unexpected interim earnings (forecast based
on a seasonal random walk model) and purely voluntary disclosure is reflected in: (1)
cumulative abnormal returns, (2) earnings response coefficients, and (3) bid-ask
spreads. The forecast for purely voluntary disclosure is based both on the determinants
of disclosure and the voluntary disclosure in the preceding interim report. 
The determinants of overall disclosure in interim reports include both the mandatory
portion and information that is reported voluntarily. Overall disclosure is directly
related to quantitative measures of: (1) business risk, (2) growth potential, and (3) firm
size. Moreover, during the research period 1985 through 1993, the development of the
quality of interim reports has been rapid, paralleling the expansion of accounting and
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market regulation. This explains why the year is a significant determinant of
accounting disclosure here.
Most of the determinants of voluntary disclosure in interim reports are the same as
those for the overall disclosure. Just as the year is a significant determinant of overall
disclosure, it is an important explanatory variable for voluntary disclosure as well.
This indicates that firms are willing to submit voluntary information, in addition to the
mandatory items, in their interim reports. The number of shareholders is a measure of
the governance structure. It is a significant determinant of the voluntary, but not of the
overall, disclosure model. 
In the implications part of the study the principal finding is that in particular
disclosures that do not contain large surprises assist the communication of earnings
information to the market.
1.2.  Outline of the study
This study has three major parts after these Preliminaries. Part one contains the
underlying theory and explains the institutional setting. This discussion lays the
foundation for the following two parts. Part two presents the empirical evidence.
Conclusions are drawn and recommendations are offered in Part three of the study.
Part one consists of four chapters, which aim to show that, although a securities
market might be efficient, there is the possibility that information asymmetries
between managers and outside interest groups exist. Chapter 2 reviews the
relationship between accounting information and the capital markets. Prior research,
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related to interim reports and to the development of disclosure studies over a 30-year
time span, is presented in chapter 3. The institutional environment surrounding interim
reporting is covered in chapter 4. This chapter contains a comparison of Finnish
regulation with that in both Sweden and the United States. Chapter 5 sets out the
specific hypotheses to be tested in this research.
Part two presents the empirical evidence. This part follows the conventional order of
research. Chapter 6 details the data sources used in this research. Chapter 7 presents
the rationale and basis for the selection of the set of disclosure items deemed to
provide valuable information for a firm’s outside interest groups. Furthermore, chapter
7 contains a measurement of the use of these determinants in interim reports. Chapter
8 discusses the market implications associated with the publication of interim reports.
Part three concludes. This single chapter contains a summary of the study. In
addition, conclusions from: (1) the theoretical, (2) the managerial, and (3) the
legislative  perspectives are drawn. Finally, some suggestions for further research are
given. 
Part one
Theory and institutional setting
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2.  Corporate communication to the capital markets 
2.1.  Information asymmetries in the capital markets 
This chapter builds the foundation for the more specific research to follow. An
essential part of financial accounting is a firm’s communication to outside interest
groups, especially to the capital markets. In efficient capital markets, this information
is immediately and correctly reflected in prices. Fama (1976, p. 133) defines efficient
capital markets as follows: 
An efficient capital market is a market that is efficient in processing
information. The prices of securities observed at any time are based on
“correct” evaluation of all information available at that time. In an efficient
market, prices “fully reflect” available information.   
The efficient market concept can be further categorized into three, more
operationalized, levels (Fama, 1970, p. 383): (1) weak form efficiency, (2)
semi-strong form efficiency, and (3) strong form efficiency. Weak form efficiency
prevails when any information contained in an historic price series is reflected in the
current price. Semi-strong efficiency prevails when all publicly available information
is reflected in a security’s price. Strong form efficiency exists when all information,
public and private, is reflected in the current price (Dyckman & Morse, 1986, p. 5).
Fama (1991) provides a review of the first two decades of market efficiency literature.
With respect to semi-strong efficiency, financial reporting provides one public
information source to the market. Research thus far reports the existence of certain
systematic inefficiencies. Markets appear unable to take immediate advantage of all
Theory and institutional setting30
the available information in investment decision-making. There is consistent evidence
that abnormal returns exist for a short time after earnings announcements (Ball, 1992).
One of the findings is that a substantial proportion of post-announcement drift is
delayed until earnings announcements in subsequent quarters (Bernard & Thomas,
1990). This is a significant finding in that it suggests some sort of market inefficiency.
Recently Ball and Bartov (1996) provided further explanation for this market
anomaly. Interestingly, besides confirming previous findings, they also report that the
market acts as if it underestimates the magnitude of the serial correlation in
unexpected earnings by about 50%.
In addition to a slower-than-immediate adjustment to unexpected information,
information asymmetries between managers and investors appear to exist. Myers and
Majluf (1984) suggest that managers know more about the firm’s value than do its
potential investors. This study was seminal for the subsequent focus of research in the
field. Furthermore, the separation of ownership, inherent in the corporate form of
business organization, can lead to incentive problems. This is analogous to the
“lemons” (low quality car) problem in the used car market discussed by Akerlof
(1970). He discusses the problems of quality and uncertainty. This separation means
that decision agents do not often bear a substantial share of the effects on wealth that
result from their decisions. As a consequence of this combination of information
asymmetry and goal incongruence, managers are tempted to make decisions which
further their personal interests rather than those of their employers (Fama & Jensen,
1983, p. 301). One practical result is that not all projects with positive net present
values will be accepted by the firm, as is hypothesized in classical financial theory.
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Financial reporting can be used to narrow the undesirable information asymmetry, and
to facilitate the disclosure of events and transactions in which managers behave in a
manner that is not in the best interest of the owners. However, financial reporting is
not yet the complete solution. In addition, it is argued that there is a misalignment of
management and shareholder interests, and that accounting rules and auditing
practices are imperfect (Healy & Palepu, 1993, p. 2). As long as the record-keeping
and control functions are unable to disclose adequate information regarding the
existence, value, and use of resources, the sources of capital available to firms will
continue to be affected. Lack of information may, for example, dissuade capital
market  investors. This, in turn, may cause the shares of a firm to be undervalued, due
to the resulting decline in the demand for its shares. If a firm’s shares are undervalued,
it might turn to conventional loan finance rather than the capital markets. This
alternative market might provide a better forum for adequate communication by the
firm with its suppliers of capital.   
Healy and Palepu (1995) examine and offer important insights into aspects of investor
communication based on the experience of CUC International, Inc. The firm faced
difficulties in convincing a wide spectrum of investors of the profitability of its
marketing efforts. CUC’s managers thought that the stock was undervalued, a situation
that could even have increased the threat of a hostile takeover by an informed investor.
The managers responded to the communication problem with accounting releases
backed up by financial action. The authors conclude that much remains to be learned
about the communication of information (op. cit., pp. 138-139): 
The CUC [CUC International, Inc.] case raises a number of questions,
suggesting that information communication between corporations and
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outside investors is potentially a rich topic for further research. While
mandated disclosures through audited financial reports and financial policy
decisions can help managers communicate with investors, they do not fully
resolve the challenges. A complete understanding of shareholder
communication challenges, therefore, involves studying issues such as the
costs and benefits of going public, voluntary disclosures, and relationship
financing.
 
Lev (1988) calls for efficient accounting policy in order to reduce information
asymmetries between investors. The perspective on accounting should be broader than
just, say, accounting for stewardship (Gjesdal, 1981). Asymmetries in the markets can
lead to high transaction costs, thin markets, lower liquidity of securities, and lower
trading profits. This argument for more efficient accounting policy is not designed to
favor or defend a specific group of investors. Rather, it is intended to benefit all
market participants (Lev, 1988, p. 19). 
Hakansson (1990, p. 51) argues that one essential element in the reduction of
predisclosure search and spillover activities would be to narrow the window between
the occurrence of an important event in a firm and its publication. This important
insight suggests the great benefit of interim reporting (see appendix E for reporting
lags). 
2.2.  Disclosures in the face of information asymmetries
Prior research shows fairly decisively that earnings contain information that is useful
to the markets. Yet earnings are found to have only limited ability to explain market
behavior in either the event  sense or  in  the  association  sense.  For  these  reasons,
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researchers continue to search for more insight into the communication gap between
managers and outside interest groups. 
Lev (1989, pp. 155-156) points out in his review article the limited understanding of
low returns-earnings associations. He calls for a reexamination of the returns-earnings
paradigm: 
While current research largely takes reported financial variables at face value
and focuses on methodological issues, a departure in the direction of
emphasizing accounting issues and in particular the quality of reported
information appears promising. The proposed research agenda focuses on
two broad issues. The first (positive) one calls for investigating the process
of financial information dissemination in capital markets. In particular, this
research is aimed at understanding the actual use of reported data by
investors (i.e., the process of financial statement analysis). The second, a
policy-oriented research agenda, focuses on possible improvements in
accounting measurement and valuation techniques which affect the ability of
earnings and other financial items to facilitate the prediction of investor cash
flows.
In addition, there are ongoing efforts to obtain more insight into the efficacy of
accounting information other than earnings. However, the theory so far offers only
limited explanation of how accounting information is either selected for disclosure or
is used. 
Researchers are constantly studying the production and use of accounting information.
There is a continuous need to understand how financial reporting might be improved,
expanded,  or  refined.  The  precise  implications  of  changes  in  the  timeliness or
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frequency of reports and the reporting horizon, or in what is reported, are not totally
understood.
The information gap between managers and the users of disclosed information was
addressed in the mid-1970s in a series of studies (Lee & Tweedie, 1975a, 1975b,
1976). They report that users have a limited understanding of accounting information.
Interim reports are said to be of only moderate to slight importance to users (Lee &
Tweedie, 1975a, p. 288). Among other things, the onus on accountants to publish
reports containing information that can be understood by its recipients is stressed (Lee
& Tweedie, 1976, p. 314). Based on U.S. data, Chandra and Greenball (1977) report
that management assigns a lower information value to some requested items than do
investors. Lev and Ohlson (1982, p. 251) continue by saying that market-based
research in accounting should be utilitarian in nature. Therefore, research findings,
some parts of them, or some of their derivatives, should be useful to firms and their
interest groups. Good research should be able to enhance this understanding. 
In Finland, results similar to those presented by Lee and Tweedie (see above) have
been reported. Havunen and Yli-Olli (1986, p. 53) find that, although financial
information is useful for investors in decision-making, there is a deficiency in
shareholder understanding. This implies that financial reports fail to adequately
address the information needs of individual investors. Among the improvements that
should be considered are better and more timely dissemination of information by firms
and the further development of both intra- and inter-year reporting (Havunen & Yli-
Olli, 1986, p. 53).    
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Ikäheimo (1991) studies shareholders’ use of information in the Finnish context. His
research is based on a field study. Fifteen shareholders are interviewed. It is found that
both the size of the portfolio and the investment style are related to the usage of
information. 
Recently, Puttonen and Kasanen (1995) analyzed the investor relation practice of the
HSE-listed firms. This questionnaire survey was directed at financial analysts. They
received 34 responses, implying a 53.0% response rate (op. cit., p. 28). The authors
found that the quality of business communication between firms differs a lot. The
leading communicators are said to be large international firms (op. cit., p. 4). The
investor relations index (IR index) indicates how, on average, financial analysts divide
their time between eight different aspects of business communication. Annual and
interim reports are clearly the two single most important sources of information as
measured by the use of time. The average proportion of time spent analyzing annual
and interim financial statements is 17.0% and 16.0% respectively (op. cit., p. 27). 
    
2.2.1.  Theoretical developments
One route to greater understanding of the impact of disclosure is theoretical. Some
theoretical studies are reviewed here to indicate both the multidimensionality and the
high degree of complexity associated with firms’ communication with outside interest
groups. These normative works serve as a backdrop for the empirical portion of the
present study. The findings reported in this monograph may contribute to further
theoretical work. Theoretical studies tend to center on determining the appropriate
degree of disclosure, given: (1)  specific situations and (2) explicit assumptions. Both
the situations and the assumptions in these studies are hypothesized. Previous studies
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may be broadly characterized under the following headings: (1) governance structure,
(2) business risk, (3) market risk, (4) capital structure, (5) stock valuation, (6) firm
growth, (7) growth potential, and (8) firm size. Some of these theoretical categories
are identified in Lev (1969), when he propounds the informational analysis of
financial statements as a course for future research (op. cit., pp. 67-68). 
2.2.1.1.  Governance structure
A firm’s ownership structure may reflect the level of sophistication of its various
owners. The communication between the firm and its owners may also differ
depending on matters such as the ownership structure and the composition of the
board. 
Dye (1986) investigates the distinctions between proprietary and nonproprietary
disclosures. Proprietary disclosures are defined as reducing the present value of a
firm’s cash flows. Especially interesting is his analysis of the impact of mandatory
disclosure on voluntary disclosure. More specifically, the issue is how the mandating
of disclosure affects voluntary disclosure. Theoretically, the mandating of disclosure
increases the incentive for voluntary disclosure. As a corollary, low voluntary
disclosure may increase the need for more mandatory disclosure. Dye concedes that
his conclusions regarding disclosure policy are dependent on a certain hypothesis of
investor knowledge prior to actual disclosure announcements (op. cit., p. 347).
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) study earnings announcements by admitting the likelihood
that certain traders make superior judgments to other traders. One important finding
is that, with certain assumptions, earnings announcements generate even more
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information asymmetry than that which existed prior to the announcement. This can
occur if earnings announcements provide information  that allows certain traders to
make superior judgments about a firm compared to other traders.   
The present study assumes that a firm’s governance structure is one of the factors
affecting  the firm’s level of disclosure in interim reports. Besides the number of
shareholders, potential variations in the sophistication of different parties is accounted
for by separating institutional and non-institutional owners. In addition, part of this
study focuses solely on voluntary disclosure in interim reports by HSE-listed firms
over the period 1985-93. This is designed to indicate how the increased regulation and
legislation of interim reporting have influenced voluntary disclosure over the period.
2.2.1.2.  Business risk
A firm’s cash flows can be considerably affected by its level of business risk. It is
important for a firm to provide accurate information on the risks involved in its
business operations. 
Dye (1990) investigates the effect that two kinds of externalities have on disclosure.
If a disclosure by one firm alters another firm’s cash flows, the externality is said to
be real. The announcement of a research breakthrough or the revelation of trade
secrets are examples of real externalities. This is because competitors can experience
actual negative cash flow changes as a result of such an announcement (op. cit., p. 2).
Financial externalities are said to exist when disclosure by one firm has the potential
to alter investor perceptions of the magnitude or variability of another firm’s cash
flows. It has been suggested by Dye that the optimal balance between voluntary and
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mandatory disclosures is dependent upon the form of externality that the firm’s
disclosure generates. In the present study a firm’s business risk represents one type of
externality that can affect firms’ (including its own) cash flows. In particular, the
study investigates whether different levels of business risk in a firm’s activities
influence its disclosure behavior in its interim reports. 
Wagenhofer (1990) studies the effect of the existence of a strategic opponent on a
firm’s voluntary disclosure. He tries to identify the trade-offs faced by a firm
possessing superior information about itself and competing with an opponent in a
financial market. The trade-offs involve the firm’s decision to disclose the superior
information. The firm has to consider the market price of its shares and the proprietary
costs it must bear in response to the reaction of its opponent to its disclosure. The
present research indirectly measures the impact of such influences as externalities via
their impact on business risk and especially how business risk affects to disclosure. In
addition, purely voluntary disclosure in interim reports is studied separately by
extracting it from the overall level of disclosure.
2.2.1.3.  Market risk
Firms may operate in very different business environments. In particular, the market
risks involved may vary considerably depending on the type of business. Firms
operating in high-risk sectors may need to observe an expanded disclosure regime
compared to firms operating in lower risk environments.
Diamond (1985) attempts to determine a firm’s optimal information release policy. In
particular, his focus is on how a firm’s disclosure policy affects investors’
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information-gathering task in respect of a firm. He demonstrates that a firm can have
an optimal policy of disclosure of information that can make its shareholders better off
due to information cost savings and improved risk-sharing. The present study attempts
to identify how firms’ disclosure policy in interim reports is affected by the
differences in market risk among the sample firms. The results obtained should offer
empirical evidence of the optimal disclosure policy in interim reports at varying
market risk levels. 
2.2.1.4.  Capital structure  
A firm’s sources of capital could also influence its disclosure policies. Debt financing
and debt reduction plans are based on formal written contracts. Lenders normally gain
access to privileged information in order to convince themselves of a borrower’s
ability to repay the loan. Equity financing and firms’ compensation to shareholders are
based mainly on dividends. The performance of a firm, especially the level of
earnings, has an important impact on the amount of dividends paid out.
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) provide insight into anticipated announcements and study
how the anticipation of a forthcoming announcement affects investors’ private
information-gathering. In particular, the anticipated precision of the public
announcement is examined. The precision (inverse of variance) refers to the random
error in future public disclosure (op. cit., p. 274). They find that between two
extremes (the precision of the public announcement is either small or extremely large),
the impact of the public announcement is sufficiently large and creates incentives for
investors to acquire alternative information. The present study examines empirically
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whether the degree of unexpectedness in disclosure influences the market’s use of
interim reports.
McNichols and Trueman (1994) also demonstrate that public disclosure stimulates
private information acquisition. In their research setting they allow traders to acquire
and trade on private information prior to a public disclosure (op. cit., p. 70).
Specifically, they show that the greater the probability or the precision of a public
disclosure, the more thorough is the information gathered by the informed trader
during the pre-announcement period. In the present work pre-event return
measurement periods are also applied in order to capture possible pre-event
information-gathering. 
Teoh and Hwang (1991) present a model where, contrary to the usual scenario, some
firms may voluntarily withhold good news and disclose bad news. This is said to be
one way for high-quality firms to distinguish themselves from low-quality firms.
Indjejikian (1991) examines how investor ability/sophistication influences a firm’s
disclosure decisions. In equilibrium, it is found that the information disclosed
increases as investors become less sophisticated. In addition, a high level disclosure
may trigger investors’ search for and interpretation of alternative sources of
information instead of the use of common sources of data, such as price. This, in turn,
decreases market consensus and potentially improves investor welfare. 
The present research measures the influence of such information asymmetry, among
other things, via a capital structure variable. The greater the information asymmetry,
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the less inclined investors will be to buy stock and the more the firms will have to rely
on borrowing.
2.2.1.5.  Stock valuation
Stock prices reflect, among other things, the ability of firms to generate earnings. The
better a firm can communicate its potential, the closer share prices should also reflect
this.
Dontoh (1989) investigates the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose information
about future outcomes. In the research design disclosure costs are determined
endogenously. The paper provides possible explanations for why value-maximizing
firms voluntarily disclose unfavorable news. One of the findings is that the level of
endogenous disclosure costs and gains depends on the intraindustry information
transfers and the resulting reaction by the firm’s competitors (op. cit., p. 505). In the
current study the proposition is that potential misvaluation of a firm’s share will lead
to extended disclosure even in the event of unfavorable news in order to avoid high
litigation costs when bad news is purposefully withheld.
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) examine the effect of informedness and consensus
on price and volume. The term informedness refers to the degree to which recipients
become more knowledgeable at the time of an information release. The term
consensus refers to the degree of agreement among recipients at the time of an
information release (op. cit., p. 192). The authors argue that informedness and
consensus effects occur jointly and exercise an influence over price and trading
volume. Their study supports the relevance of further research focusing on either: (1)
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unexpected price changes or (2) unexpected changes in trading volume. In the present
study unexpected returns reflect the information content of disclosure and earnings to
the markets.           
Demski and Feltham (1994) study market responses to financial reports in a two-date
theoretical model. They find that price changes on a public reporting date are linked,
among other things, to the precision of the publicly known information about the
future value of the firm and to the extent to which prior information is discounted in
prior prices. The present study analyzes the influence of disclosure and earnings on
unexpected price changes. Furthermore, the pre-announcement return measurement
periods are applied in order to capture the pre-event information already discounted
in prices.       
2.2.1.6.  Firm growth
The growth of a firm can be seen both as an opportunity and as a threat to its
shareholders. Growth could cause an increasing information asymmetry between
managers and markets if that growth or the direction of it are not adequately explained
in disclosures. Among other things it is important for the markets to evaluate the
growth horizon. Management can use voluntary disclosure to demonstrate their skill
in predicting the future.
Trueman (1986) offers an explanation for voluntary disclosures of earnings forecasts.
The background to the paper is his observation that, although a firm must announce
earnings at the end of a period, some firms seem to announce forecasts of earnings
during the period. Trueman argues that the central reason for voluntary forecasts is
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management’s willingness to indicate its ability to anticipate: (1) future changes and
(2) how those changes will affect the firm’s earnings. Management’s ability to
anticipate future earnings is valuable for investors irrespective of whether the
expectation is of favorable or unfavorable news. An average positive price change is
observed at the time of earnings forecast releases (op. cit., p. 70). However, the costs
associated with the preparation and release of earnings forecasts decrease the
incentives for such disclosures. The empirical results of unanticipated positive or
negative earnings reported in the present study provide some explanation of the
willingness of managers to publish forecasts of earnings.
2.2.1.7.  Growth potential
Growth potential would normally be expected to cause expanded disclosure, but this
is not always necessarily the case. Verrecchia (1983) shows that, theoretically,
managers exercise discretion in their disclosure behavior. One of the premises is that
traders are aware of the existence, but not the content, of the information possessed by
managers. An interesting conclusion is that managers may occasionally withhold some
good news as well as bad news. An example is a variety of favorable accounting
statistics that have the potential to foster harmful effects when misunderstood by the
investor. Verrecchia (1990) extends his 1983 work by showing how information
quality affects disclosure. In general, he shows that when managers possess high
quality information it is likely to be passed on in the form of increased disclosure. 
Chen (1994) postulates that the apparent short-term orientation of firms that do not
reveal favorable information is due to the fact that their competitors might benefit in
the longer term from that information. For instance, the disclosure of investment
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opportunities, technological expertise, or business plans may have a negative impact
on the firm in terms of competing in its product market (op. cit., p. 212).
Penno (1996) studies the significance of precision choices in financial reporting. He
shows theoretically that managers’ incentives to produce more precise information are
a function of the firm’s future prospects. Specifically, firms with poor (good)
prospects choose more (less) precise disclosures. He calls disclosure with high
precision back-to-the-wall policy, where initially unfavorable news is followed up by
an extensive output of information. Disclosure with low precision is viewed as a
don’t-rock-the-boat policy, where good initial news is not followed up by an extensive
output of information.  
The present study addresses empirically the discretionary disclosure issue. In
particular, the market consequences of different levels of disclosure quality in interim
reports are examined by including variables related to growth potential. These provide
new insight into how growth potential and disclosure are related.  
2.2.1.8.  Firm size
The size of a firm may also influence the degree to which its operations can be
comprehend by outsiders. The operations of a large multinational company will
contain elements rarely found in a small domestic firm. The size of the interested
public and their reasons for being interested will be very different for different sizes
of firms.
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Newman and Sansing (1993) prove that the presence of multiple users with conflicting
objectives can affect the degree of information that a firm discloses. The larger the
firm, the larger is usually the interested public. The current study also includes the
firm’s size as one potential explanatory variable for the degree of disclosure in interim
reports.  
In addition to theoretically based models, empirical disclosure studies are reported in
literature. One recent focus is on the attempt to better understand manager incentives
to voluntarily disclose news which is conventionally interpreted as unfavorable for the
firm. One common explanation for the open communication of bad news is that
managers wish to systematically build up long-run confidence in their investors.
Some recent studies focusing on actual disclosure behavior and emphasizing single
information items are introduced briefly below.
2.2.2.  Some evidence of discretionary disclosures
Empirical studies recognize some of the difficulties related to financial reporting.
Radebaugh and Gray (1993, p. 195) find that the cost of competitive disadvantage is
ranked as the number one factor constraining voluntary information disclosure by
executives in the U.K. and the U.S. However, although this type of finding is
prevalent, there are some recently reported exceptions. Harris (1994) studies whether
competition has any impact on managers’ reporting of business segment information.
Interestingly, she finds that the likelihood of segment reporting increases with greater
intraindustry competition (op. cit., p. 73). The finding supports the view that
disclosure costs are lower in highly competitive industries than they are in less
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competitive industries. In addition, one reason why firms are reluctant to disclose
segment information in noncompetitive industries is said to be the protection of profits
(op. cit., p. 73).
One influential branch of research is positive accounting research, focusing on the
contractual relationships between parties associated with a firm and the role of
accounting in that context. Important studies within this research direction are Watts
and Zimmerman (1978) and (1990). However, hypotheses derived from positive
accounting research have only partially succeeded in explaining managers’ accounting
decisions (Bromwich, 1992, pp. 321-328).
Recently some important insights have been gained into managers’ disclosure
practises. For example, knowledge of the voluntary disclosure of bad news has
improved. An important work in this area is Skinner (1994). He analyzes corporate
earnings-related disclosure practices in a random sample of 93 NASDAQ firms
between 1981 and 1990. The main findings are as follows: (1) earnings-related
voluntary disclosures occur infrequently; (2) there is a tendency for good news to be
reported as a point or range of annual earnings per share, while bad news disclosures
tend to be qualitative statements about the current quarter’s earnings; and (3) the stock
price response to bad news disclosures is greater than to good news disclosures. In
addition, large quarterly negative earnings surprises are preempted 25 percent of the
time by voluntary firm disclosures (op. cit., p. 39). That frequency is higher than that
of other earnings announcements, which are preempted less than 10 percent of the
time. The explanation for voluntary bad news disclosure is said to be related to
managers’ asymmetric loss function. The results give indirect evidence that managers
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incur high costs from the concealment of bad news. Two reasons for this are stated
(op. cit., p. 39): (1) shareholders may sue due to large stock price declines on earnings
announcement days and (2) managers may lose their reputation due to their failure to
disclose bad news in a timely manner. Similar results are reported in Kasznik and Lev
(1995).  
Theoretical developments, underpinned by empirical results, indicate the
multidimensional nature of disclosure development (see also appendix A). It seems
that the trend is toward more transparent and long-run disclosure strategies. This
satisfies investor needs more fully than was true with earlier practices. The trend
toward more integrated disclosure strategies is recognized in literature. Lev (1992, p.
28) summarizes some of the key aspects that are reviewed in section 2 in this study
and concludes as follows:
Given that without an active, long-term disclosure strategy, there is no
assurance that the full value of the firm’s other activities will be fully
reflected in a timely manner in the various markets in which it operates, the
need for a disclosure strategy arises. A disclosure strategy should be of
particular interest to top management, since disclosure is among the few
corporate activities practiced directly by executives, as contrasted with most
other activities which are delegated to subordinates.  
Chapter 3 continues the literature review. One important element in a firm’s business
communication is interim reports. Therefore, studies involving interim reporting are
given special emphasis in the next chapter.
Theory and institutional setting48
3.  Survey of prior studies of interim reporting
This literature survey continues to build on the foundation laid in the previous chapter.
The first part of this survey focuses on studies based on interim reports. The main
objective of  the interim reporting section is to differentiate between what is known
and what remains to be discovered about interim reporting. The information in this
section leads to the empirical part of this study.
The second section of this literature survey focuses on a principal method of
quantifying disclosed information - disclosure index studies. The major studies
published between 1961-95 are summarized briefly. A special effort is made to
identify potential deficiencies in previous studies. Lessons and findings from prior
literature led to the construction of a new disclosure index, which is employed in the
present work. 
3.1.  Causes and consequences of interim reporting
This section reviews the general level of accumulated knowledge related to interim
reports. The aim is to provide the reader with a background to interim reporting issues.
This background will demonstrate why interim reports are an important research topic.
Recent literature supports the value of frequent reporting, but also recognizes the
difficulties associated with it. There is a strong belief that quarterly reporting by
public companies should be retained. Three reasons for quarterly reporting are stated
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 1994, p. 25).
These are summarized below:
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1. quarterly reporting helps users to have a longer-term focus,
2. quarterly reporting provides for an orderly dissemination of reliable
   information, and 
3. quarterly reporting reduces problems associated with insider trading.
Some discussions even suggest that quarterly reporting has an impact on the volume
of trading  (Porter, 1992, p. 76). 
The first subsection of this review is organized under the following topics: (1)
reporting frequency, (2) the relationship of interim and annual reports, (3) time-series
evidence related to interim earnings, (4)  the relationship between interim earnings and
the stock markets, and (5) a concluding subsection. This organizational structure
follows a logical flow. Reporting frequency is a function of a combination of the
response to regulation and a voluntary desire to communicate with investor groups.
This leads to the existence of interim reporting. The interaction of interim and annual
reports is, therefore,  the first relationship reviewed after the section on reporting
frequency. The order in which each subsection progresses is mostly based on the date
of publication time of the works cited.
3.1.1.  Reporting frequency
Interim financial statements are an integral part of the financial reporting process.
Interim statements provide a theoretically efficient channel for the enhancement of the
information flow to parties interested in the results of a firm’s operations.  A trade-off
exists, however, between the benefits and the costs of such reporting.
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Continuous reporting would provide the market with the greatest amount of
information.  There would be few surprises, because all market participants would be
informed of events and transactions as they occur. With perfect visibility, the
accounting system would be a continuous and error-free source of complete and
perfect information to its users (Walker, 1973, p. 23). Continuous reporting does not
exist in practice. Among other things, continuous reporting would require the rapid
reporting of decisions made at all levels of an organization, even before the financial
impact of such decisions is felt.  An additional cost would be that associated with the
loss of secrecy to third parties which is inherent in detailed disclosure.
At the other practical extreme is reporting once per fiscal year. Such a system would
have the merit of preserving organizational secrecy for as long as reasonably possible,
in addition to the relatively low cost of producing just one report per period. The price
to be paid would be increased information asymmetry in the market place vis-à-vis the
firm’s management. If events and transactions are reported only once per year, much
of the report will be a surprise to the user.
It is to be expected that market participants seek to balance the benefit-cost
relationship associated with report frequency. Firms that report too often would be
penalized for the high cost of providing the information. Firms that report too
infrequently would be penalized for the unnecessary information asymmetry that their
failure to report would generate. There would be rewards, however, for those firms
that optimize reporting frequency. Of course, firms cannot always decide the
frequency of their reporting, due to the existence of regulatory requirements. Chapter
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4 presents current practice relating to reporting frequency in both a regulated and a
voluntary environment.
The literature survey of this subsection begins with an institutional setting in which
the publication of interim reports is voluntary. The order of presentation is determined
by the chronological sequencing of the periods investigated in the articles.
The earliest of the periods studied is that reported by Morris (1984). He studies
disclosure in a substantially unregulated environment: New South Wales during the
second half of the nineteenth century. One interesting finding in the study is that firms
listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange published half-year reports more frequently than
annual reports during the period 1851-90. A majority of listed firms disclosed: (1) a
director’s reports, (2) audited balance sheets, and (3) audited profit and loss accounts.
The author concludes that most of these disclosure practices seem to have been set by
market forces.
The theme in Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) is closely related to the present
work. They provide evidence of managers having an incentive to supply interim
reports voluntarily. Their intention is to explain the existence of interim reports as a
monitoring device. The research period is 1937-48. They find that NYSE-listed firms
reported more frequently than firms listed on the ASE. The 1937 reporting behavior
of NYSE firms tends to persist as late as 1948, and there is not much relationship
between the frequency of interim reports and the determinants of monitoring.
However, agency theory and team monitoring are not refined enough to allow
unambiguous predictions on the basis of the detailed variables suggested by Leftwich
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et al. (Schipper, 1981, p. 88). There has also been a suggestion to replicate the study
by Leftwich et al. in European countries with more current data (Burton, 1981, p. 83).
There are also more recent studies based on voluntary semiannual earnings disclosure
practices in non-U.S. markets. If evidence from other markets confirms previous
findings, the global validity of the results will improve. Bradbury (1992) examines the
topic in New Zealand institutional setting. He tries to explain voluntary semiannual
earnings disclosures, both quantified and unquantified, by: (1) earnings volatility, (2)
unexpected earnings, and (3) firm size. The period covered is 1973-76, when the
content of semiannual disclosures by firms listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange
was unregulated. The results suggest three things. One, there is no association
between the level of voluntary semiannual earnings disclosures and annual earnings
volatility, or that the relation is uncorrelated due to opposing effects. Two, firms with
larger annual forecast errors have more nonquantified interim disclosures. Three, firm
size does not affect the level of disclosure. Differences between these results and
those found in prior research are judged to result from the thinness of the New
Zealand capital market. These factors might have enhanced the role of indirect
channels of corporate disclosure over the period studied.  
3.1.2.  Linkage between interim and annual reports  
One elementary topic in interim reporting research is the relationship between interim
and annual reports. Variations in this relationship may also be a reflection of the type
of information disclosed in the different reports. Two basic, competing, views of this
relationship are given by Foster (1986, p. 222): (1) the discrete view and (2) the
integral view. Some earlier discussions also touch on this matter (Bollom, 1973;
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Bollom & Weygandt, 1972; Bows & Wyatt, 1973; Sprague, 1975; Van Pelt, 1970;
Walker, 1973), as do some more recent articles (Courtis, 1987; Nurnberg, 1988). The
issue remains unresolved.
In the discrete view, each interim period is considered independent (Foster, 1986, p.
223). Sales and expenses occurring during the interim period are also reported as such.
In the discrete approach, the emphasis is on the actual achievement of the interim
period (Fried & Livnat, 1981, p. 493). Users of interim reports are assumed to monitor
a firm’s performance exclusively for the reported period. One danger associated with
this view is the fact that the data can contain biases, such as those caused by seasonal
operations. A classic study on this subject is Foster (1977). 
In the integral view, every interim period is considered an integral part of the reporting
year (Foster, 1986, p. 222). In this view, the emphasis is on providing information to
users as an estimation of annual results (Fried & Livnat, 1981, p. 493).  
Current literature indicates that neither of these views is demonstrably superior to the
other. In Canada, a compromise combination of these two extremes is advocated
(Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants [CICA], 1991, p. 67).
3.1.3.  Time-series behavior and forecasting related to interim accounting
 numbers
This subsection focuses on two forecasting-related issues: (1) time-series analysis of
quarterly   earnings  and  (2)  financial  analysts’  use  of  quarterly  earnings  in  the
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preparation of their forecasts. Studies dealing with both of these are reported here in
order of publication.
3.1.3.1.  Time-series behavior of interim financial statements
Foster (1977), using data for 69 firms covering the period 1946-74, reports that
quarterly time series have two components: (1) an adjacent quarter-to-quarter
component and (2) a seasonal component. His study reveals that markets adjust for the
seasonality of reported quarterly earnings. Griffin (1977) reports the same two
components of the quarterly earnings process. His research is conducted with data for
94 firms over the period 1958-71. The results of these two studies have important
implications for forecasting purposes and also help the task of regulatory bodies.
Ball and Foster (1982) and Kinnunen (1988, appendix 2-1) provide a detailed list of
other studies which assess the time-series behavior of interim accounting numbers. 
3.1.3.2.  Use of interim financial statements
Time-series research is later extended by taking structural changes, such as
macroeconomic random shocks, into account. Lee and Chen (1990) report that more
accurate quarterly earnings forecasts are obtained if such structural changes are taken
into consideration.
Abdel-khalik and Espejo (1978) examine whether or not the announcement of interim
earnings has any influence on the accuracy of annual earnings forecasts made by
analysts. The study includes 100 firms in the Value Line Investment Survey for 1976.
Their results show that use of the data reported in each of the first three quarters
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increases the accuracy of annual earnings forecasts. Because the accuracy of annual
earnings forecasts is highly correlated with the announcement of interim earnings,
they conclude that analysts use interim reports in their forecasting work.    
Hopwood, McKeown, and Newbold (1982) attempt to assess the amount of additional
information contained in quarterly earnings compared with annual earnings. Their
approach is to consider both quarterly and annual earnings in the prediction of the
next annual earnings. Their data comprise 267 firms beginning in the first quarter of
1962 and containing 48, 52, 56, 60, and 64 quarters of information. They report
increased forecasting accuracy when quarterly earnings are introduced into the model.
Collins, Hopwood, and McKeown (1984)  examine the predictability of earnings for
the first, second, third, and fourth quarterly reporting periods. Forecasts by securities
analysts and time-series models are analyzed. The sample consists of 161 firms for the
period 1951-79. Their findings indicate a strong pattern of larger forecast errors
relating to the fourth interim period, regardless of the forecasting horizon. The pattern
holds for both financial analysts’ forecasts and for time-series models. These results
are consistent with the view that fourth-quarter earnings include adjustments due to
deviations in earnings estimates made in the previous three quarters.      
Bathke, Lorek, and Willinger (1989) examine whether firm size is related to the
predictive ability of quarterly earnings. Their primary sample has 109 firms covering
the period 1967-82. They conclude that firm size does not affect the appropriateness
of the common time-series model structure. Their results also indicate that the firm’s
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size affects the model’s predictive ability. Greater predictive power is documented for
larger firms vis-à-vis smaller ones.   
Stickel (1989) studies the result of the process used by securities analysts to anticipate
and respond to interim earnings announcements. The sample includes 7,526 interim
announcements made by 1,251 firms for the period 1982-85. It is reported that
revision activity after an interim announcement is greater: (1) if unexpected interim
earnings are larger, (2) if there are competing analysts’ forecasts, and (3) if
unexpected interim earnings are negative. In addition, it is found that analysts are
more likely to revise forecasts after third-quarter announcements than they are after
first-quarter announcements. Analysts seem to be less likely to revise their forecasts
early in the fiscal year than they are to revise their forecasts later in the fiscal year.
One potential reason for this bias is said to be due to possible offsetting factors in later
quarters. 
Jones and Bublitz (1991) support the view that fourth-quarter earnings are noisier
compared  to earnings for other quarters. Their data consist of quarterly disclosures in
331 annual reports for 1983 and 308 annual reports for 1984. They find that every
year the total number of extraordinary items in the fourth quarter exceeds the total
number of extraordinary items in the other three quarters. Furthermore, the fourth
quarter market reaction is less related to negative earnings surprises than it is to the
reaction to quarters 1 through 3. This is in line with the view that earnings forecasting
errors for the fourth quarter are highest.
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Kang, O’Brien, and Sivaramakrishnan (1994) examine the properties of forecasting
errors associated with forecasts made at the same point in time but for different future
periods. Their final sample contains 132 firms with 743 forecasts for a five-quarter
forecast horizon and 1,692 forecasts for a one-quarter forecast horizon. By basing
forecasts on the same point in time they are able to freeze the underlying information
set. They show that ex post biases are systematically different across differing forecast
horizons, even when the forecasts are based on the same information set. 
Laitinen (1994) studies interim reports to determine whether or not they contain
quantitative or qualitative information that is useful in predicting annual financial
ratios. The sample contains 25 commercial and industrial firms listed on the HSE
during 1990-91. The interim reports used are the latest ones issued in each of these
two years. The results indicate that the quantitative interim data contain useful
information for predicting the next-year value of both the growth rate in net sales and
the rate of return on investment. In addition, qualitative interim variables are important
copredictors of: (1) the growth rate, (2) the rate of return on investment, (3) the
shareholders’ capital to total assets ratio, and (4) the current ratio.
3.1.4.  Interim earnings and stock markets
The impact of interim earnings on stock markets has been studied fairly extensively.
Early evidence suggests that quarterly earnings contain information that stock markets
can use (Brown & Kennelly, 1972; Jones & Litzenberger, 1970; Kiger, 1972; May,
1971).  
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There are, however, some imperfections. Jones and Litzenberger (1970), for example,
identify imperfections in market adjustment to information. Based on available
quarterly earnings reports, they develop a stock selection technique that outperforms
the market ten times out of ten. In addition, they raise very interesting questions
related to the potential influence of the favorableness of an earnings report and its
potential effect on different types of investor. 
In the early 1970s, important implications were drawn that are still valid today. These
may be summarized as follows (May, 1971, p. 151):
1. Any significant improvement in the quality of quarterly data themselves
  might lead to significant social benefits, since it appears that quarterly
accounting data do influence the basis of actual investment decisions.
2. Any effort on the part of accountants that succeeds in unambiguously
conveying to investors the lesser reliability of quarterly data will contribute
to the prevention of potentially significant market inefficiencies, i.e.,
under- or overvaluation of securities in the period between market
adjustments to quarterly earnings numbers and subsequent adjustments to
the superseding, more reliable, annual earnings numbers.  
3.1.4.1.  Aggregate components
Brown and Kennelly (1972), using data for 94 firms covering the period 1951-67,
draw two major conclusions. First, quarterly earnings per share (EPS) reports are
useful in predicting aggregate abnormal returns. Second, the disaggregation of annual
EPS into its quarterly components improved the predictive ability of the EPS series by
30 to 40 percent over that possible when the components are aggregated. This shows
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that quarterly data contain detailed earnings information not revealed by annual
figures. 
Hopwood and McKeown (1985) attempt to establish whether the interim earnings
information content is due to interim sales and/or interim expenses. The foundation of
the study is discussions challenging the relevance of interim reporting. The sample
consists of 238 Compustat firms with accounting data for 68 consecutive quarters,
beginning in the first quarter of 1962. They conclude that both interim sales and
interim expenses contribute to the information content of interim earnings. 
3.1.4.2.  Reporting lags
The reporting lag is defined as the number of days from the date of the end of the
quarter/fiscal year to the publication date. The reporting lag is important when
considering the informational value of a single report to the market. Zeghal (1984), in
the context of both quarterly and annual reporting, studies the impact of the length of
the reporting lag. His sample comprises 4,186 annual and 11,933 interim reports
between 1973 and 1975 (NYSE and AMEX firms). He finds the reporting lag to be
shorter for interim reports than it is for annual reports. The mean lag for interim
reports is 27.2 days and for annual reports 46.6 days. He measures information
content by return magnitude and volume. The results show that the information
content especially of interim, but also of annual, accounting reports with a short delay
exceeds the information content of reports with a long reporting lag. Furthermore, the
author discussed the somewhat different roles that the two classes of report may
represent. Interim reports may have an anticipatory role in annual earnings
forecasting, while audited annual reports play a confirmatory role.
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Freeman and Tse (1992b) examine intercompany information transfers using quarterly
earnings data. They find that security prices for late announcing firms have already
reacted to the information provided by early announcers in that industry.  Logically,
they also report that the greatest reaction is associated with the first industry
announcement. They are able to extend prior research, such as Foster (1981), by
showing that the price reaction of the late announcer to early announcements is
strongest in industries with the highest earnings comovement.   
3.1.4.3.  Delayed adjustment to new information
Joy, Litzenberger, and McEnally (1977) study stock price adjustments to quarterly
unexpected earnings. Their sample consists of 102 firms continuously listed from
1963 through 1968. Weekly stock price data suggest that the stock markets are
somewhat inefficient in the adjustment process.  Similar results are reported by other
researchers at about the same time. Watts (1978) finds that systematic abnormal
returns exist after quarterly earnings announcements in the period 1962-65. However,
the benefit to the potential investor of this inefficiency is not substantial as it is
unlikely to exceed the direct transaction costs. Morse (1981) reports delayed market
reaction to quarterly earnings announcements. 
More recently, too, researchers have reported that markets systematically fail to apply
all the information contained in earnings. An important and thorough publication in
this area is that by Bernard and Thomas (1990). They report that stock prices do not
fully reflect quarterly earnings information. Specifically, applying a three-day
window, they find that the current quarter’s earnings can be used to predict the price
reactions to the following four quarters’ earnings announcements. Further insight into
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this finding is provided in Ball and Bartov (1996). A detailed discussion related to
stock market anomalies is reported and discussed by Ball (1978, 1992).
3.1.4.4.  Business risk
McNichols and Manegold (1983) investigate the impact of  the introduction of interim
reports on the information content of annual earnings. The information content is
measured by the variance of returns. Specifically, they suppose the marginal
information content of an annual earnings report to be greater when it has not been
preceded by quarterly reports. Also, the relationship between the information
environment of a firm and its systematic risk is studied. The data are from 34 AMEX
firms. Some have annual reporting only. Others have both interim and annual
reporting. The results indicate that the marginal information content of annual
earnings is reduced significantly when interim earnings announcements are available.
The authors are not able to find any significant relationship between interim reporting
and risk. 
Rippington (1991) studies four firm-specific events and their information content: (1)
the preliminary announcement of annual accounting numbers, (2) the annual report
and accounts, (3) the annual general meeting, and (4) interim reports.  The sample
consists of 337 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange as of June 30, 1981. The
preliminary announcement and interim report have the highest information content.
An abnormally strong reaction is found for interim reports containing bad news. A
similar tendency is found in Schadewitz (1992). The results support the view that
annual reports and accounts, on aggregate, lack the investment utility provided by
more timely information. 
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3.1.4.5.  Market risk
It is possible that the disclosure of even a single item in an interim report may have an
influence on the information content of the report. Lee (1987), studying the period
1975-86, investigates whether or not interim segment reporting has an influence on the
market. He suggests that interim segment information produces reduced variability of
returns and a decreased value of betas around the time of earnings announcements.
The data are a random sample of firms that introduce a change in interim reporting
disclosure practice over the period. His final sample contains 28 firms. The results are
somewhat inconclusive. However, the study reveals that disclosing segment
information in interim reports is associated with reduced variability of returns. This is
evidenced for second-quarter segment disclosures. No reasons are offered why
second-quarter segments are especially significant. Moreover, no effort is made to
explain the lack of significance with respect to the firm’s beta.
3.1.4.6.  Stock valuation
Hopwood and McKeown (1990) study the association between both statistical
earnings forecasts and financial analysts’ forecasts and security returns. They report
that statistical model forecasts and financial analysts’ forecasts are associated with
security returns. The apparent superiority of analysts’ forecasts over statistical models
disappears after controlling for the analysts’ timing advantage. Timing advantage, in
this context, refers to the analysts’ ability to make forecasts closer to the
announcement date than statistical models can.
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3.1.4.7.  Growth potential
Aharony and Swary (1980) study the impact that quarterly dividend and earnings
announcements have on stock returns. Their sample contains 149 NYSE-listed
industrial firms over the period 1963-76. In order to isolate dividend and earnings
effects, the sample contains only those quarterly dividend and earnings
announcements with separate publication dates. They conclude that both quarterly
dividend announcements and quarterly earnings announcements are signals of the
prospects of the firm.  
Dempsey (1994) studies whether potential interim earnings manipulation is reflected
in fourth-quarter earnings announcements. The intuition behind the study is related to
income-smoothing. It is supposed that nonaudited quarterly reports offer managers the
possibility to engage in income-increasing and/or expense-reducing accounting
procedures (see also Alford & Edmonds, 1981; Givoly, Ronen, & Schiff, 1978).
Therefore it is possible that investors know this and logically react more to bad
interim news than to good interim news. The results, however, show evidence of a
larger reaction to fourth-quarter good news earnings than to fourth-quarter bad news
earnings. No reason is offered for this anomaly.
3.1.4.8.  Firm size
Bamber (1987) studies factors that are systematically associated with investors’ use
of accounting disclosures. First, she investigates whether or not larger unexpected
earnings are related to higher unexpected share trading volumes around quarterly
announcements. Second, she seeks to determine whether or not larger unexpected
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earnings are associated with longer periods of abnormally high trading. The data
comprise about 900 first, second, and third-quarter earnings announcements made by
195 firms between 1977 and 1981. The results indicate that the magnitude and
duration of the trading volume reaction to quarterly earnings announcements are
increasing functions of unexpected earnings and decreasing functions of firm size. In
partial confirmation, Davis (1989) reports that size is related to the  market reaction.
Earnings releases by small firms cause greater market reactions than earnings releases
by large firms.      
Seasonal patterns in security returns around quarterly earnings announcements are
documented by Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988). They examine the average
excess return around quarterly earnings announcement dates for 2,527 firms covering
the period 1976-84 (62,515 quarterly earnings announcements). The results show that
returns for small firms are substantially above average two days before the
announcement.  This pattern is not found for large firms. Also, the variance of daily
stock returns prior to and at the event are higher for small firms than they are for large
firms. 
Kross and Schroeder (1988) study the effects of a firm’s prominence on the
information content of quarterly earnings announcements. Their data consist of 3,552
observations (twelve quarters, 296 firms in each) for the period 1978-80. Prominence
is proxied by the number of column inches reported in the Wall Street Journal Index.
Their major finding is that earnings announcements convey more information about
obscure firms than they do about prominent firms.
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Studies of earnings response coefficients (ERCs) have improved comprehension of the
price-earnings relation. Both annual and interim earnings numbers are the subject of
ERC studies. Easton and Zmijewski (1989) find that ERCs vary between firms. Their
sample size ranges from 104 to 206 firms, with each firm having 20 quarterly
time-series observations. For a firm to be included in the sample, Value Line forecasts
had to be available for the six-year period 1975-80. The results indicate: (1) a positive
association between the ERC and the coefficient relating current earnings to future
earnings, (2) a negative association between the ERC and systematic risk, and (3) a
positive association between ERC and firm size. Although ERC studies increase
understanding of the relation between prices and earnings, the ERC values obtained
are still below the theoretical values (Bernard, 1989, pp. 89-90; Lev, 1989). One way
to gain improved understanding of low ERCs is to try to capture the potential
asymmetry in information reflected in prices and earnings. Kothari and Sloan (1992)
take this potential timing difference into account. They show that annualized ERCs
systematically increase when the earnings and return measurement interval is
extended. The average annualized ERC, using quarterly data, is 1.58. It increases to
4.91 when four-year data are used. A similar tendency in results has been observed
using nonlinear models (Freeman & Tse, 1992a).  
Kross and Schroeder (1990) investigate seasonality in stock price responses to
quarterly earnings. In particular, their investigation concerns the precision of small
firms’ quarterly reports. Based on earnings announcements between 1978 and 1980
(3,552 observations) they report that the return response to unexpected earnings for
small firms in the fourth quarter is lower than it is for other interim quarters. They
assume the reason for this is that with small firms interim estimation errors are
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clustered in the fourth quarter. In larger firms, such biases are corrected during prior
quarters. 
Shores (1990) studies the association between interim information and security returns
around earnings announcements. The study develops seven firm-specific attributes as
a proxy of the level of interim information (op. cit., p. 167): (1) firm size, (2) number
of financial analysts, (3) number of interim earnings announcements, (4) number of
nonearnings announcements, (5) trading volume, (6) number of market makers, and
(7) bid-ask spread. The sample comprises 2,156 annual earnings announcements made
by OTC firms between 1983 and 1984. Interim earnings announcements are obtained
from the Wall Street Journal Index. The results support the theory that interim
information preempts the information content of annual earnings.    
3.1.4.9.  Legislation and regulation
In order to explain reporting practices it is important to take into account the
development of the regulatory framework. It should be noted that one important aspect
of positive accounting theory is to study the evolution of accounting standards (Watts
& Zimmerman, 1978, 1990). Watts (1977) and Ball (1980) identify the regulatory
environment as an important element in the determination of the magnitude and
character of disclosure. Ball makes the following comment about the impact of the
regulatory environment (1980, p. 37):
One type of specification error seems common to the entire class of policy
effect experiments, almost without exception. The error is to assume that
accounting policy changes are exogenous, as if they were acts of nature or
as if they were induced by the experimenter in a controlled laboratory
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environment. However, there are potentially severe identification problems
associated with this type of assumption. Environmental changes are likely to
create a type of demand for changes in the accounting policy set; and policy
changes can be thought of as a type of supply process. The experimenter
observes the joint effect of both. It then follows that there can be
complicated problems of timing and control in this type of experiment.  
Cornell and Landsman (1989) examine the impact of three elements on stock prices.
These are: (1) forecast revisions made one quarter ahead, (2) forecast revisions made
one year ahead, and (3) forecast errors. The final sample comprises 2,777
announcements made by 330 firms from the third quarter of 1984 through the third
quarter of 1986. They find that analysts’ forecast revisions provide significant
incremental explanatory power in a pooled regression of abnormal returns on forecast
errors and analyst forecast revisions. The results are not identical across quarters.
Fourth-quarter announcements are found to provide more information to analysts and
investors than other interim announcements. The authors interpret the finding to mean
that analysts use interim announcements to forecast earnings one quarter ahead. In
addition, fourth-quarter announcements are uniquely informative in annual forecast
updating. The possible reasons given for these two results are that only year-end
statements are audited and that fourth-quarter results may contain some corrections of
earnings reported in prior quarters. 
Recently Frost and Kinney (1996) documented evidence on the nature and timing of
disclosures by foreign registrants to the SEC (see also section 4.2.1 below). Their
research design is relevant because the SEC has relaxed some disclosure requirements
for foreign registrants. The authors report, among other things, that (1) foreign firms
file fewer interim reports than U.S. firms, (2) their reports are filed later, (3) they
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announce earnings later, and (4) over 80% of them use non-U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Furthermore, the differences in disclosure are related
to firms’ filing status. Finally, the lack of scrutiny directed by U.S. analysts at foreign
registrants is consistent with the rather low disclosure levels of these firms. 
3.1.4.10.  Period disclosed
Hagerman, Zmijewski, and Shah (1984) provide further evidence that quarterly
earnings contain information useful to the stock markets. Their data are derived from
215 NYSE or ASE firms over the period 1974-76. There are 2,189 quarterly
announcements and 404 annual announcements. The results support the notion that
stock prices are influenced by quarterly earnings information. In addition, the
fourth-quarter information signal is more highly associated with prices than is the case
with annual earnings. 
Due to the proximity of first and fourth-quarter interim reports to the publication of
annual earnings, a strong relation between first and fourth-quarter interim earnings
and annual earnings is presumed to exist. To avoid this correlation, Atiase (1985)
focuses on second-quarter earnings announcements. Specifically, he attempts to
determine whether or not second-quarter information influences price behavior around
the time of earnings announcements. His data comprise 200 sample firms with
second-quarter earnings reports between 1971 and 1972. The findings are consistent
with previous research, indicating that price revaluation occurs during the event week.
In addition, he discovers that the price revaluation is inversely related to the
differential levels of (private) predisclosure information production and dissemination.
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Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) report differences in market reactions to reported
earnings in earlier quarters versus reported earnings in the fourth quarter. Their study
is based on the possibility that managers exercise discretion over expense reporting in
the first three quarters but are unable to do so for the entire reporting year. The
authors assume that managers will delay bad news announcements as long as possible.
Their results support this view. However, a published discussion of this paper points
out that fourth-quarter earnings might be noisier than previous quarters’ earnings. This
alone might cause different market reactions (Palepu, 1988). 
Although the majority of studies focusing on interim reports are based on quarterly
data, there is also evidence that the behavior of the return-earnings relation is valid for
interim reporting periods other than quarterly. This is evidenced in Finland
(Schadewitz, 1992) and the U.K. (Opong, 1995). 
Information content research is closely related to market microstructure. Because the
present study is not directly a market microstructure study, that literature is not
discussed here. However, the interested reader could begin with a review of Brown,
Clinch, and Foster (1992).
3.1.5.  Summary of interim reporting research
The studies cited above indicate that the amount of research focusing on interim
reports is fairly substantial. In addition, they show the variety of purposes for which
interim reports are used. In this subsection, a few major conclusions are offered, based
on  the  literature  survey. In general, it can be said  that interim  reports  reduce  the
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uncertainty related to a firm’s operations observed and monitored by outside interest
groups.  
First, as with annual earnings numbers, aggregate interim earnings seem to contain
useful information for the market around the time of the announcement.  Second,
separate interim income statement components contain incremental information. The
usefulness of interim reports is also supported by the fact that some firms voluntarily
publish interim reports. Third, quarterly earnings time-series have both an adjacent
quarter-to-quarter component and a seasonal component. Fourth, interim earnings are
useful in annual earnings predictions. Fifth, some anomalous price behavior is
reported. The market seems not to use all the information that reported earnings
actually contain. The above findings are mainly based on studies conducted with
readily available databases such as Compustat and CRSP (Center for Research in
Security Prices). 
 
Current knowledge related to other information that is published in conjunction with
interim earnings is much more limited. The importance of identifying the net benefit
of publishing voluminous nonearnings data has been recognized (Lev & Ohlson, 1982,
p. 250): 
Accounting data convey useful and timely information to investors. While
this conclusion definitely holds for earnings data, the marginal contribution
of the voluminous nonearnings data published in financial reports is still
largely unknown. Given the nontrivial costs of information disclosure and
dissemination, this issue obviously deserves more research attention. 
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Some recent studies provide new insight into disclosures other than earnings (Lev &
Thiagarajan, 1993; Martikainen, 1990; Ou & Penman, 1989). However, each of these
studies is based on annual financial statement analysis. These studies are
characteristically  based solely on financial statement numbers/ratios, without taking
into account managers’ nonquantified analyses disclosed in annual reports along with
the accounting numbers. Hoskin, Hughes, and Ricks (1986) address this deficiency.
They find that qualitative comments by officers made concurrently with earnings
appear to be  important disclosures (op. cit., p. 28): 
Perhaps the most notable and least anticipated finding is the significance of
officer comments regarding the future prospects of their firms. The
implication is that such comments are informative as well as credible. One
possible explanation is that reputation serves to discipline officers in ways
that we do not yet fully understand. Given the availability of officer
comments on the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service at times other than the
time earnings are announced, an extension of this study would be to
investigate associations with stock returns for those comments as well. 
The paper’s finding are confirmed by Brown (1986, p. 36):
The finding that prospective operating data and prospective officer
comments are informative for valuing firms’ common shares is the primary
contribution of the study. Further research should examine how capital
markets price these subjective data and should examine officer comments
made at times other than earnings announcement dates.  
Smith (1991) also reports that the quantitative (change in earnings per share) and
qualitative commentary (management’s narrative) in annual reports are both important
in explaining market reactions to annual earnings announcements. Bryan (1994), too,
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finds that the management discussion and analysis contains incrementally relevant
information.
The somewhat limited ability of theory to guide researchers to a fuller understanding
of the use of accounting information calls for more detailed analysis with small
samples. Bernard (1989, p. 106) concludes his review of capital market research in
accounting by saying:
The key to further progress in this arena is to avoid being overly ambitious.
There is much groundwork to be laid. The suggestions of section 5 [The role
of accounting in equity valuation] - moving to more within-industry
analyses, explicitly considering how the information conveyed by accounting
numbers is conditioned on the economic context, gaining a better
understanding of the relations among accounting numbers before introducing
price data, emphasizing economic interpretation more and statistics less -
may be useful in laying that groundwork.  
Academic literature reviewing evidence associated with business communication
seems to be based on single-firm analyses (Healy & Palepu, 1993, 1995). There is an
evolving literature on the role and properties of disclosure. 
Although not all of the above is directly related to interim reporting, it illustrates the
areas in which new insight can be gained. Interim reports are one potentially fruitful
medium of communication by a firm to its interest groups. It is likely that interim
reports reflect managers’ communication propensities, especially at in the early stages
of the development of interim reporting. Study of those reports will, therefore, have
the potential to deepen understanding of the role of accounting in the capital markets.
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Besides the above reasons for studying interim reports in general, there is a particular
need for this type of focus in Finland, where information content studies have
concentrated on annual financial statement information. Yet the potential benefits that
investors might derive from investigation of Finnish interim reports and the lack of
research determining whether or not this is actually the case are recognized
(Martikainen, Yli-Olli, & Gunasekaran, 1991, p. 278):
An extremely important change in the Finnish stock market has been the
improved quality and quantity of interim reports. Each listed firm must
publish at least one interim report each year. So far, however, no studies
exist concerning the informational value of these reports to Finnish investors.
    
This study is designed to help eliminate these deficiencies by adding to the very small
body of literature addressing the information content of Finnish interim reports
(Bergström, 1989; Laitinen, 1994; Schadewitz, 1992). One crucial element of the
present research is to measure the nonearnings information disclosed in interim
reports. This will be done by the use of disclosure indices. The next section introduces
and summarizes disclosure index research covering a time span of over 30 years. 
3.2.  Investigation of the determinants of the information disclosed in interim
    reports
This part of the survey of prior research focuses mainly on the development of
disclosure index literature. Some problem areas related to this literature are identified.
This is done in order to illustrate the necessity of the improvements incorporated in
the disclosure index constructed in this study.
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Beginning with the early work by Cerf (1961), the use of financial reports has been a
continuous topic of study. In the 1970s, disclosure research was fairly intense, mainly
in the U.S.A. One of the obvious reasons is that the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) issued “more accounting releases since 1972 than it had in the
previous 26 years.” (Beaver, 1978, p. 44). Prior to 1976, the level of disclosure was
interpreted by applying variables mainly based on a prima facie understanding of the
use of disclosure. Appendix A summarizes some of the studies. Marston and Shrives
(1991) provide a review of these studies.
Theoretical developments during the 1970s helped to formulate more specific and
advanced research hypotheses for corporate disclosure. One of the key works in the
development of the theory was Jensen and Meckling (1976). Following their study,
disclosure mainly attempted to explain the monitoring function of principals in the
relationship between principal and agent (outsiders and management). However, some
of the variables based on the monitoring function were insufficiently derived. This
deficiency has led to criticism. Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) attempted to
explain voluntary interim reporting in terms of the theory of agency and monitoring.
Burton (1981) and Schipper (1981) argue that the theory of agency and monitoring is
not sufficiently developed to accommodate the level of institutional detail in the
variables proposed by Leftwich et al. Ball and Foster (1982, p. 192) agree. It has also
been suggested that the Leftwich et al. study should be replicated, since the data are
over 30 years old. The recommendation is to do so in European countries with more
recent data (Burton, 1981, p. 83).
Theory and institutional setting 75
Several conclusions can be drawn based on prior literature. The emphasis in
disclosure index studies to date has been on annual reports. The reason for using
annual reports instead of interim reports is not usually explicitly stated. It appears that
large firms disclose more information than small ones. The concern of the capital
markets is with high disclosure. Over time, the quality of disclosure seems to have
improved. Risk measures, such as beta, seem not to be undisputedly related to
disclosure. It is also interesting to note that accountants and analysts have somewhat
different views of the importance of various items. This indicates the lack of
communication between different interest groups. It should be borne in mind that the
vast majority of the studies listed in appendix A have somewhat different indices. One
of the studies, Wallace (1988), standardizes indices in prior studies in order to
establish whether there is a consensus in different disclosure studies. 
Wallace (1988) standardizes the disclosure indices used in nine studies. The author
reports 16 disclosure indices. Standardization allows the importance of items in each
separate study to be evaluated together. One outcome of this standardization is that the
items applied in previous studies are all categorized into dominance quartiles. The
dominance of a quartile reveals the preference of different user groups for that item.
It is reported that there are 15 items in the most important dominance quartile, which
has a perception consistency of over 60 percent. There seem to be only a limited
number of items with the highest importance. 
Therefore, the best policy to follow in the construction of a disclosure index would
seem to be to make the number of items as small as possible without sacrificing
important items. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has
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mentioned this in one of its recommendations (Recommendation No. 7 in AICPA,
1994, p. 124): “Standard setters should search for and eliminate less relevant
disclosures.” 
During the 1990s, more user-defined disclosure indices have been applied. These
studies attempt to determine what disclosures are effective in business
communication. Recently, the focus has moved toward an integral type of disclosure
strategy (Lev, 1992). Ratings published by the Association for Investment
Management and Research (AIMR) have been applied in several recent studies (see
appendix A). Although these indices are probably more user-oriented than those
developed in prior studies, there are also some deficiencies. One is that the AIMR
indices are not necessarily based directly on original reports. Lang and Lundholm
recognize this deficiency (1993, p. 269): 
As mentioned previously, however, use of these disclosure scores [published
by the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF), AIMR comprises the Institute
of Chartered Financial Analysts (ICFA) and FAF] is not without its dangers;
particularly because the data are based on analysts’ ratings rather than the
disclosures themselves. To the extent that analysts’ ratings are biased and the
bias varies cross-sectionally with the independent variables of interest, care
should be exercised in interpreting the results. 
In addition, those opinions that constitute the ranking of intertemporal studies
probably change over time. This would also cause some biases/inconsistencies over
time. In this study, the measures of disclosure are established from the original interim
reports to minimize the influence of any perceptive bias.
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4.  Institutional regime influencing interim reporting
Financial accounting research is commonly carried out in a setting with a given
institutional structure. Thus there is a need to describe the relevant parts of the
institutional structure that relate to this particular study. The importance of the
institutional regime is pointed out in Ball and Foster (1982, p. 165): 
In particular, the researcher must attempt to match the constructs of the
discipline with institutionalized data and must be prepared to live with the
anomalies arising from the imperfect match. Viewed against research in the
basic disciplines, accounting research tends to emphasize the mapping of
theory into institutional data.
The above citation indicates the importance of recognizing the institutional setting.
Providing a description of the relevant characteristics of a particular institutional
regime has at least two major advantages. First, it puts the reader in a better position
to evaluate the research design and the findings. Second, the reader is provided with
a basis for evaluation of the impact of different institutional settings, as also pointed
out in Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski (1993, p. 213). Interim reporting is one
of many means of communication open to a firm. Interim reporting is a very common
phenomenon and is used in many countries. Because of this, it is possible to increase
understanding of interim reports by studying the sensitivity of the results so far
obtained to different regulations in different countries at different times. The outcome
of this investigation should be advances in the development of theory, especially in
terms of: (1) better separation of institutional domains and (2) theoretically mature
explanations of the differences. Through this, there should be a growing awareness of
how to better assist the regulators, producers, and users of  financial accounting data.
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Section 4.1 briefly introduces some international differences in the accounting
associated with interim reporting. Due to the multitude of differences in technical
aspects, the review is restricted to an overview. A greater detailed presentation,
focusing on European accounting, can be found in Blake and Amat (1993). This
review is designed to give a sense of the range of differences in accounting regulations
between countries. 
Section 4.2 is devoted to a review of interim reporting regulation and legislation in
three countries. The countries selected are Finland, the U.S.A., and Sweden. The U.S.
is selected as the benchmark, due to the existence of a large amount of relevant
literature based on U.S. data. Finland is included because the data of this study are
Finnish.
There are several reasons besides geographical proximity for selecting Sweden as the
comparable Nordic country. One reason is the close economic relations between
Finland and Sweden. Based on total imports and exports in 1994, Sweden was
Finland’s second largest trading partner (Statistics Finland, 1995b, p. 220). Second,
there is a research tradition in finance and financial accounting whereby Finnish and
Swedish data are compared (Martikainen, Yli-Olli, & Gunasekaran, 1991, pp. 274-
275). Third, at a more practical level, foreign analysts usually monitor the Nordic
countries as a single entity (Jääskeläinen & Roine, 1992, p. 52). Therefore it is
important that the information on which their analyses are based is as comparable as
possible. Furthermore, historically there is a tradition of collaboration, especially
between Finland and Sweden, but also between the Nordic countries in general, in the
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area of regulation and legislation. More background information on the regulation of
financial reporting in the Nordic countries can be found in Flower (1994).
4.1.  International overview of interim reporting practices
Gray, Campbell, and Shaw (1984) survey the interim reporting practices of 30
countries. The study includes Finland and the U.S.A., but not Sweden. The survey is
based on relevant current statutes as of 1 January 1982. Interim reports are required or
recommended in 21 of the 30 countries. Semiannual reports are required in ten
countries. Quarterly reports are required in nine countries. This latter group includes
the U.S. 
An analysis of 200 annual reports of the world’s largest companies can be found in
Tonkin (1989). It includes 25 U.S. firms, six firms from Sweden, and a firm from
Finland. Bavishi (1989) contains information about 24 countries. One part of that
study contains general trends in the form and content of interim reporting. Bavishi
(1989) reports that in Canada, West Germany, and the U.S., interim reports are almost
exclusively on a quarterly basis and in Finland, Norway, and Sweden a four-month
reporting period is common. Recent work by Hussey and Woolfe (1994) reports that
the majority (66%) of countries (total number of countries in their sample is 35,
including Finland, Sweden, and the U.S.) have a reporting requirement of half-yearly
or more frequent (op. cit., p. 49).
Alford et al. (1993) study the reporting practices of 18 countries (including the U.S.
and Sweden, but not Finland). The authors report that annual accounting earnings in
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Singapore, and Sweden reflect less-timely or less value-
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relevant information than in U.S. accounting earnings. Alford et al. (1993) point out
that it is important to relate these differences in accounting data to variations in
financial reporting requirements and disclosure practices. Choi (1991) reports that the
Toronto, Frankfurt, Tokyo, London, and New York stock exchanges all require
interim reports. However, only the Toronto and New York stock exchanges require
quarterly reports. The other three require semiannual reporting. 
There are differences in accounting regulations between countries. In addition, there
seems to be pressure for international accounting harmonization and disclosure.
Radebaugh and Gray (1993, pp. 141-180) provide an extended discussion of the role
of governments, trade unions and employees, investors, bankers and lenders, the
general public, and accountants and auditors in the harmonization of disclosure
practices. 
According to Gray, Campbell, and Shaw (1984), interim reports more often contain
income statements than balance sheets (op. cit., p. 516). At the time of their study,
audited interim statements were required in only five of the 30 countries surveyed:
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Japan, and Thailand. An interim fund flow statement was
required in three countries: Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. It appears that there are almost
no requirements at all regarding the forecasting of information in interim reports. No
reason for this phenomenon is discussed. One potential explanation that the author
offers is the seasonality associated with inflows and outflows and the difficulty of
adequate forecasting  resulting from this kind of uncertainty.
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One of the central aims of interim reporting is to provide the user with timely
information. The timing of the publication of information is, therefore, an important
factor associated with interim reporting. About half of the countries in the Gray,
Campbell, and Shaw (1984) study have requirements stating limits within which an
interim report must be published. The variations in the allowable lags are, however,
very large: from one to five months. The reporting lags of Finnish interim reports may
be seen in appendix E.
The general differences between countries vis-à-vis interim reporting requirements set
the stage for the next section, 4.2. This section focuses solely on the interim reporting
practices in the U.S.A., Sweden, and Finland.  
4.2.  A chronology of the recent regulation of interim reporting in the U.S.A., 
        Sweden, and Finland
This section briefly reviews the regulatory development of interim reporting in each
of the three countries. The emphasis is on a general review of the development over
time, rather than the description of many technical aspects. The purpose is to give the
reader a view of interim reporting differences and similarities in the three countries.
Country-specific presentations are followed by a comparison section. Each country’s
regulation history is briefly presented in chronological order.
4.2.1.  Developments in the U.S.A.
Of the three countries presented here, the longest tradition of interim reporting is in
the U.S.A. The development of interim reporting occurred in several phases. A
detailed and very enlightened description of the development of U.S. interim reporting
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can be found in Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981). A comparison of interim
reporting between the U.S.A., Canada, and New Zealand can be found in a research
report by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (1991, pp. 147-158). A
comparison of interim reporting between the U.S.A. and the U.K. is given in Hussey
and Woolfe (1994). A broader comparison of accounting disclosure practices with
some empirical evidence comparing the U.S. and the U.K. can be found in Frost and
Pownall (1994).         
The Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 28 on “Interim Financial
Reporting” forms the basis of current interim reporting practice in the U.S. Its
publication date is May 1973. Its effective date is for interim periods related to fiscal
years beginning after December 31, 1973 (Financial Accounting Standards Board,
1994, p. 303). In other words, APB Opinion No. 28 has been in force over 20 years.
Articles written at the time of the publication of Opinion No. 28, such as Bows and
Wyatt (1973) and Miller (1973), indicate the prevailing need for the Opinion. Miller
(1973, p. 755) states the following:
The Opinion is responsive to the recent emphasis on the need for more
accurate and informative interim financial reports. This emphasis may be
attributable (1) to reactions of financial analysts and others who questioned
the credibility of published interim financial information which all too often
has been subject to year-end “adjustments,” and (2) to CPAs who have
sought guidance because of their increased involvement with interim
statements and to the interim reporting requirements which the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated recently.        
The minimum disclosure of interim financial information for public firms is as follows
(Mottola, 1991, p. 9:12): 
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1. Sales or gross revenue, provision for income taxes, extraordinary items (including
related income tax effects), cumulative effect of a change in accounting principles
or practices, and net income.  
2. Primary and fully diluted earnings per share for each period presented, determined
in accordance with the provisions of APB Opinion No. 15 “Earnings per Share.”
3. Seasonal revenue, costs, or expenses.
4. Significant changes in estimates or provisions for income taxes.
5. Disposal of a segment of a business and extraordinary, unusual, or infrequently
occurring items (with explanation).
6. Contingent items.
7. Changes in accounting principles or estimates.
8. Significant changes in financial position (i.e. liquid assets, net working capital,
long-term liabilities, or stockholders’ equity).
The above data should be presented for the current quarter and current year to date or
for the last 12 months to date, together with comparable data for the preceding year.
In addition, if there is no separate fourth quarter report, the APB requires a note in the
annual financial statements containing the data specified above or at a minimum: (1)
disposal of segments of a business; (2) extraordinary, unusual, or infrequently
occurring items; and (3) the aggregate effect of year-end adjustments that are material
to the results of the quarter (op. cit., p. 9:12).
Besides APB Opinion No. 28, there are two other sources of interim reporting
guidelines: (1) the disclosure requirements of stock exchanges and (2) the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements for interim reporting. The
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requirements of stock exchanges are considered to be generally less extensive than
those set forth in APB Opinion  No. 28. Therefore, this study does not include specific
coverage of the requirements of stock exchanges. It is mentioned here only that the
NYSE and AMEX require quarterly reviews, with some exceptions in cases where it
would be impractical or there might be a danger of misleading the public. As regards
reporting lags, the NYSE requires information to be reported as soon as it is available
(op. cit., p. 9:13). The AMEX requires information within 45 days. 
The requirements of the SEC for interim reports represent the third major influence
over the formation of interim reports in the U.S. The SEC requires public firms to file
their quarterly information on Form 10-Q. This information includes:
1. A condensed balance sheet at the end of the quarter.
2. Condensed statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows for the quarter
and the year to date.
3. An exhibit setting forth the earnings per share computation in reasonable detail.
4. Notes describing in detail any material events (e.g. lawsuit settlements) or other
changes deemed to be materially important to shareholders.
These quarterly reports need not be reviewed by external auditors. However, Ettredge,
Simon, Smith, and Stone (1994) find that firms with high agency costs tend,
voluntarily,  to purchase a review by an external auditor. 
The use of auditors is also related to the usefulness of the interim reports. McEwen
and Schwartz (1992) find that firms do not always disclose all the information
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required by APB  Opinion No. 28. They suggest stricter enforcement: one way being
a compulsory external audit. Deitrick and Alderman (1979) suggest the same thing.
The view taken by the SEC is that interim results are an integral part of the annual
period. Therefore, in cases where unusual or significant events occur within a quarter,
Form 8-K should be used as an addendum. Events that qualify for such treatment
include elements like: (1) changes in control, (2) major acquisitions, and (3) changes
in the firm’s external auditor. 
4.2.2.  Developments in Sweden
In Sweden interim reports are regulated by the Companies Act of 1975, §§12-14
[Aktiebolagslagen 1975, §§12 -14]. Cooke (1989a, p. 126) summarizes the regulation
and legislation of interim reports in Sweden as follows: 
As well as a difference with respect to funds statements’ all larger companies
[according to shareholders equity, number of employees, net assets, branch
of a foreign enterprise, or listed shares or bonds (Cooke, 1989a, p. 79)] are
required to file, with the registratory authority, an interim report covering not
less than half, but not more than two-thirds’ of their financial year. Again
there is no obligation for the company to distribute copies of the interim
report to shareholders although copies must be made “available at the office
of the company for anyone and it shall be sent at once to a shareholder who
requests it.” There is no requirement for an interim report to be audited. An
interim report must contain a brief description of the company’s activities,
financial results, investments, and changes in working capital and financing
during the period. In addition, the amount of turnover and the profit or loss,
before changes in untaxed reserves and tax, must be disclosed. Information
contained in the interim report must be provided for the period under review
and for the same interim period during the preceding financial year.    
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The permissible reporting lag is two months. In addition, the interim report
information should as far as possible be comparable with the concepts and terms in
the previous annual report. Importantly, firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange
(SSE) A list must sign a registration agreement which obligates them to publish
interim reports on at least a six-month basis. 
As in the U.S.A., Swedish financial analysts have also provided some
recommendations covering interim reports (Föreningen Auktoriserade Revisorer,
1995, pp. 971-973). It is interesting to note that the analysts explicitly state that a
firm’s presentation of information should not be affected by the quality of the
information it contains (favorable or unfavorable) and prefer quarterly reporting to
longer reporting intervals. Tertiary reporting is considered a second best. One interim
report only per year is considered less adequate than more frequent interim reporting
(op. cit., p. 971). 
The analysts also propose a format for annual forecasts in interim reports. More
specifically, annual forecasts may be fairly general in the first interim report and
become progressively more precise in ensuing interim reports during the year (op. cit.,
p. 972). In addition, the analysts recommend that when there is a deviation of over 10
percent from the forecast, the firm should immediately announce that fact (op. cit., p.
972). From 1995, the registration agreement also extends to the recommendations
made by the Swedish financial analysts. 
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4.2.3.  Developments in Finland
The four major steps in the development of interim financial statement regulations are:
1. January 1, 1986 (effective date) recommendation concerning interim financial
statements (HSE Cooperative, 1988, p. 18), 
2. December 31, 1987 (effective date) recommendation for a listed firm’s interim
financial statements (HSE Cooperative, 1991, pp. 47-48),
3. January 1, 1990 (effective date) recommendation concerning interim reports (HSE
Cooperative, 1991, pp. 26-27), and
4. January 1, 1994 (effective date of the amendments) the Securities Markets Act of
1989 [Arvopaperimarkkinalaki 1989] including regulations for interim reports
(HSE Cooperative, 1995, p. 19).
The recommendation of December 31, 1987 consists of the minimum items that a
listed firm has to announce. Below is the structure of the recommended income
statement at that time (HSE Cooperative, 1991, p. 48):
 result after financial items
     +/- other income and expenses    
= result before closing entries and taxes.
The recommended information should (op. cit., p. 48): “be given for the period to be
analyzed and comparative information for the corresponding time during the previous
accounting period as well as for the whole previous accounting period.”
The recommendation of January 1, 1990 requires more detailed specification of, for
example, changes in the listed company’s commitments compared to the previous
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recommendation. The statute of January 1, 1990 required firms to make public their
decision concerning the number of interim reports to be published in the coming
financial year. Under the January 1, 1986 recommendation, the latest permissible
publication lag was three months (HSE Cooperative, 1988, p. 18). Under the January
1, 1990 recommendation, the interim report had to be made public one month earlier:
“within two months after the close of the period reviewed.” (HSE Cooperative, 1991,
p. 27). The Securities Markets Act allowed the lag to be one month longer: three
months.    
The latest recommendation of January 1, 1994 bears many resemblances to its
predecessor, the January 1, 1990 recommendation. The major difference is that the
current recommendation is part of the Securities Markets Act and as such its legal
status is considerable (HSE Cooperative, 1995, p. 19). With respect to the interim
report, the company must observe the regulations of §5 of Chapter 2 of the Securities
Markets Act. Interim reports must also comply with the Resolution of the Ministry of
Finance (op. cit., p. 40). The guidelines of the HSE are also valid in parallel. It should
be mentioned that the current legislation and regulation of interim reports in Finland
conform with EU practice. 
According to the Resolution of the Ministry of Finance (effective date July 1, 1995),
a firm’s interim report should contain an explanatory statement and an accounts
statement [see HSE Cooperative (1995, p. 40) for the Resolution of the Ministry of
Finance]. Furthermore, §3 of the Resolution stipulates the content of  accounts
statements in detail, to include numerical disclosures, where appropriate, for (op. cit.,
p. 39): (1) all main income statement components, other income and expense
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components reported without netting; (2) major assets and liabilities together with
appropriations; (3) investments; (4) number of personnel; (5) order backlog and
evaluation of principal risks; and (6) commitments and contingencies, including those
for financial derivatives.
As in the U.S.A. and Sweden, Finnish financial analysts have provided some
recommendations covering interim reports (Association of Finnish Investment
Analysts, 1992). It should be mentioned that, normally, Finnish interim reports are not
audited separately. However, the Securities Markets Act (Chapter 2, §6) stipulates that
annual accounts should include an auditors’ statement on the correctness of the firm’s
interim reports for the same year. For a recent discussion of the role of auditors in
Finnish interim reporting, see Luoma (1994).       
4.2.4.  Comparison between Finland, the U.S.A., and Sweden 
Basically, interim reporting regulation is fairly similar in Finland, the U.S., and
Sweden. In all three countries, interim reporting is required to be comparable to the
concepts and terms applied in the firm’s previous annual report. Therefore, there is a
general requirement that interim reporting should complement annual reporting by
providing the user with up-to-date information, stated in the same financial terms as
the immediately preceding annual financial statement. In normal cases, interim reports
do not have to be audited or reviewed by an external accountant. One common feature
in all three countries is the ad hoc response of firms to additional recommendations
made by unofficial user groups, such as financial analysts. 
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The regulation of interim reporting in the U.S.A. differs somewhat from that in
Finland. One technical difference is that in the U.S.A. SEC filing imposes a particular
format. In Finland and Sweden, special filing formats exist only for the banking and
insurance sectors. This may be a reflection of the fact that different organs are charged
with monitoring firms in the three countries; in the U.S.A. it is primarily the SEC and
in Finland and in Sweden it is mainly the stock exchange.
Another difference is the frequency of reporting. In the U.S.A., quarterly interim
reporting dominates. In Finland and in Sweden, the required reporting frequency is
lower. However, many Finnish firms publish more than one interim report per year.
Recent statistics by the HSE (archival list No. 12-03, date: December 13, 1995) show
that 74% of HSE-listed firms published at least two interim reports in 1995. In
Sweden 80% of SSE-listed (A list) firms published quarterly reports in 1995 (this
figure was kindly obtained from Mr. Hans Edenhammar of the SSE).
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5.  Research hypotheses and outline of the empirical investigation
This chapter derives the research hypotheses based on prior literature, firm attributes,
and the development of the institutional regime. The research hypotheses related to
the determinants and implications of interim reports are stated in sections 5.1 and 5.2
respectively.
5.1.  Hypotheses of the determinants of the information in interim reports  
It is hypothesized that the following nine properties affect the general disclosure in
interim reports: (1) governance structure, (2) business risk, (3) market risk, (4) capital
structure, (5) stock valuation, (6) firm growth, (7) growth potential, (8) firm size, and
(9) yearly dichotomy variables representing the maturity of the market. The reasoning
for the inclusion of these properties is discussed below.
5.1.1.  Governance structure 
Governance refers here to the ownership structure of a firm’s shares. It is argued that
a firm’s ownership composition is reflected in its business communication and might
also influence the structure of the firm’s interim reports. The theory is that a firm’s
monitoring principles might depend upon variables such as the number of seats on the
board and the ownership structure. The relationship of governance and the mode of
communication is complex. For example, a seat on the board might allow faster, more
confidential information transfers between managers and owners than would be
possible, or even prudent, via interim reports, with their wider circulation. Because of
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the existence of alternative communication channels, it is not always unambiguous
how a firm’s governance structure affects disclosure.
Despite its complexity, the ownership structure might be reflected in a perceptible
manner in the interim reporting. Reporting policies might be affected by the
sophistication of the investors. The existence of institutional investors as majority
shareholders might lead to different disclosure policies from those of firms whose
owners are mainly non-institutional. In this study there is an expectation in respect of
the direction of the hypothesis only for the non-institutional ownership group. We
hypothesize that the greater their ownership of a firm the greater is that firm’s level of
disclosure.
Furthermore, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) have shown theoretically that certain levels
of disclosure may attract information processors (institutional investors and other
market experts that may follow a firm closely, e.g. large shareholders, financial
analysts, and managers of competing firms). This, in turn, may increase the
information asymmetry between subsets of traders because certain traders can make
superior judgments about a firm’s performance compared to other traders. This
distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors has also been applied
empirically by others (Hand, 1990; Potter, 1992).  
5.1.2.  Business risk
The second property believed to be related to disclosure is the firm’s business risk.
The interpretation of  this  property is fairly  straightforward. The higher the  firm’s
Theory and institutional setting 93
business risk, the higher the level of disclosure it should have. This statement
presumes that interim reports are used to some extent to monitor a firm’s operations.
5.1.3.  Market risk
The third property, market risk, refers to conventional market risk as measured by
beta. If a firm’s market (undiversifiable) risk is high, its share price is more sensitive
to market movements than shares in general. This sensitivity should induce high-beta
firms to pursue an extended disclosure policy. In order to assist investors in their
evaluation of the firm and its prospects, it is in the interest of managers of high-risk
firms to communicate firm-specific and potentially industry-specific information in
their interim reports. Prior literature also shows that securities where only a small
amount of information is available have a higher systematic risk than shares with a
greater amount of information available (Barry & Brown, 1985, 1986). Beta can be
related to the cost of equity capital. Dhaliwal, Spicer, and Vickrey (1979) find that an
increase in disclosure (segmental disclosure requirement) decreases the cost of equity
capital.
5.1.4.  Capital structure
The fourth property, capital structure, is also believed to affect a firm’s voluntary
disclosure. Debt holders have explicit contracts that the firm must honor. These fixed
obligations have implications for shareholders. Especially when a firm’s debt/equity
ratio is high, its shareholders should monitor the firm’s operations so that the rights of
the shareholders are not overlooked. The sign of the relation between disclosure and
capital structure is somewhat ambiguous. The reason for this is the existence of free
Theory and institutional setting94
cash flows. When there is a large amount of free cash flow, managers might use the
free cash flow in a way which the owners would not want. Debt contracts can be
interpreted as one way to reduce the prospects of such misuse. Organizational
efficiency, therefore, can be enhanced via the judicious use of debt. In this sense, debt
can be seen as being efficient for managers and their organizations (Jensen, 1986, p.
324). If the markets interpret debt contracts as protection against the misuse of free
cash flow, then the owners might not feel as compelled to institute monitoring. 
5.1.5.  Stock valuation
There are solid grounds for arguing that the fifth property, stock valuation, is related
to disclosure. The intuition is that when managers view a firm’s stock as mispriced
they ought to have an incentive to correct the aberration (Healy & Palepu, 1993, 1995;
Healy, Palepu, & Sweeney, 1995). Choi (1973b) derives a conceptual framework
relating disclosure improvement to the cost of capital. It is shown that increased firm
disclosure allows a more precise estimation of a security’s expected return streams
(op. cit., p. 289). When stocks are undervalued: (1) there should be high incentives for
informed market participants to purchase, (2) underpriced firms become potential
targets for takeover, and (3) if a firm’s share price has implications for remuneration,
managers should be interested in eliminating such undervaluation. Undervaluation
also works against current shareholders. First, the value of their property is
underpriced and therefore new owners are able to buy shares cheaper. Second, the
acquisition of new equity capital might be difficult and will be more expensive when
share prices are undervalued. All of these eventualities lead to increased demand for
the shares, thus driving the price up to its true value. Management should seek to
expand disclosure in an effort to speed the process of adjustment.
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High overpricing of existing shares should also induce managers to extend disclosure.
This is especially true when the potential drop in share prices is so significant that
possible legal action against management might ensue (Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper,
1994). All of this argues that either overpricing or underpricing leads to increased
disclosure. The focus of the present study is the effect on disclosure of potential
undervaluation.
5.1.6.  Growth and growth potential
As regards the sixth and seventh properties, growth and growth potential, there is
recent evidence for a relationship between some firm-specific fundamentals and stock
returns (Chan, Hamao, & Lakonishok, 1993; Dennis, Perfect, Snow, & Wiles, 1995;
Fama & French, 1992). Somewhat contrary results are reported by Kothari, Shanken,
and Sloan (1995). Therefore, certain carefully selected fundamentals were investigated
to establish whether they contained information related to corporate growth and
growth potential. The assumption is that managers, who have superior information
compared to outside investors, will inform interested investors of the firm’s growth
potential by extending disclosure. 
5.1.7.  Firm size
The eighth property, size, is included because several papers have unambiguously
documented that large firms have a higher degree of disclosure than small firms (Cerf,
1961; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Giner Inchausti, 1993, April; Lang & Lundholm,
1993). Size is included as an explanatory variable to capture this influence.
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In addition, Freeman (1987) states that differences between large and small firms
affect investors’ information search costs. Operational complexities are said to be a
notable cause of differences in these costs. However, as suggested by Freeman, certain
initiation costs may be mitigated with firm size. This is because large firms normally
have a public or investor relations department anyway that supplies published
accounting information. 
It has also been reported that the degree of a share price revaluation in response to
earnings announcements is inversely related to the firm’s size (Atiase, 1985). This
finding is attributed to differential levels of predisclosure information production and
dissemination by different sizes of firms. It may well be that large firms especially
take this into account already during the predisclosure period. This kind of disclosure
policy helps to bring together the desire of investors for information on a firm and the
firm’s actual communication during the predisclosure period. Firms with a responsive
predisclosure communication policy are likely to be equally investor-friendly in their
interim report disclosures. These are the main reasons why size is included as an
explanatory variable. 
5.1.8.  Market maturity
The ninth property is designed to capture the impact of regulation and other aspects
of the development of the HSE during the research period. One of the indications of
this development is the rapid increase in the stock exchange turnover in HSE-listed
firms, especially in the second half of the 1980s (for more details, see Helsinki Stock
Exchange, 1995, p. 66). By their nature, regulation and other factors reflecting the
development of the HSE can be characterized as qualitative rather than quantitative.
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Changes associated with aspects of the regulatory environment or other advances are
measured by the use of a yearly dichotomy variable.
  
The following is a summary of the nine properties affecting disclosure that are
identified in this study. The hypothesized direction, where applicable, which an
increase in each variable exercises relative to disclosure is stated in parentheses. The
model for the determinants of disclosure is as follows:
disclosure = f [number of shareholders (+), degree of institutional ownership, degree
of non-institutional ownership (+), business risk (+), market risk (+), capital structure,
mispricing (+), firm growth (+), growth potential (+), firm size (+), market maturity
(+)].                      (1) 
 
5.2.  Identification of the independent variables determining the implications of
   interim reports
Besides the determinants of interim reports, the implications of those reports for the
market are studied. Since Ball and Brown (1968), there has been accumulating
evidence that earnings contain useful information to the stock market. However, our
knowledge of the information content of other disclosed information, besides
earnings, is much more limited. This includes the relationship of earnings and other
disclosed information.   
There are some reasons that partly explain the lack of disclosure studies in the stock
market context. First, compared to the relationship between prices and earnings, the
theoretical definition of the relationship between prices and disclosures is somewhat
insufficient. This makes refined statements of hypotheses theoretically very difficult.
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Hypotheses in the area of disclosure are usually based on information asymmetries
between managers and outside interest groups, especially investors, and how these
asymmetries affect the disclosure behavior of management.
Second, the measurement of disclosure is more complicated than that of earnings. This
can be attributed to the multidimensional nature of disclosure relative to the more
unidimensional nature of earnings. To illustrate this, earnings that are favorable for the
firm are usually also good news for its shareholders because they increase the firm’s
ability to pay dividends. With disclosure, however, the value to shareholders is not
always as unequivocal as with earnings. In practice, this can lead to a lack of
adequately specified hypotheses about the direction that a certain disclosure will have
on prices.
The construction of the hypothesis for the implications of disclosure should be seen
in the light of existing returns/earnings literature. The question of whether disclosure
contains any incremental information for the market over that captured via earnings is
studied. This incremental information is believed to exercise an influence over: (1) 
earnings response coefficients, ERCs; (2) cumulative abnormal returns, CARs; and (3)
bid-ask spreads. 
Different firms may have varying disclosure strategies besides the disclosure practice
observed in their interim reports. These possible differences in disclosure strategies
should be taken into account and controlled for. In this study, therefore, ERCs are
computed for both: (1) a set of return periods ending before the event and (2) a set of
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return periods including the event. This isolates any change in ERC values which are
due to the event itself.
The CAR function is structured such that CAR is the dependent variable and both
earnings and disclosure are independent variables estimated around the event. The
CAR study is based on the impact of disclosed information using several return
window specifications around the event.
In this study, estimated returns are both market- and risk-adjusted and are determined
by the market model. Brown and Warner (1980, p. 249) find that complicated methods
used in event studies might even give worse results than simple methods: 
A “bottom line” that emerges from our study is this: beyond a simple, one-
factor market model, there is no evidence that more complicated
methodologies convey any benefit. In fact, we have presented evidence that
more complicated methodologies can actually make the researcher worse off,
both compared to the market model and to even simpler methods, like Mean
Adjusted Returns, which make no explicit risk adjustment.
Brown and Warner (1985) confirm the results of Brown and Warner (1980) using
daily data.
In this context, the reliability of the pricing of the HSE deserves mention (see also
Martikainen, 1990, appendix 10). Berglund and Wahlroos (1985) study the efficiency
of the Finnish market for rights issues. They find no evidence of significant departures
from market efficiency between 1977 and 1981. In a study on the Finnish tax
environment, Kanniainen and Kurikka (1984) report that the tax system affects the
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behavior of the stock market. They find that additional tax burdens have no influence
on stock prices. According to the authors, one potential reason for this is the Finnish
practice of allowing the deduction of the real cost of capital (op. cit., p. 147).
However, Finnish dividends and taxes are calculated on a firm’s annual earnings.
Therefore, managers can more freely report the actual operating result in interim
reports without direct dividend or tax consequences.
Recent evidence also shows that, according to the abnormal performance index (API),
the pricing of the HSE is consistent with results reported for major foreign exchanges.
Over the period (-50, 10) business days relative to the interim report’s announcement
day (0), a statistically significant difference exists between the mean of positive and
the mean of negative API portfolios. The highest difference between a negative and
positive API is obtained using window (-3, 7) in the research period 1986-89
(Schadewitz, 1992). 
Based on previous studies, it has been established that bid-ask spreads reflect
information asymmetry between managers and investors. Lev (1988) suggests that
information asymmetry in the capital markets leads to wide bid-ask spreads. This is
empirically verified by Greenstein and Sami (1994). In this study, it is argued that a
high level of disclosure decreases the bid-ask spread that exists after the event.
Narrow windows are applied in the spread part of the work.    
5.3.  Outline of the empirical investigation
This subsection outlines the major steps that are followed in the empirical
investigation. A detailed description follows in Part two: Empirical evidence. Because
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there is no readily available interim reporting database, one is compiled. The
construction of the database is described in chapter 6. Chapter 6 also reports the
collection of other necessary data, based on: (1) annual financial statements, (2)
governance data, and (3) stock market data.
The major stages in the construction of the interim report database include: (1) a
definition of required interim report information, (2) collection of actual interim
reports, (3) completion of disclosure scoresheets, and (4) input of interim report
information to the appropriate computer software. The guidelines used in this portion
of the study are found in prior literature. Data previously collected by Schadewitz
(1992) cover the  period 1985-90. A pilot study of these data tested the suitability of
the formula for use in the finalized disclosure scoresheet. Finally, the data collection
was extended to cover the period 1985-93.
After finalizing the interim reporting data collection, the disclosure scoresheets were
completed. The interim report-specific disclosure scoresheets were then recorded as
part of the database. Some additional financial statement information, based on
interim reports, was also recorded. 
The following principal classes of data were required for this study: (1) quantitative,
from interim reports; (2) qualitative, from interim reports; (3) quantitative, from
annual reports; and (4) quantitative, from share prices. Since no databases providing
all the data necessary for this research were available, appropriate databases were
constructed. Primary data, consisting of a qualitative analysis of interim reports and
quantitative data extracted from those reports, were first compiled. Existing disclosure
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databases, maintained by both the Helsinki School of Economics and Business
Administration (hereafter the Helsinki School of Economics and Business) and the
University of Oulu, were utilized for cross-checking where possible. The Helsinki
School of Economics and Business also maintains a quantitative database constructed
from annual reports. A final data set was required from the stock market. Those data
were available from the Helsinki School of Economics and Business. Thus, all the
data not based on interim reports were available from secondary sources. Details of:
(1) the process of determination of the primary data entries, (2) the verification of the
secondary data sources, (3) the merger procedures, and (4) the interpretation of the
data are given in the next three chapters.  
Governance data were not available in a database form. Therefore, that information
was collected from other publications. These are mainly Kansallis-Osake-Pankki
annual publications. These data were merged into the expanded, now complete
database. Appropriate checks were performed at every stage to ensure that all the
desired data had been collected once and only once and that only the desired data
were included in the databases.
Part two
Empirical evidence
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6.  Data sources
This part (Part two: Empirical evidence) of the work contains data, methods, and
results related to the determinants and implications of the information disclosed in
interim reports. To make the presentation as fluent and precise as possible, the data
are presented here in chapter 6. The major reason for this is that the methods applied
in the determinants part and in the implications part of the study are different.
Therefore, chapter 7 describes the methods and results for the determinants part of the
study. Chapter 8 contains the methods and results for the implications part of the
study. The benefit of this type of structure is that the reader can find in one chapter the
methods and results of either the determinants part (chapter 7) or the implications part
(chapter 8) of the study. This type of organizational structure also minimizes the
amount of cross-referencing. In addition, the reader can find a description of the data
and their preparation in one chapter (chapter 6).   
6.1.  Accounting data
6.1.1.  Period studied
The measures of disclosure are based directly on original interim reports covering the
period 1985-93. The data comprise practically all the interim reports published by the
firms listed on the HSE during that period. The finance and insurance sectors are
excluded, due to the variability: (1) among reporting firms and (2) within reporting
firms over time.  A similar exclusion practice is followed by Niskanen (1990, p. 48).
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Although some Finnish firms published interim reports before 1985, calendar year
1985 is selected as the starting year for this research. There are two major reasons for
this. One reason is that systematic filing of interim reports by the HSE began in 1985.
This starting point provides a base from which to compare the impact of interim
reporting regulations, which commenced in January of 1986. These initial regulations
were the subject of public comment as early as 1985. Kauppalehti (July 24, 1985, p.
3) contains an article entitled: “Käytäntö selkiytyy: tulostiedot myös osavuosikatsauk-
sessa” [Disclosure practice to be clarified: earnings information to be disclosed also
in interim reports]. Professional journals in Finland also contained articles dealing
with the information requirements of interim reports (Koskelainen, 1986).  
The second reason for selecting 1985 as the starting year is pragmatic. Empirical
experience related to data collection indicates that the longer the time since the
announcement of the interim report, the harder it is to obtain the original report. The
interim reports required for this research are practically no longer available for years
earlier than 1985. The primary aim of this research is to construct a database from
original interim reports. In a few cases it was even impossible to obtain interim reports
for the current research period of 1985-93. 
Disclosure databases constructed by the Helsinki School of Economics and Business
and the University of Oulu record the history of interim reporting within the HSE.
These databases provide some information on the period prior to regulation, though
not in the detail required by this research. The Helsinki School of Economics and
Business databases were generated from information provided by Helsingin Sanomat.
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They cover the years 1970-93. The University of Oulu database is a subset based on
Helsingin Sanomat, covering the years 1973-85. 
From 1970 through 1984, about 200 interim reports were published by listed firms,
excluding the finance and insurance sectors. Of these, less than 80 were published in
the 1970s. Almost 130 cover the much shorter period 1980 through 1984. It is clear
that a trend toward greater disclosure frequency preceded the period in which
statutory requirements demanded increased disclosure frequency. 
6.1.2.  Sample firms
A protocol was used to ensure that all listed firms, excluding the finance and
insurance sectors, were included in the study. Accordingly, a follow-up document was
prepared for each year, containing the name of all firms listed on the HSE at the
beginning of the year. This document also contained changes in the listing status of
those firms plus any additions to the list during that year. 
All the available interim reports were then entered on a list appending the protocol. If
no interim report was available for a firm on the list, the missing report was requested
from that firm. These inquiries were recorded and are described in appendix B (item
No. 8), which contains the primary accounting data sources. If a particular interim
report was not received even after an intensive search, it was excluded from the study.
In the end, only 14 interim reports remained unavailable. Because those reports were
published by 11  firms, this deficit should cause practically no bias in the results.
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The data primarily collected and used from the interim financial statements are group
data. If group-level information was not available, then parent company or divisional
information was used. This order of priority was followed so as to have information
relating to the firm as a whole. In a few cases, only parent company information was
reported. Usually, the reason indicated by the firm for that kind of policy was the
minor significance of the daughter firms to the business unit as a whole. The
importance of group-level information is also recognized in the HSE’s regulation. In
the January 1, 1990 (effective date) rules and regulations it is explicitly mentioned
that, if a firm is obliged to publish group-level annual accounts, it should also prepare
and publish corresponding interim report information (HSE Cooperative, 1991, p. 24).
Because reports containing parent firm information only were very rare, they are
unlikely to cause any bias in the results. 
The vast majority of the sample firms applied Finnish accounting (FA) standards in
their interim financial statement preparation. Some firms simultaneously reported
numbers according to both FA and international accounting (IA) standards. In those
cases, the FA numbers were used in this research. A few Finnish firms report IA
numbers only in their financial statements (less than 7% of the interim reports
evaluated). In those cases, the numbers were adjusted, as far as possible, to match FA
numbers. In practice, the minority interests component was reallocated to resemble
more the FA allocation. The IA component share of profits in associated companies
was not reallocated due to the insufficient information available in the interim reports.
An inquiry covering years 1985-90 was undertaken amongst the sample firms to
obtain more information about some of the accounting principles and practices applied
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in interim financial statements. The themes of that inquiry were: (1) depreciation
policy, (2) appropriations, (3) consolidation practice, and (4) currency translations.
The inquiry revealed that one clear difference between interim and annual financial
statements was in the treatment of appropriations. No appropriations were made in
interim financial statements. A more detailed interpretation of the inquiry is reported
by Schadewitz (1992,  pp. 102-103). Finally, it should be mentioned that all the
databases compiled by the author have been archived. These data files make it
possible: (1) to verify the final data applied in the further stages of this research and
(2) to confirm that the statistical programs use the data appropriately.    
6.1.3.  Defining event date
Precise definition of the event date is critical to this study. Fig. 1 below illustrates an
actual example of how misspecification of the event day may give biased results. The
news media involved are intentionally withheld. Permission to refer to an
announcement by an HSE-listed firm, the Rautaruukki Group, was kindly given by
Vice President of Corporate Communication, Mr. Esko Lukkari. The actual events and
media commentary were as follows. One, Rautaruukki published its eight-month
interim report on 18.10.1991, a Friday. Earnings were sharply down. Two, newspaper
A commented on the announcement the next day, 19.10.1991, a Saturday. Three,
newspaper B commented on the announcement the following Monday, 21.10.1991. 
To illustrate how the date decided upon as the event date may introduce bias into the
result, observe that in this case there are but three logical event dates: (1) the date of
the announcement by the firm, (2) the response by newspaper A, and (3) the response
by newspaper B. Only one of these, (1), represents an unbiased measure of the result.
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Fig. 1 below shows that the market reacts very strongly to the significant earnings
decrease which the firm discloses in its report and this stresses the importance of
precision in defining event dates. The earnings decline, or its magnitude, must have
been unexpected, because the event causes a highly negative abnormal return. The
correct event day (0) is the date of the announcement (18.10.1991) by the firm and is
therefore used in this study. This example also demonstrates the need to seriously
consider how to define the actual event day when the only source of dates is a
newspaper or other nonfirm medium.The adjustment process used in this particular 
study is described below.
The final event day was controlled by applying multiple, independent data sources. In
normal cases, the following procedure was used. Some interim reports, or their cover
letters, state the date on which the firm officially announced the report. In those cases,
the official  announcement day was used as the event day. Failing that, the primary
source of event dates was the date on which the interim financial statements were
registered as received at the HSE. The HSE has some interim reporting material on
file for 1985. However, this information is so limited that Kauppalehti newspapers
were systematically used to supplement the files. The HSE began systematic
collection of interim reports in 1986. 
To attain maximum credibility for the event dates selected, especially for 1985, event
day information was compared with several data sources. The data sources for 1985
were: (1) the official archives of the HSE; (2) the disclosure database of the Helsinki
School of Economics and Business, based on Helsingin Sanomat; (3) Kauppalehti;
and  (4)  the  disclosure  database  of  the University  of  Oulu,  based on  Helsingin
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Figure 1.   Abnormal return behavior around the event. The abnormal return is the
deviation between a firm’s share return and the return of a value-weighted market
index. The event is the publication of an eight-month (January - August, 1991) interim
report by an HSE-listed firm, the Rautaruukki Group. 
Sanomat. Comparison between event days was possible because all the event days
originating from these data sources were collated into a merged database. Systematic
comparison of the event days indicated that, in many cases, the newspapers had a one-
day reporting lag relative to the actual announcement. Therefore, when the source of
the event day was a newspaper, the previous business day was used as the event day.
In addition, when there was uncertainty about the exact event day, the interim report
was consulted to find any indirect indication of the event date. If event-day
information was available from several sources, the earliest date was applied. Abdel-
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khalik (1984) discusses evidence related to the use of the Wall Street Journal as a
valid source of event dates.
Where the disclosure database in the Helsinki School of Economics and Business
indicated that the validity of an event date might be in doubt, it was checked from the
original news item in Helsingin Sanomat. All of these individual tests were
transcribed and filed. If an incorrect event day was identified, it was not used in this
study.
For the period 1986-87, the data sources for event dates were almost the same as those
for 1985. However, the disclosure database of the University of Oulu only covers the
period 1973-85, so it could not be used for the entire research period. For 1986 and
1987, Kauppalehti is available on microfilm. Because there was already one
comparison between the primary source of event dates (HSE archives) and the
disclosure database of the Helsinki School of Economics and Business, it was decided
to go through the stock market pages in each copy of Kauppalehti for 1986-87,
exclusively. 
For reports from 1988 onwards, the event days in the different data sources were
cross-checked in a similar manner to the previous year. However, two technical
advances made the search easier. First, primary event dates were available from the
HSE through their archival program (see appendix B for archival printouts used). In
addition, Kauppalehti search data for 1988 onwards are available on a computer
program. In a few cases, an interim report is available, but the event day is unknown.
In those situations, the Kauppalehti search was repeated around the likely event time.
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If that search did not reveal the event date, then the missing event date was requested
from the HSE or from the firm itself. 
The final outcome of this lengthy procedure was that 92.6 percent of the available
event dates are based on information from the HSE or from the firms themselves. A
further  4.2 percent were obtained from Helsingin Sanomat. The remaining 3.2 percent
of the final event dates were taken from Kauppalehti. Reporting lags, defined as the
number of business days from the end of the interim reporting period to the event, are
given in appendix E.
It should also be mentioned that some basic statistics give independent support to the
conclusion that the vast majority of the event days applied are very precise. For
example, the standard deviation of returns during the period (-30, 1) business days is
highest at event day zero. A high level of standard deviation of returns remains for
several days after the event.    
6.1.4.  Disclosure variables
In section 5.1 above, disclosure is stated to be related to: (1) governance structure, (2)
business risk, (3) market risk, (4) capital structure, (5) stock valuation, (6) firm
growth, (7) growth potential, (8) firm size, and (9) the maturity of the market. The
empirical counterparts of these theoretical firm attributes are presented below.
6.1.4.1.  Governance structure
Corporate governance was approximated by the number of owners and the
composition of ownership as between different types of owners (see also Pohjola,
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1988, for a study on the concentration of shareholder voting power in Finnish
industrial companies). Number of shareholders, LHOLNU, during the event year
indicates how many shareholders a firm has. A natural logarithm format was applied
in an attempt to avoid the possibility of extreme values contaminating the results.
Besides the number of shareholders, the composition of the shareholders was studied
in order to establish whether this had any impact on the disclosure. The degree of
ownership by institutions was divided into four groups and measured as the
percentage of ownership by these groups: (1) foundations and associations, ASSOC;
(2) firms, FIRMS; (3) banks, BANKS; and (4) insurance companies, INSUR. There
may be alternative communication channels, such as a seat on the board. Because of
this, it is not unequivocal how these four ownership groups affect disclosure. The
degree of non-institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of ownership by
individuals, INDIV. Individual owners do not usually have alternative information
sources from a firm. Therefore it is hypothesized that firms with a large proportion of
individual owners practice a high degree of disclosure. Besides these five variables for
the ownership groups, there is a further group for “other” owners.
The Kansallis-Osake-Pankki annual publication entitled: Listed companies in Finland
(Kansallis-Osake-Pankki, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992,
1993) was a primary source of these figures. 
6.1.4.2.  Business risk
A firm’s risk in relation to its operations was mainly approximated by variables
derived from income statement components disclosed in interim reports. Variations in
the values of income statement components were applied as a business risk measure.
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The variance measurement used is standard deviation (Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper,
1995, June). Six measures are used. Due to the lack of sufficiently long accounting
data series, a single standard deviation value was estimated for each firm for the
whole research period. 
The first measure is standard deviation of the percentage change in net sales:
SCGNETS. It is assumed that higher values of SCGNETS demonstrate higher
business risk, indicating that the more a firm’s net sales vary, the higher is its business
risk. The second measure is the standard deviation of the profit/net sales ratio:
SPROFNTP. The ratio of profit to net sales indicates the firm’s earnings after the
costs of its normal operations (i.e. without extraordinary items). The more the values
of this variable vary, the higher the business risk was considered to be. The third and
fourth measures of business risk are ratios containing comparisons of the current and
previous year’s figures. It was assumed that the greater the variation in changes in
those ratios, the higher business risk is also. The third ratio is standard deviation of
the percentage change in profit after financial items: SCGPROFI. This indicates the
degree of variation in a firm’s intertemporal  earnings generation. The fourth variable
is standard deviation of the percentage change in profit after financial items/net sales
ratio: SCGNETPR. This denotes a firm’s earnings generation over the years. Possible
changes in the level of net sales are eliminated by deflating profit with net sales.
These four business risk variables are all derived from interim reports.
The fifth business risk variable is traced from the annual income statement. It is
standard deviation of the percentage change in annual net sales: SANNETSP. This
variable is included in an effort to identify any distortion caused by seasonality in
Rit  iiRmt it,
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   (2) 
earnings or cost figures. The primary source of annual net sales numbers was the TA-
Yritysmalli financial database, containing annual financial statement information and
ratios for major Finnish firms (TA-Yritysmalli, 1993, p. 7-1):
100 * [net sales - net sales (previous year)] / net sales (previous year).
A sixth measure of business risk is the variation in net investments. Intuition argues
that large variations in net investments signal the potential of increased business risk
(e.g. in terms of investing in new business areas). Variation in investment activity was
measured by the standard deviation of the net investments/total assets ratio:
SNIQKPOP. The values for this ratio originated from the annual financial statement
database at the Helsinki School of Economics and Business. 
6.1.4.3.  Market risk
The third theoretical property affecting a firm’s disclosure is argued to be market risk.
In this study, market risk is approximated by beta: ANNBETA. This measure is based
on the market model presented below (Fama, 1976, p. 69):
where
R = return on stock i at time t,it
R = return on a market portfolio m at time t,mt
  = intercept for stock i, i
 = slope coefficient (market beta) for stock i, andi
  = n.i.d. errors for stock i at time t.it
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The market index employed is value-weighted. Daily stock returns were applied in the
estimation of betas. Where a firm had several share series listed on the HSE, the most
frequently traded was selected for the computations. The estimation period was 250
trading days before the event ending 30 business days prior to the event. If there were
other interim report announcements for that firm in the estimation period, those
announcements were excluded from the beta estimation period. The excluded period
was always (-30, 30) business days relative to the event in question. An estimation
period of 250 trading days was used because a longer estimation period would have
led to the inclusion of more data based on post-event observations (described in more
detail later in the text). The estimation periods were modeled on those reported in
Mendenhall and Nichols (1988, p. 72). 
Because there is no absolute theoretical basis for selecting an appropriate length for
the excluded period, the decision to use 61 business days was based on previous
research findings. This is because prior results,  based on Finnish interim reports,
indicate no clearly discernible difference in abnormal return behavior between
positive and negative earnings portfolios prior to 30 business days before the event
(Schadewitz, 1992, p. 61). 
The same study also shows that it would pay to lengthen the window to cover more
days after the event than ten business days. This conclusion is based on the
observation that, after the event, abnormal performance indices for positive and
negative earnings portfolios are still fairly far from each other. It is possible, therefore,
that  not  all  the information  revealed  in the  announcement of an interim  report is
Empirical evidence118
discounted in prices within a period of ten days. These findings, based on visual
observations, are validated by statistical analyses (op. cit., p. 66). 
It should be also mentioned that windows exceeding 61 business days would have led
to overlaps in successive firm-specific windows. Therefore, the length of the window
was close to its maximum  already in Schadewitz (1992).  Moreover, compared to a
(-50, 10) window, a somewhat different window definition relative to the event
provides additional insight into return behavior. Therefore, the window around the
event was repositioned to cover fewer business days before the event and more
business days after  the event compared  to the above study.  For these reasons the
final window is (-30, 30) business days around the event. It is logical, therefore, that
since (-30, 30) day periods were excluded in the estimation of beta, these same
periods were studied in the implications part, investigating the implications of interim
reports for the stock markets (section 8.5.2.2 below). 
If there was not enough data before the event for a 250 trading day window, the
window was extended to cover the requisite number of days in the post-event period.
Symmetrically, the pre-event period computations, in cases where the window had to
be extended beyond the event, start is 30 business days after the event. This secondary
type of procedure was adopted in 13.6 percent of cases. In 29 of the cases (5.1 percent
of the total number of computed ANNBETA values), the length of the post-event
period exceeds 150 trading days. Due to the relatively small number of cases where
the period had to be extended beyond the event, this procedure should not have any
major impact on the results. Where more than one share series was traded, the more
actively traded share series was applied. This series is very often also the main share
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series of the company. It normally has the longest trading history in the firm. Daily
stock market data were adjusted for stock dividends and stock splits and are available
at the Helsinki School of Economics and Business.
6.1.4.4.  Capital structure
The fourth theoretical property associated with disclosure is the firm’s capital
structure. Two measures were applied to indicate the firm’s capital structure: (1) the
debt/equity ratio, ANNDEBTS; and (2) the ratio of change in equity/equity before the
change, ISSRATIO. When a firm’s debt/equity ratio is high, its shareholders need to
monitor the firm’s decisions so that the rights of shareholders are not overlooked.
This increased need to monitor a firm should result in expanded disclosure unless the
debtholders do not monitor the situation carefully. In respect of the ISSRATIO
variable, there may be a need for additional disclosure close to equity issues. On the
other hand, if a share issue falls at a time of low information asymmetry between
management and investors it may not result in expanded disclosure. Therefore theory
does not provide unambiguous guidance as to how the ANNDEBTS and ISSRATIO
variables influence disclosure. The debt/equity ratio is given in the TA financial
statement database (TA-Yritysmalli, 1993, p. 7-5): 
(debt - advances received + unfunded portion of the pension liability) /
(appropriations + reserves + equity).
The input for ISSRATIO was also based on the TA-Yritysmalli. However, for this
variable one adjustment was made to the published data. Where an increase in equity
exceeded the previous amount of equity, the equity increase was divided by the total
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equity including the increase. In other words, the increase in equity was not deducted
from the denominator. In normal cases this adjustment was not necessary. This
procedure eliminated negative values which might otherwise have resulted and was
applied in eight cases. 
These eight entries were scrutinized in more detail. This investigation revealed that in
these particular cases a portion of the new equity issue was entered in firms’ restricted
equity under items other than capital stock. Because capital stock was the item
employed in the computation of ISSRATIO it is possible that the variable, after
subtraction of increases in equity, acquired a negative value. The principles that were
followed in the entries for restricted equity were inquired from the compilers of the
database in question, who informed that the entries followed the principles in the
individual firms’ audited annual financial statements. It is important to note that the
observations for which the above adjustment was made were not included in the final
regressions because of a lack of data for some other necessary variables. Therefore, 
the adjustment had no influence on the results. Negative changes in equity (18 times)
were allowed if they were reported as such in the original database.
6.1.4.5.  Stock valuation
Stock value is one of the major concerns of a firm’s managers. Therefore it is likely
that a firm’s managers are willing to inform the capital markets of events that will
favorably affect the firm’s value. This desire should be especially strong where a
firm’s shares are perceived by management to be undervalued. This potential
undervaluation will be tested here.
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To study whether stock valuation affects management disclosure practice, pre- and
post-event share price performance was included in the determinants model. This
approach is in line with Healy and Palepu (1995) and literature cited there. The use of,
say, the price/earnings (P/E) ratio would have been distorted by the earnings, whereas
the purely stock market-based measure of valuation applied in this study is not. Pre-
event share price performance was measured by cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
covering a 125 business day window (-140, -15) before the event. This variable is
called PREBCAR. In the  computation of CAR, expected returns are based on the
market model.
A symmetrical post-event CAR was measured for a 125 business day period (15, 140)
after the event. This variable is referred to as POSBCAR. Where a firm had several
share series listed, the most frequently traded series was selected for the computations.
A 250 trading day period, ending 140 business days before the event, was applied in
order to estimate the market model parameters for the PREBCAR computation. Here,
too, a (-30, 30) business day window was used for elimination of the event in the
estimation period. The parameters for POSBCAR were computed employing days
before the event and containing a total of 250 trading days. This estimation period
ended 30 business days before the event and proceeded backward for 250 trading
days. If there were not 250 trading days before the event, trading days were added
after the event, starting from business day 30, as discussed in section 6.1.4.3.
The business day period (-14, 14) was excluded from the computations of PREBCAR
and POSBCAR in order to avoid the influence of the publication of the interim report
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in question. It should be mentioned that the excluded period here is different from the
excluded business day period (-30, 30) used in conjunction with ANNBETA. This
was in order to capture as much as possible of the implications related to the
publication of the interim report, whilst at the same time avoiding any overlaps in
successive firm-specific windows.
In the case of the variable PREBCAR (POSBCAR), the end (beginning) of the
window is somewhat closer the event than that applied with ANNBETA. This closer
event window was used because previous work indicates that no significant
relationship exists between CAR and earnings until one week before the event (Kanto
& Schadewitz, 1995). Therefore, it is possible to apply windows that end/begin at day
-15/15 respectively. This definition excludes two more business weeks in order to
eliminate the potential impact of the event not captured by the above study.
6.1.4.6.  Firm growth
The sixth theoretical property is related to a firm’s growth. The variable is derived
directly from the interim reports. It is computed as percentage change in net sales:
CHGNETS.
Two other growth variables are applied. Both are based on annual financial
statements. Percentage change in annual net sales, ANNNETSP, is applied as one
possible proxy for growth (TA-Yritysmalli, 1993, p. 7-1). In addition, the net
investments/total assets ratio, NIQKPOP, is used to approximate a firm’s investment
activity. This ratio should be appropriate for measuring a firm’s growth in
investments, because it indicates the investment level after elimination of replacement
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investments, i.e. net investments. The values for this ratio are derived from the annual
financial statement database at the Helsinki School of Economics and Business. 
6.1.4.7.  Growth potential
The measure of a firm’s growth potential is the ratio of book equity value/market
equity value: BMRATIO. Recent studies report that the book-to-market ratio is an
important predictor of stock returns (Dennis, Perfect, Snow, & Wiles, 1995; Fama &
French, 1992). However, Fama and French (1992, pp. 449-452) find that the precise
role of the book-to-market ratio in security analysis remains somewhat unclear. Ryan
(1995) seeks to distinguish the variation in book-to-market ratios associated with
future abnormal earnings, differences in expected returns, and market mispricing.
The intuition for applying the BMRATIO variable in this study is as follows. Because
an information asymmetry situation exists, a firm’s managers may notice that the
firm’s shares are underpriced, with respect to their own view of the value of the firm’s
growth prospects. As a result of this potential underpricing, the firm’s book-to-market
ratio will be considered to be relatively too high. Therefore, it is logical for managers
to respond to this undervaluation by informing market participants of the situation.
One way to do this is to use extended disclosure. The data for this variable are based
on the annual financial statement database. The ratio is as follows (see Chan, Hamao,
& Lakonishok, 1993, p. 64):
[shareholders’ equity (book value) + reserves (book value)] /
capital stock (market value).
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Book-to-market values are computed from the balance sheet information at the
beginning of the interim reporting period. The reason for this is that if managers have
an information advantage concerning the firm’s growth potential relative to outsiders,
and if interim reports are employed to decrease this information asymmetry, then the
book-to-market ratio should capture the growth potential. This is especially true when
the ratio is measured at the beginning of the interim reporting period. The market
value database of the Helsinki School of Economics and Business is the primary
source for the required market value of shares in the ratio.
Profitability could also be an indicator of a firm’s growth potential. Therefore, three
profitability indicators are studied: (1) the profit/net sales ratio, PROFNETP; (2)
percentage change in profit after financial items, CHGPROFI; and (3) the percentage
change in the profit after financial items/net sales ratio, CGNETPRO. Percentage
change is defined as the change relative to the previous year’s corresponding interim
reporting period. The PROFNETP variable is designed to capture the overall
profitability over time. The CHGPROFI and CGNETPRO variables are designed to
capture shorter run profitability changes and their potential effects on disclosure.
6.1.4.8.  Firm size
The eighth theoretical property affecting disclosure is firm size. Appendix A lists
numerous previous studies that report size as an important determinant of disclosure.
Besides that, the inclusion of the size variable in the model should control possible
departures from normality in the context of certain financial ratios. Perttunen and
Martikainen (1989) test empirically the proportionality assumption of financial ratios
using Finnish data.
Empirical evidence 125
Firm size is approximated by two variables (TA-Yritysmalli, 1993, p. 7-1): (1) annual
net sales, LANNETRE; and (2) number of personnel, LANPERSO. Changes in money
values are eliminated from the annual net sales figures by deflating with the
appropriate wholesale price index (Statistics Finland, 1995a, p. 12). Distortions
caused by potential extreme values are eliminated by the use of the natural logarithm
format.
6.1.4.9.  Summary of the variables
The variables presented in sections 6.1.4.1 through 6.1.4.8 are summarized below. For
the sake of completeness the market maturity variables are also listed. The expected
sign of the category in the model in eq. (1) or of the variable itself is given in
parentheses.
Governance structure
LHOLNU = natural logarithm of the number of shareholders (+).
Variables representing institutional ownership
ASSOC = percentage of foundation and association ownership,
FIRMS = percentage of corporate ownership,
BANKS = percentage of bank ownership, and
INSUR = percentage of insurance company ownership.
Variable representing non-institutional ownership
INDIV = percentage of ownership by individuals (+).
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Business risk (+)
SCGNETS = standard deviation of the percentage change in net sales,
SPROFNTP = standard deviation of the profit/net sales ratio,
SCGPROFI = standard deviation of the percentage change in profit after financial
   items, 
SCGNETPR = standard deviation of the percentage change in profit after financial
   items/net sales ratio,
SANNETSP = standard deviation of the percentage change in annual net sales, and
SNIQKPOP = standard deviation of the net investments/total assets ratio.
Market risk (+)
ANNBETA = market model beta.
Capital structure
ANNDEBTS = debt/equity ratio, and
ISSRATIO = ratio of change in equity/equity before the change.
Stock valuation (+)
PREBCAR = pre-event cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at business day -15, and
POSBCAR = post-event cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at business day 140.
Firm growth (+)
CHGNETS = percentage change in net sales,
ANNNETSP = percentage change in annual net sales, and
NIQKPOP = net investments/total assets ratio.
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Growth potential (+)
BMRATIO = ratio of book equity value/market equity value,
PROFNETP = profit/net sales ratio,
CHGPROFI = percentage change in profit after financial items, and
CGNETPRO = percentage change in the profit after financial items/net sales ratio.
Firm size (+)
LANNETRE = natural logarithm of annual net sales, and
LANPERSO = natural logarithm of the number of personnel.
Market maturity (+)
D  to D =  yearly dichotomy variables.85 92
The next section will interpret the stock market data and how these will be analyzed
further.
6.2.  Stock market data
The unexpected returns used in the study are market- and risk-adjusted returns (for the
market model, see Fama, 1976, p. 69). Both daily share-specific indices and the value-
weighted market index are used in the computation of market- and risk-adjusted
returns. Returns on individual stocks are measured by logarithmic price differences
adjusted for cash dividends, stock dividends, right issues, and other causes of changes
in the number of outstanding shares. It is also assumed that all proceeds from a given
stock are reinvested in the same stock at zero transaction costs. Market returns are
measured against a value-weighted market index, similar to that presented by
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Berglund, Wahlroos, and Grandell (1983). The latest available data in this particular
database extend to the end of 1990. 
From the beginning of 1991 the Berglund et al. database was merged with stock
market data, where the normal adjustments for cash dividends, stock dividends, right
issues etc. were made at the University of Tampere. The stock index series in the new
database were adjusted with a share-specific scaling factor and then added to the
share-specific indices in the Berglund et al. database. The scaling factor applied was
obtained as follows.
First, an overlapping period of four months (September through December) in 1990
was used to make the indices compatible. It was necessary for the bid and ask
quotations for a security in the Berglund et al. database to be identical with the
respective bid and ask quotations in the database made at the University of Tampere.
After this control had been conducted the scaling factor was computed for the stock-
specific index. The scaling factor was a ratio between the stock-specific indices in the
two databases (in the Tampere database the share-specific index was an arithmetic
average of the bid and ask share indices). The index values for the scaling factor
computations were based on a day when the bid and ask quotations matched as
described above. From the beginning of 1991 the value-weighted market index applied
was obtained from the HSE (HSE Cooperative, 1994). This HSE based market index
was likewise appropriately calibrated and then added to the WI  market index in the
Berglund et al. database. For the database constructed at the University of Tampere
the missing bid (ask) share index values were supplemented with previous available
bid (ask) share index values for the computation of the share-specific indices. This
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procedure is commonly applied in studies of Finnish stock market data (e.g. in
Berglund, Liljeblom, & Löflund, 1989; Martikainen, 1990; for a discussion of
alternative ways of correcting for missing values, see Kmenta, 1986, pp. 379-388).
The market model was estimated starting 250 trading days before the event and ending
31 business days before the event (see also section 6.1.4 above). In cases where there
was a shortage of data before the event for estimation of the market model, the lacking
portion was supplemented with post-event material. Other interim report
announcements by the same firm were eliminated from the estimation period. In such
cases the eliminated period was (-30, 30) business days around the event in question.
Below is a summary of the main data sources utilized:
1.  daily stock return index files,
2.  market value database,
3.  annual reports of the HSE,   
4.  annual reports of the firms, and 
5.  Kauppalehti.
The next chapter presents the results for the determinants of disclosure.  
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7.  Determinants of the information disclosed in interim reports
7.1.  Measures of disclosed information
7.1.1.  Index types
This section first briefly repeats the research hypotheses related to the determinants of
disclosure. As stated in chapter 5, the level of disclosure is related to the firm’s: (1)
governance structure, (2) business risk, (3) market risk, (4) capital structure, (5) stock
valuation, (6) growth, (7) growth potential, (8) size, and (9) market maturity. 
The information in interim reports is approximated by disclosure indices. In this study,
two different types of disclosure indices are applied: (1) a disclosure index containing
all items, both mandatory and voluntary, DIALL; and (2) a disclosure index
containing only those items that are purely voluntary throughout the entire research
period, DIVOLPUR. The data schedule for the disclosure scoresheet used together
with the criteria for interpretation of a particular scoresheet item or interim report are
presented in appendix C.
There are several reasons why this research focuses on the extremes represented by
the DIALL and DIVOLPUR indices. The first reason is the lack of any study reporting
results related to disclosure policy in Finnish interim reports. The only reference,
besides the studies where the author of this work is coauthor, is Laitinen (1994). His
study covers the years 1990 and 1991. 
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In this context it should be mentioned that the present study adds to the author’s
previous coauthored papers (Kanto & Schadewitz, 1995; Schadewitz & Vieru, 1993)
in several ways. The Schadewitz and Vieru (1993) paper focuses solely on the market
risk pattern around announcements of interim reports. The research was conducted on
a small subsample of the present work. Kanto and Schadewitz (1995) employ actual
earnings and actual disclosure rather than the unexpected forms of the earnings and
disclosure variables in the present research. Also, the disclosure index, statistical
methods, and return window periods are different from Kanto and Schadewitz (1995).
More details of these differences are given in section 8.2 below. 
Even research focusing on other aspects of Finnish interim reporting is very limited.
Therefore it is appropriate first to provide new insight into how overall reporting has
developed over the nine-year research period studied here. The DIALL results serve
as a benchmark index for the period 1985-93. 
In contrast to DIALL, DIVOLPUR tracks those items that are purely voluntary
throughout the whole research period. It is very likely that the regulatory development
is reflected in the quality and quantity of the items voluntarily disclosed. Moreover,
each mandating protocol is to some degree not stated as an exact item, but is rather
described as a class of conditions that should elicit a disclosure. These requirements
are easy to overlook or misinterpret. However, when very influential events take place
during the reporting period, it is expected that the firm’s management would want to
report those events. Some of these would be expected to be voluntary disclosures.
Therefore,  although  DIVOLPUR  is  not entirely without influence from the direct
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impact of the regulatory development, this index should be as uninfluenced as
possible by the direct effects of the evolution of mandatory disclosure requirements.
7.1.2.  Index weighting
It would have been possible to weight the indices by means of a questionnaire directed
to analysts. However, the danger was that the responses might have been biased in
favor of current practice. Due to the intertemporal nature of the study, therefore, only
unweighted indices are applied. The ideal is to obtain a set of disclosures and their
importance for analysts that represent weights appropriate for the whole research
period. The subjectivity associated with weighting is recognized by Ashton (1974, p.
728):
Generally, individuals overestimate the extent to which they utilize the less
important cues and underestimate the extent to which they utilize the more
important cues, i.e., “subjective” weights are much more evenly distributed
across cues than are statistically-derived weights. 
This means that weights may not be reliable indicators of the actual use of information
in interim reports. Moreover, some prior studies, such as Cooke (1989b), have ended
up applying unweighted indices. In addition, Spero (1979, p. 57) finds that firms
disclosing “important items” also consistently do a good job of disclosing “items with
minor importance.” More detailed analysis of the benefit of unit weighting schemes
can be found in Einhorn and Hogarth (1975).
The databases used in this research, however, are constructed such that each item can
be weighted. Both the index and all subindices are automatically adjusted to the
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weight selected (see section 7.1.3). This allows for the performance of simulations to
analyze the importance of different weighting schemes. Moreover, there is one index
construction with a weight option available in the numerator but with an unweighted
denominator. This construction should provide the maximum sensitivity for the impact
of the weights. This is achieved by eliminating the potential dilution effect associated
with a weighting of both the numerator and the denominator. 
Another complicating issue related to the use of weights is that the proportionality of
index components changes depending on the product of the weight multiplied by the
score assigned to an item in the scoresheet. This proportionality is not a problem in
this study, because: (1) the indices applied are unweighted and (2) the scores of all the
items in the scoresheet are in the interval [0, 1].
7.1.3.  Disclosure scoresheet
The maximum number of items in a disclosure index in any year is 26. Appendix C
provides a complete list of the items in the index. On the scoresheet, the items are
grouped according the concise listing given below (scoresheet item numbers in
parentheses):
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A. Management report (items 1 through 9):
A.1. Management overview        (1-6)  
A.2. Investments and finance          (7-9) 
B. Information in financial statements (items 10 through 26): 
B.1. Information in general     (10-12)
B.2. Business segment information   (13-14) 
B.3. Geographical information       (15-16)
B.4. Disclosure and analysis of components 
related to financial statements   (17-26). 
The general construction of the index is that the actual total of points that an interim
report receives is divided by the maximum points it would have received by reporting
all eligible disclosure items. This makes each ratio an interim report-specific
disclosure index. The dichotomous variables 0 and 1 are applied when a particular
item is unsuitable for a specific firm. In the scoresheet, these unsuitable items are
assigned an X. For more details of this, see section 7.1.3.2 below. The use of
dichotomy variables makes the disclosure index impartial for each firm, such that each
specific firm is required to report only those items suitable for its operations and state
of affairs during the accounting period disclosed in a particular interim report. 
DIVOLPUR tracks items that are purely voluntary throughout the whole research
period 1985-93. The item numbers in the disclosure scoresheet fulfilling these
voluntary criteria are: 2 through 16, 18, 19, and 23 (see also appendix C). In other
words, the following eight items were mandatory for at least part of the research
period: 1, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26. 
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Below is presented the procedure followed in the selection of items for the scoresheet
and the principles followed as the scoresheets were filled with firm-specific data.
7.1.3.1.  Construction of the scoresheet
The items included in the disclosure scoresheet were to some extent dictated by the
legislation governing interim reports. Beyond this, other important guidelines were
also followed in the scoresheet construction phase. In the first phase, a literature
survey of disclosure indices was performed. This survey is reported as appendix A.
Based on this literature search, the initial version of the scoresheet was constructed.
Because the disclosure scoresheet was compiled from information based on original
interim reports, it is important that the scoresheet was compatible with those interim
reports. The importance of pilot work in the construction of an index is emphasized in
Oppenheim (1966, p. 100). To obtain additional insight into domestic business
communication in general and interim reports in particular, two classes of interview
were conducted: (1) the users’ view and (2) the producers’ view. The author’s own
knowledge was increased by an inquiry covering the years 1985-90 conducted
amongst the sample firms to obtain more information about some of the accounting
principles and practices applied in interim financial statements. This inquiry was
described in section 6.1.2.
An in-depth discussion was conducted with a professional investment analyst on
February 23, 1993. The main objective of that interview was to gain insight into what
items are important for analysts in interim reports. In addition, some opinions on
current interim reports published by Finnish HSE-listed firms were elicited. A second
class of interview involved the process from the producer’s viewpoint. This was
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accomplished by a discussion with the director of corporate communications of a firm
listed both on the HSE and a foreign exchange. 
An inventory composed of 146 interim reports from the period 1985-90 provided
additional insight. A list of 30 pages of notes on the information obtained was
compiled.
An internal report of interest group views related to the development of the HSE was
also available to the author (Jääskeläinen & Roine, 1992). That report was based on
interviews of representatives of central interest groups for the HSE (24 representatives
from Finland and 13 representatives from the U.K., including both users’ and
producers’ views). The aim of the report was to present the original ideas and views
of interviewees without filtering them. In addition, published recommendations are
available for some user groups (Association of Finnish Investment Analysts, 1992).
The disclosure scoresheets applied in the evaluation of corporate financial reporting
in the U.S. for 1991-92 provided additional information (AIMR, 1992). The European
Federation of Financial Analysts Societies does not have any specific, generally
applicable, rating standards for interim reports.
Users value numbers that are backed up by specific analytical comments. The need for
such analysis is recognized in prior literature. Shaw (1981, p. 85) states as follows: 
In practice, many comments made by companies supplementing numerical
disclosure constitute “warnings” to users about placing too much reliance on
the predictive quality of interim figures. Such “warnings” at least support the
view that stipulated numerical disclosure alone is not enough to provide full
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communication between the preparers and users of interim financial
statements. 
Ball and Foster (1982, p. 199) point out the general lack of analysis of the benefits
associated with voluntary disclosure policy by stating: “A heuristic framework of
’more disclosure is better’ appears to guide many statements in this area.” Some
recent studies, say Collins, Davie, and Weetman (1993), also focus on management
discussion and analysis. However, the Collins et al. study only quantifies disclosure.
They do not directly address the market implications that variations in disclosure may
induce (see also Weetman, Collins, & Davie, 1994).
The analysis of interim reporting disclosure policy could be even more important than
the analysis of annual reporting disclosure policy. This is due to the potential bias
introduced by seasonal fluctuations in such components as net sales and earnings (see
section 3.1.3). The present study attempts to accommodate the need for analysis by
providing 17 items of the total 26 (65.4%) with an option: (1) item with a few
comments or equivalent and (2) item with an analytical discussion or equivalent. The
last ten items in the scoresheet (17 - 26) entitled B.4. Disclosure and analysis of
components related to financial statements include both these two options (see
appendix C). 
Wallace (1988) compares nine survey studies of disclosure indices. Wallace
constructs a standardized list of 41 items, based on the previously reported indices.
The items in the new composite index are classified into dominant quartiles, according
to the information in the original study (op. cit., pp. 248-250). The most dominating
quartile contains 15 items (op. cit., p. 254). The disclosure scoresheet applied in this
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study contains the majority of the 15 items that are in the most dominant quartile in
the Wallace study. The items in the dominant quartile which are excluded from the
scoresheet in this study are taxation and dividends. The natural reason for excluding
taxation from the scoresheet in this study is that taxation is not based on interim
financial statement information. In addition, dividends are excluded from the
scoresheet because Finnish firms only pay dividends annually.       
7.1.3.2.  Completion of the scoresheet
The scoresheets were filled out by the author using original interim reports in order to
minimize the influence of subjectivity and personal opinions (see section 3.2). The
information in item 6 (outlook for the remainder of the operating year) was verified by
two independent datasets - one by a research assistant and the other by the author.
This comparison of the logic of two different datasets was possible because the
present extension of the interim reporting database also contains information about
firms’ annual forecast information of net sales or earnings disclosed in interim report.
If all the 26 scoresheet items applies to a firm, but its report lacks analysis, the
disclosure index value for DIALL is 67.3 from a possible 100.0. In this illustration the
score assigned to items with an analysis option is 0.5. DIVOLPUR is also influenced
unfavorably by a lack of analysis. When all 18 purely voluntary items are eligible for
a firm, the disclosure index value for DIVOLPUR is 75.0, a reduction of 25.0 percent
from the potential value.      
Disclosed items are scored in accordance with the 0.0/1.0 or 0.0/0.5/1.0 system
applied by Giner Inchausti (1993, April). If an item is not disclosed, then it is scored
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as 0.0. Full disclosure, as defined specifically for a given item, is scored as 1.0.
Anything else is assigned the score 0.5, where the item has that option. 
There are five exceptions to the 0.0/1.0 or 0.0/0.5/1.0 scoring presented above. Items
13, 14, 15, 16, and 21 are assigned alternative scoring schemes (see appendix C). For
items 13 and 14, the scoring is X/0.0/1.0, where the X option indicates that the item
is not eligible for that interim report. This alternative procedure is required because
the subset deals with the disclosure of business segment information (for recent
discussion related to segmental reporting, see International Accounting Standards
Committee, 1994). The X option is necessary in order to avoid penalization of a firm
for failure to disclose business segments when none exist within that particular firm.
Where the X alternative is applied, that item is eliminated by means of a dichotomous
variable from the computations for that particular firm. Thus there is no artificial
penalty for a firm if an item is not eligible. The information in item 13 (breakdown of
turnover or net sales by business segment) and item 14 (breakdown of income by
business segment) was in each case systematically verified from the annual Pörssitieto
[Review of listed firms on the HSE] publication (Kock, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988,
1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1995).
An X/0.0/0.5/1.0 scoring is used for items 15 and 16. Both of these scoresheet items
treat the disclosure of the impact of geographic diversity of a given firm’s operations
(see appendix C). The X option is required to avoid penalizing a firm for failure to
disclose the impact of geographic diversity when there is none. Where the Pörssitieto
publication (op. cit. above) reports that a particular firm’s exports for a specific year
account for at least three percent of total revenues, the research methodology requires
Empirical evidence140
the firm to report geographical information for that year. When a firm’s exports are
below the three percent threshold, the X option is applied to items 15 and 16. 
For cross-checking purposes, an attempt was made to obtain additional information
related to each firm’s research and development (R&D) activity (item 18). If such
information had been available, the X option would have been included in the
responses to item 18 in cases where R&D expenditure was minimal for a particular
firm. R&D information is systematically monitored by Statistics Finland. However,
that information is collected exclusively for internal use and is not revealed to
outsiders. If the X option had been used, the lack of adequate information during the
compilation of the scoresheet might have caused erroneous judgements about firms’
disclosure practice regarding R&D costs. Therefore, item 18 has the options
0.0/0.5/1.0. R&D disclosure evaluations are based solely on the information in interim
reports. 
 
The X/0.0/0.5/1.0 scoring scheme is necessary in item 21 because that item measures
the disclosure of other income and expenses. The X option avoids penalizing a firm
for not reporting the impact of other income and expenses when there are none to
report. The criterion is that if other income and expenses for the interim reporting
period amounts to five percent or more of the preceding earnings item in the same
period, a comment is required. If other income and expenses are less than five percent
of the interim period’s earnings, the X alternative is applied. To ensure that this
procedure was followed properly, the  data entries were made by one person and
checked by the author. This resembles a control technique presented in Foster (1986,
p. 83).
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7.2.  Schedule for statistical analysis
The disclosure indices DIALL and DIVOLPUR are applied as the dependent variable
in their respective analyses [see eq. (1) in chapter 5]. In the multiple regression
models, the final combination of independent variables is based on backward
elimination (Draper & Smith, 1981, p. 305). In practice, the largest regression model
includes all eligible independent variables: (1) governance structure, six each; (2)
business risk, six each; (3) market risk, one each; (4) capital structure, two each; (5)
stock valuation, two each; (6) firm growth, three each; (7) growth potential, four each;
(8) firm size, two each; and (9) market maturity, one dichotomous variable for each
year of the study. The final model is constructed so that at least one variable from
each variable class is included in the model. Appendix D details the selection of the
variables used. Following the practice of Collins and Kothari (1989) and Ettredge,
Simon, Smith, and Stone (1994), variables with statistically insignificant coefficients
are also reported.
The yearly dichotomy variables are included to account for the impact of regulatory
and other HSE-inspired developments, as shown in eq. (1) of chapter 5. The
disclosure index scores also reflect the rapid development of interim reporting over
the period covered in this study. Therefore there was ample justification for including
the yearly dichotomy variables in the model.
Analysis of multicollinearity revealed that, for the final multiple linear regression
models, backward elimination did not yield results that were influenced significantly
by   multicollinearity   among  any  variables.  In  analyzing  multicollinearity,  each
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independent variable was explained by the remainder of the other independent
variables. These analyses are reported in appendix G.  
With the dependent variables, some experiments were performed applying logit
transformation (Agresti, 1990, p. 81). The use of logit transformation ensured that the
disclosure predictions, required in chapter 8, were within the admissible range: [0, 1].
In this study, the disclosure index values for both index types (DIALL and
DIVOLPUR) could vary between [0, 1]. The forecasts obtained by the model with
logit transformation lay within the admissible interval of 0 to 1. However, the
behavior of the error terms better met the requirements of ordinary least squares
(OLS) without logit transformation. Because the predictions based on the OLS model
without logit transformation were also in the admissible range of 0 to 1, it was decided
to perform the final runs using OLS without logit transformation.
Additional tests were performed in order to examine how well the estimated models
coincided with the assumptions of OLS. In brief, the underlying assumptions of the
regression analysis were as follows (Hald, 1952, p. 627):  
1. for every fixed value of independent variables, the dependent variable is
conditionally normally distributed,   
2. the mean value of dependent variable is a linear function of independent
variables,
3. the variance of dependent variable is independent of explanatory variables,
and
4. the observations are independent. 
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The heteroscedasticity of the error terms was examined by means of White’s test
(White, 1980). In this test, squared error terms are explained by the original
regressors, their second moments, and their cross-moments. 
The normality of the residual terms was examined by means of the Jarque-Bera test
(Jarque & Bera, 1987). The test is based on the skewness and kurtosis of the error
term (see also appendix F).
The model applied assume a linear relationship between the dependent and
independent variables. Therefore, the potential nonlinearity in the relationship
between dependent and independent variables had to be ascertained. The existence of
nonlinearity was studied by the regression specification error test (Ramsey, 1969,
RESET test). In this test, error terms from a regression are explained using the
predicted values raised to the power of two, three, and four. According to Ramsey, the
use of these three moments is sufficient (op. cit., p. 362).
7.3.  Determinants of disclosure
This section presents the determinants of disclosure. First, the multiple regression
results are presented when the dependent variable included all items (DIALL),
followed by the results when the dependent variable was based on items that have
been purely voluntary over the entire period (DIVOLPUR). 
7.3.1.  Disclosure results including both mandatory and voluntary information
Table 1 below contains results for the general level of disclosure. The high statistical
significance of the F-test value (12.36) indicates that the overall model provides
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evidence of a linear relationship between DIALL and the explanatory variables. A
joint test, where the yearly dichotomy variables were added to the model, yielded F(7,
234)=3.59, p=.001, indicating that the yearly dichotomy variable is statistically highly
significant. The general explanation for this is that in recent years interim reports have
established their position as part of listed firms’ efforts toward more timely business
communication. Later in this section, when the determinants of voluntary disclosure
are investigated, it is observed that regulatory developments alone are not an adequate
explanation of the rapid development of disclosure. 
Next the other tests reported in table 1 are discussed briefly. The heteroscedasticity
test (White, 1980) of the error terms indicated that residual variance cannot be
forecasted for the DIALL model. The model containing error terms from the DIALL
regression gave   (121)=103.50, p=.873. The test value indicates that no2
heteroscedasticity was found in the regression of all interim reports including both
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Table 1 also reports heteroscedasticity-corrected
(White, 1980) t values in the rightmost column. An investigation was also performed
to see whether the squared error terms and the moments of the predicted values were
correlated (another version of the Breusch-Pagan test; Breusch & Pagan, 1979). It was
found that the squared error terms and the second moment specification of the
predicted values were correlated by -.139, p=.031. This correlation suggests that the
data might be slightly heteroscedastic. Thus, due to the possible heteroscedasticity,
predictions of high disclosure were slightly more accurate than predictions of low
disclosure. Table 1 shows, however, that t values with standard OLS and those
corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) correspond fairly well with each other.
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Table 1.  Regression results of all interim reports including both mandatory and
voluntary disclosures
Dependent variable: DIALL
Independent                            Parameter         Standard                t value            
variables                          estimate            error               standard         Whitea
 D .003 .05285
 D .008 .05086
 D .019 .05187
 D .056 .05388
 D .067 .05389
 D .090 .05190
 D .084 .04991
 D .087 .05292
 FIRMS -.001 .000 -1.805 -2.055
 SCGNETS .053.123   2.326  2.282
 SNIQKPOP .001.003  3.793  3.427
 ANNBETA -.007 .018  -.353  -.359
 ISSRATIO .026 .018  1.463  1.664
 POSBCAR -.008 .021  -.387   -.444
 CHGNETS -.049 .028  -1.740 -2.115
 PROFNETP .096-.337 -3.504 -3.626
 LANPERSO .006.038 6.693  6.045
 Adjusted R = 42.10%             F(16, 234)=12.36, p=.0002
 White:                          Jarque-Bera:                    RESET:
    (121)=103.50, p=.873                (2)=8.09, p=.018              F(3, 247)=1.13, p=.3382 2
a = White refers to heteroscedasticity-corrected t values (White, 1980),
DIALL =  index of all interim reports including both mandatory and voluntary
    disclosures,
D  to D =  yearly dichotomy variables,85 92
FIRMS =  percentage of corporate ownership,
SCGNETS =  standard deviation of percentage change in net sales,
(for other table footnotes see next page)
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Table 1 (continued)
SNIQKPOP =  standard deviation of net investments/total assets ratio,
ANNBETA =  market model beta,
ISSRATIO =  ratio of change in equity/equity before the change,
POSBCAR =  post-event cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at business day 140.
     Expected returns are based on the market model. 
CHGNETS =  percentage change in net sales,
PROFNETP =  profit/net sales ratio, and
LANPERSO =  natural logarithm of the number of personnel.
Boldface (italic boldface) designates statistical significance at the 5% (0.1%) level.
The normality of the residual terms was examined by the Jarque-Bera test (Jarque &
Bera, 1987). The test value for the residuals obtained from the DIALL regression was
  (2) =8.09, p=.018. This indicates some degree of deviation from normality. If a2
more fitting model had been applied, however, it would have caused additional
intricacy. 
In order to establish whether the nonnormality was due to potential outlier(s), the
observations with extreme error residuals were then eliminated. Specifically, the two
observations with the highest and the two with the lowest error residuals were
eliminated from the data. The Jarque-Bera test value for the residuals obtained from
the DIALL regression with these trimmed data was   (2) =2.85, p=.241. It should be2
noted that all diagnostic test outcomes that yielded insignificant values are deliberately
excluded from the text. With the extreme values expunged from the data, the residuals
are normally distributed. The screening did not essentially change the t values, and
consequently the OLS method was applied to the original data. Furthermore, table 2
in section 7.3.2 shows that the error terms in the DIVOLPUR regression are normally
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distributed. This is important, because the prediction of disclosure in chapter 8 is
partly based on the DIVOLPUR model.
Finally, the potential nonlinearity in the relationship between the dependent and the
independent variables was investigated via the RESET test (Ramsey, 1969). The
model containing error terms from the DIALL regression yielded F(3, 247) =1.13,
p=.338. The test value obtained strongly supports the use of the linear model, instead
of a nonlinear alternative.
If an individual firm published several interim reports during the research period, there
might be a slight intraclass correlation, indicating that interim reports of one firm
would resemble each other. In practice, this potential intraclass correlation will
overstate the obtained t values slightly compared to a situation where there is no such
correlation (Särndal, Swensson, & Wretman, 1992).
Further analysis of the results obtained with the standard OLS indicated that, in
addition to regulation (standard t values): (1) business risk, (2) growth potential, and
(3) firm size are clearly related to disclosure. The hypothesized relationship of: (1)
governance structure, (2) market risk, (3) capital structure, (4) mispricing, and (5) firm
growth was not demonstrated.
The coefficients of the business risk variables (SCGNETS and SNIQKPOP) were both
statistically significant. The positive sign of the coefficient of the SCGNETS variable
indicates that there is a tendency for extended disclosure when a firm’s net sales vary
a lot. This outcome is fairly natural, because large changes in a firm’s net sales may
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influence the operations of the firm as a whole. Changes in net sales may be due to a
development that requires explanation by management. It is likely, therefore, that
analysis of interim reports will increase during a volatile net sales period. The
disclosure index applied in this study is constructed to be sensitive to the analysis
section of interim reports (see section 7.1.3 above). The variable approximating
variations in a firm’s investment activity (SNIQKPOP) also has a positive and highly
significant coefficient. This outcome of the model suggests that high variations in
investments are positively related to extended disclosure. It is interesting to note that
the measure of the investment level, NIQKPOP, does not show up as a significant
determinant of disclosure policy. One reason for this might be that some industries
have a relatively higher level of investment than others. Thus, it is departures from
these levels, as measured by standard deviation, that provide the best indicators,
becoming significant elements in disclosure policy. Beyond this, large investments are
always a big news item. Consequently, firms tend to make a separate announcement
when large investments are decided upon. Such investment items are therefore
unlikely to be announced as part of the standard interim reporting cycle. The rapid
announcement of investment news, via special bulletins and the news media, is an
understandable way to prevent the illegal use of privileged information after an
investment decision has been concluded.
A firm’s growth potential, PROFNETP, influences a firm’s total disclosure in interim
reports. Contrary to the prediction, the coefficient of the growth potential variable is
negative. One possible interpretation of this outcome is that firms with growth
potential, as evidenced by a favorable profit/net sales ratio, believe that the ratio in
itself is a sufficient indicator of the firm’s present and future performance. In other
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words, stable, well performing firms may not see any particular need for extended
disclosure. The next chapter addresses this issue in more depth, as the relation
between: (1) performance, (2) disclosure, and (3) stock market behavior is analyzed.
Finally, because of the covariate nature of the size variable, the results obtained with
this variable are presented. The findings of this study concerning firm size are in line
with those reported in previous research. The variable measuring firm size
(LANPERSO) has a positive and significant coefficient. Because the disclosure index
applied also takes into account the degree of analysis in interim reports, the results
obtained with the size variable suggest that the interim reports of large firms are also
somewhat more analytical than those of small firms. The reason for this may simply
be that the business processes of large firms are more complex, demanding greater
disclosure. The needs of the users of large firms’ interim reports may also be more
divergent than those of the users of small firms’ reports. These findings confirm those
of previous studies, referenced earlier.  
It should be mentioned that the coefficient of the governance structure measure,
FIRMS, is not statistically significant. Nor are the coefficients of the market risk
measure, ANNBETA; the capital structure variable, ISSRATIO; the stock valuation
variable, POSBCAR; or of the firm growth variable, CHGNETS. 
The insignificant coefficient for the FIRMS variable may be partly due to the increase
in the concentration of shareholder power during the second half of the 1980s
(Pohjola, 1988). This concentration may also have resulted in additional seat(s) on a
firm’s board for its major shareholders. A seat, as discussed in section 5.1.1 above,
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might facilitate faster, more confidential information transfers between managers and
owners than would be possible via interim reports. There is also reported evidence
that shareholder concentration may decrease the information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders. Douglas and Santerre (1990) find an inverse relationship
between stockholder concentration and executive remuneration. According to them,
this inverse relationship reflects the reduced information asymmetry accompanying
greater stockholder concentration (op. cit., p. 28). 
One likely explanation for the insignificance of the coefficient of the capital structure
variable is that the relevant information has already been published elsewhere, such
as in a share issue prospectus. Myers and Majluf (1984) arrive at the theoretical
conclusion that the optimal time to issue shares is when managers and the market
share the same information. In the context of the present results, the insignificant
coefficient for the ISSRATIO variable may be a function of firms issuing shares
during periods of low information asymmetry. Therefore, it can be argued that the
ISSRATIO variable does not help to explain disclosure because low information
asymmetry exists between managers and the market. 
Because foreign listings have been fairly common for HSE-listed firms during the
research period, their influence on disclosure behavior was also studied. A
dichotomous variable was applied to distinguish those firms listed both on the HSE
and a foreign exchange from those that listed solely on the HSE. The  results obtained
show that there is a positive relationship between disclosure and a foreign listing.
However, the validity of the foreign listing dichotomous variable is poor. More
detailed analyses revealed that the foreign listing variable is closely related to firm
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size. Since size is already taken into account, the foreign listing variable is dropped
from subsequent analysis in both the DIALL and DIVOLPUR models.
7.3.2.  Disclosure results involving purely voluntary information
The second model relates to the determination of purely voluntary items. The
definition of purely voluntary disclosure is items that are not explicitly required in any
of the years covered in this study (see appendix C). However, every regulation
contains a general statement that firms should disclose any extraordinary events
affecting their operations. This means that some aspects of disclosure are not
explicitly named, but are nonetheless required. This anomaly might be expected to
affect the purity of DIVOLPUR. This shortcoming must remain, however, because the
information available does not permit a more precise distinction of the mandatory-
voluntary dichotomy. This calls for a separate study. The most refined delineation
between mandatory and voluntary disclosures would be achieved via the use of a case
study approach, focusing on just a few, highly selected firms. 
Table 2 below gives additional support for the importance of market maturity in the
development of disclosure. Despite the fact that the items in the index applied are not
explicitly mandated during the research period, the influence of mandatory disclosure
elements at a given time is very strong. A joint test, adding the yearly dichotomy
variables to the model yielded F(7, 263) = 4.11, p=.000. The high significance of the
test value indicates that the yearly dichotomy variables should be included in the
model. The results confirm anecdotal evidence that interim reports have established
their position in corporate communication. The high statistical significance of the F-
test  value,  10.02,  for  the  whole  model  indicates  that overall the model provides
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Table 2.  Regression results of all interim reports including purely voluntary 
disclosures only
Dependent variable: DIVOLPUR
Independent                      Parameter Standard                        t value
variables                      estimate error                  standard       White  a
 D -.110 .06185
 D -.058 .05786
 D -.044 .05887
 D -.007 .05988
 D .018 .05989
 D .006 .05790
 D .000 .05691
 D -.018 .05892
 LHOLNU .005.012 2.321 2.363
 FIRMS .000-.001 -2.165 -2.303
 SCGNETS .087 .047 1.869 1.803
 SNIQKPOP .001.003 2.822 2.624
 ANNBETA -.014 .019 -.721 -.758
 ANNDEBTS .003 .003 .970 1.060
 POSBCAR -.002 .021 -.097 -.094
 NIQKPOP .001 .001 1.041 1.010
 PROFNETP .112-.390 -3.478 -3.701
 LANPERSO .006.029 4.968 4.774
 Adjusted R =35.40%               F(17, 263)=10.02, p=.0002
 White:                                     Jarque-Bera:                          RESET:            
    (139)=141.02, p=.436                (2)=1.92, p=.383                F(3, 277)=.35, p=.7892 2
     
a = White refers to heteroscedasticity-corrected t values (White, 1980),
DIVOLPUR =  index of all interim reports containing purely voluntary disclosures
    only,
D  to D =  yearly dichotomy variables,85 92
LHOLNU =  natural logarithm of the number of shareholders,
FIRMS =  percentage of corporate ownership,
(for other table footnotes see next page)
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Table 2 (continued)
SCGNETS =  standard deviation of percentage change in net sales,
SNIQKPOP =  standard deviation of net investments/total assets ratio,
ANNBETA =  market model beta,
ANNDEBTS =  debt/equity ratio,
POSBCAR =  post-event cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at business day 140.
    Expected returns are based on the market model.
NIQKPOP =  net investments/total assets ratio,
PROFNETP =  profit/net sales ratio, and
LANPERSO =  natural logarithm of the number of personnel. 
Boldface (italic boldface) designates statistical significance at the 5% (0.1%) level.
 evidence of a linear relationship between DIVOLPUR and the explanatory variables
(see table 2).
The same set of tests as those used for the DIALL model were applied for the
DIVOLPUR model. This allows the reader to see how well the OLS model
corresponds to alternative data. The tests are detailed in table 2. The heteroscedasticity
test (White, 1980) of the error terms indicates that the residual variance cannot be
forecasted for the DIVOLPUR model. The error terms from the DIVOLPUR
regression give   (139)=141.02, p=.436. The test value indicates that no2
heteroscedasticity is found. Another heteroscedasticity test was performed, following
the procedure established with the DIALL regression (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). This
tested whether the squared error terms and the moments of the predicted values were
correlated. Contrary to the DIALL model results, no significant correlation existed
with the DIVOLPUR model. This contrast gives further evidence that the data in the
DIVOLPUR model are not heteroscedastic. 
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The normality of the residual terms was investigated by means of the Jarque-Bera test
(Jarque & Bera, 1987). The test value for the DIVOLPUR regression error term
yielded   (2) =1.92, p=.383. This indicates no deviation from normality. Therefore the2
DIVOLPUR model should be acceptable for predictive use in chapter 8.   
Finally, the RESET test for identifying nonlinearity (Ramsey, 1969) was performed.
The model containing error terms from the DIVOLPUR regression yielded F(3, 277)
=.35, p=.789. The test value indicates that the linear model should be used in
preference to a nonlinear model.
Besides the impact of regulation, there are several other interesting conclusions that
may  be drawn from table 2 above. In general: (1) governance structure, (2) business
risk, (3) growth potential, and (4) firm size have variables with significant coefficients
in the DIVOLPUR model. The governance structure exercises two types of influence
over voluntary disclosure. One, the variable number of shareholders has a positive and
significant coefficient. In the DIVOLPUR model a greater number of shareholders
also causes extended voluntary disclosure in interim reports. In the DIALL model the
coefficient of the number of shareholders is not statistically significant. One reason
for the different outcome might be that the DIVOLPUR index is more sensitive to
firm-specific factors than the DIALL index. Managers have fewer choices to make
when disclosing mandatory items. This could cause the sensitivity of DIALL to
explanatory variables be lower than that of DIVOLPUR. Two, the coefficient of the
percentage of corporate ownership variable is negative and statistically significant.
The interpretation of this result is that where a large proportion of a firm’s shares are
owned by other firms, that firm will tend to disclose less than a firm with a broad base
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of shareholders. Firms, as owners, can be classified as institutional investors. They are
in a position to demand high quality information and communication from the firms
whose shares they own. This leads to the conclusion that other communication
channels are used in cases where other corporates own a significant portion of a firm.
One of these other communication channels is a seat on the board. Bradbury (1992, p.
144) suggests that if a capital market is thin, indirect channels of corporate disclosure
might become more widely used. This argument is also valid in the current study. 
One of the business risk variables, SNIQKPOP, has a positive and significant
coefficient. In the DIVOLPUR model a high standard deviation in net investments is
related to extended disclosure. The reasons for extended disclosure are likely to be
very similar to those  already discussed with the DIALL results. 
One of the growth potential variables, PROFNETP, has a negative and highly
significant coefficient. The sign of the coefficient is contrary to that expected. This
result suggests that a high profit/net sales ratio does not in itself result in any
voluntary disclosure in interim reports. This view is similar to that previously
discussed in connection with the DIALL results. One possible interpretation of this
outcome is that a firm’s managers view good profit generation as sufficiently strong
communication to outside interest groups. No extension of the formal disclosure
process to the capital markets and other interest groups appears to be viewed as
warranted.
The firm size variable, LANPERSO, has a positive and significant coefficient. This is
an identical outcome as with the DIALL model. The coefficients of the variables
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approximating the firm’s market risk (ANNBETA), capital structure (ANNDEBTS),
mispricing of the firm (POSBCAR), and the firm’s growth (NIQKPOP), are not
statistically significant. 
A comparison of the results of the DIALL and DIVOLPUR models (tables 1 and 2)
indicates that, besides the year in which an interim report is published, the variables
for: (1) business risk, (2) growth potential, and (3) firm size have significant
coefficients in both of the models. In addition, the variables for governance structure
have significant coefficients in the DIVOLPUR model but not in the DIALL model.
The next chapter investigates more of the implications in the market resulting from
different levels of disclosure in interim reports. 
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8.  Implications of the information disclosed in interim reports
8.1.  Construction of the hypothesis
In this chapter, the implications of the information disclosed in interim reports are
studied. The stated hypothesis (HI, in its alternate form) in the implications part of the
study is as follows:
HI : The degree of disclosure has an impact on the market.1
The nature of the above hypothesis is fairly general. Some kind of relationship
between disclosure, earnings, and stock returns is assumed to exist. However, at the
derivation stage of the hypothesis there is only limited a priori knowledge about the
exact relationships between the variables in question. The major background guiding
the derivation of hypothesis HI  is summarized below.1
Prior academic literature has reported the relationship between stock returns and
earnings. However, although there is a wealth of evidence of this relationship, the
degree of explanatory power of the applied models has been said to be still rather low
(Lev, 1989). The evidence, therefore, supports the view that earnings are rather
limited in their usefulness to investors. One approach, potentially leading to a greater
understanding of the market’s use of financial statements in business analysis and
valuation, is to include disclosure variable(s) in returns/earnings models. The
inclusion of disclosure variable(s), with a suitable research design, should add to the
informativeness of returns/earnings models. This, in turn, should help describe the role
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of financial statement  data in the security pricing process (see also Palepu, Bernard,
& Healy, 1996).
Further support for the hypothesis applied in the implications part of the study can be
found in literature where corporate financial statements are considered a product of
the market and political processes (for more details of this, see Watts, 1977). As
reported in chapter 7 above, the matureness of the market is an important variable
explaining disclosure in interim reports. Partly, therefore, the interim reporting data
used in this study have the potential to contain information on the implications of
disclosure in interim  reports.    
Disclosure has the potential to contain market-relevant information. However, in order
to properly capture and measure the information value of disclosure to the market,
disclosure should first be quantified. In this study special care has been taken in the
construction and completion of disclosure scoresheets (described previously in chapter
7; see also Lev & Thiagarajan, 1993, for the guided search procedure for
fundamentals). The validity of the disclosure measure, in turn, should facilitate the
relevance of research into disclosure. 
Finally, previous related research has found preliminary evidence that both earnings
and disclosure provide market-relevant information (Kanto & Schadewitz, 1995). The
present work adds to this preliminary finding by focusing on the purely voluntary
portion of disclosure. Purely voluntary disclosure in interim reports ought to be less
distorted by regulatory developments than is overall disclosure, which contains a
mandatory set of elements.
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8.2.  Methods for analyzing market effects of disclosed information 
The methods applied are fairly conventional in this research field. The contribution
here is to analyze how disclosure is viewed by users. This impact is measured by
changes in share prices. This study concentrates solely on disclosures in interim
reports that are purely voluntary throughout the research period: 1985-93. It is likely
that some of the voluntary part of any disclosure reflects the information that
management desires to communicate to investors. The remainder of the voluntary
disclosure potentially reflects management’s reaction to mandatory disclosures or
expectations of subsequent disclosure requirements. This section contains the
principles for each method applied in order to capture the implications of interim
reports for the stock markets. A more refined discussion of the methods is presented
in each section. 
Section 8.3 focuses on the association between: (1) returns, (2) earnings, and (3)
disclosure. This is accomplished by means of multiple linear regressions. In the
regressions,  cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) serve as the dependent variable, with
unexpected earnings and a measure of stock price variability as the independent
variables. Defining abnormal returns as the difference between actual returns and
normal returns (t is the time subscript), AR  = R  - R  , CAR can be computedt t tA N
additively (Foster, 1986, pp. 404-405). In this study, the computation of abnormal
returns is presented in eq. (3) later in the text. 
Qualitative variables can provide explanatory power in regression analysis (Neter,
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). Preliminary analysis indicate that unexpected
disclosure could be applied as a classificatory variable for the regressions in this
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study. As a result, regressions were performed separately for: (1) the lower
unexpected disclosure quartile, n=64; (2) the two middle unexpected disclosure
quartiles, n=127; and (3) the upper unexpected disclosure quartile, n=63/64. This
classification is similar to that recently reported by Penno (1996), who derives
theoretical conditions in which management applies a high precision (back-to-the-
wall) disclosure policy in some situations and a low precision (don’t-rock-the-boat)
disclosure policy in other situations. This procedure is described in greater detail in
section 8.5.1 below.
Schadewitz (1996) finds it beneficial, in terms of capturing and controlling potential
asynchrony between prices and earnings, to compute coefficients of unexpected
earnings for different window definitions. A similar research design is applied in
Collins and Kothari (1989). The first type of window is contemporaneous with the
interim financial statement period: (bgn, end), where bgn/end refers to the
beginning/ending day of the interim reporting period. This is a logical interpretation
of the association approach (see also Collins, Kothari, Shanken, & Sloan, 1994).
Relevant events that will affect the valuation of shares are assumed to occur over the
entire accounting period (Collins & Kothari, 1989). By initially applying a return
window that is contemporaneous with the interim earnings period, benchmark values
for the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are derived. The second window type
starts at the beginning of the interim reporting period but ends 30, or alternatively 15,
business days before the reporting date (event). The third window type also starts at
the beginning of the interim reporting period, but ends at the event, or alternatively 15
or 30 business days after the event. By extending the window to the event and past it,
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it is possible to study the impact of the announced information (earnings and
disclosures) on ERCs.         
Section 8.4 focuses more closely on the implications caused by the event itself. This
is done by applying short and intermediate windows, instead of long ones, around the
event. In this part of the work, the long window periods are shortened and subdivided.
The pre-event period examined begins 20 days before the announcement. The post-
event period ends 20 days after the announcement. Each period is further divided in
order to capture the associated relationships with more precision. In particular, at and
immediately after the event, single day windows are employed to specifically identify
the length of time it takes for the markets to react to unexpected earnings and related
disclosures.
Unexpected disclosure is the classificatory variable. CARs are applied to capture
information that may cause abnormal return behavior near to the event. That portion
of the information which is new, previously unknown, to the market is the source of
abnormal returns at the event. Previous research shows that interim earnings are
informative to users of interim reports (Schadewitz, 1992). However, it is still
somewhat obscure whether data besides earnings contains information valuable to the
market. Kanto and Schadewitz (1995) give preliminary evidence that disclosure assists
in the communication of earnings information to the market.
Kanto and Schadewitz (1995) employ actual earnings and disclosure instead of the
unexptected form of the variables, as in the present research. Furthermore, the
disclosure variable in the previous study is an index, including both mandatory and
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voluntary disclosures (DIALL), instead of an index containing unexpected purely
voluntary disclosures only (UPVD). The weekly CAR investigation period applied in
the previous paper is further shortened in the short window part of this research. This
is done in an effort to specifically identify the length of time it takes for the markets
to react to earnings and related disclosures. These are just some of the ways in which
part of this study relates to Kanto and Schadewitz (1995). 
The following two sections describe the research design in more detail.
8.3.  Association between share price, unexpected earnings, and unexpected
    disclosures with long return periods
The association between share price and a firm’s potential value can be studied by
regressing the information contained in interim reports with contemporaneous share
price data. The values of the regression coefficients (ERCs) allow a scrutiny of the
extent to which price has captured the firm-specific information that is known before
the actual event. The event day is designated as time 0. The natural basis for window
definition is to start the computations using return measurement windows that are
symmetrical with the interim reporting period: (bgn, end).
Note that the end of the reporting period (end) need not be the same as the date of the
announcement (0). Because this contemporaneous window does not extend beyond
the announcement date, the impact of the event is excluded from this window type.
This initial examination period is designed to capture the degree to which the actual
operations of  the  firm  during  the reporting period are reflected in share  prices. In
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addition to this symmetrical  window type, two asymmetrical window classes were
applied. 
The second window type starts at the beginning of the reporting period (bgn) and ends
30  or 15 business days before the announcement of interim reports: (bgn, -30) or
(bgn, -15). This window type does not contain the information gained from the actual
event. The window is designed to discover the general association between earnings
and prices. If prices reflect valuation-relevant events with a lag, this window
construction should capture at least some of potential lack of synchrony between
prices and earnings. 
The third window type includes the event. This window type starts at the beginning of
the reporting period (bgn) and extends 0, 15, or 30 business days after the event: (bgn,
0), (bgn, 15), or (bgn, 30). By comparing the ERCs obtained from these three different
models, it is possible to draw conclusions about when and to what extent earnings
information and disclosure information are reflected in prices. Eq. (3) below
summarizes the regressions and applied variables:  
CAR(bgn,d)it 01UEit2SDRit it,
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(3)
where
CAR(bgn, d) = cumulative abnormal returns in an arithmetic (additive) form, CARit
for stock i at event t. Expected returns are based on the market
model. Cumulation starts on the first business day of the interim
reporting period bgn and ends on date d. A negative/positive sign
for a day d indicates a pre/post-event day. 
 = intercept,0
 = regression coefficient of the unexpected earnings UE,1
 = regression coefficient of the standard deviation of returns SDR2
during the (-30, 30) business day period around  the event, and
  = n.i.d. errors for stock i at event t.it
UE  is defined as: [interim earnings after financial items (t’) - interim earnings afterit
financial items (corresponding period, t’-1)] / market value of equity at the beginning
of interim reporting period (t’). In the notation i refers to the stock, t to the event, and
t’ to the year. In this context, it should be mentioned that some studies apply
alternative earnings and returns specifications when studying the association between
them (Collins, Kothari, Shanken, & Sloan, 1994; Schadewitz, 1992).    
Seasonal random walk (SRW) earnings forecasts are preferred over an index model
mainly because of the previous findings with a smaller interim report dataset
(Schadewitz, 1992). In particular, the portfolio comprising firms with negative
unexpected earnings, forecasted using the SRW model, was also the weakest
performer when evaluated by the abnormal performance index (API). This outcome
supports the view that unexpected earnings obtained via SRW capture fairly well the
actual degree of surprise to the market caused by the event. This finding can be related
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to the discussion on how investors operationally determine earnings. For example,
investors are unlikely to use sophisticated statistical methods to determinate earnings
persistence (Lev & Thiagarajan, 1993). 
Furthermore, the management comments disclosed in interim reports provide support
for the use of SRW models. It is a standard practice that managers, in their discussion
of the current interim reporting period, compare performance to the corresponding
period in the previous year. This kind of comparison is very natural, especially when
the operations of a firm are sensitive to seasonal factors. Also, the SRW forecasting
model properly takes potential seasonalities into account.
Finnish regulations also stipulate that the information contained in an interim report
must enable comparison with the information for the corresponding period of the
preceding year (HSE Cooperative, 1995, p. 19). This requirement should further result
in earnings figures that lend themselves to SRW forecasting. This is especially
important in cases where a firm has changed the length of reporting period covered in
its interim reports from the preceding year. Section 4.2.3, above, provides a review of
these regulations.
Finally, in the present study, annual earnings are not included in the interim earnings
forecasts. A central reason for this practice is the relationship between interim and
annual financial statements. In Finland, interim reports are consistent with the discrete
reporting view. In this view, each interim period is considered independent (Foster,
1986, p. 223). Sales and expenses occurring during the interim period are reported as
such. In the discrete approach, the emphasis is on the actual achievements of the
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interim period (Fried & Livnat, 1981, p. 493). Also, the users of interim financial
statements are assumed to monitor a firm’s performance during the reported period
(op. cit., p. 493). Because the periodical data are reported as independent of other
periods they are liable to contain biases caused by such factors as seasonality. Foster
(1977) presents empirical evidence of this. 
In eq. (3) above, the intercept   captures other possible factors influencing returns0
independent of earnings and disclosure. No theoretical value is derived for   in eq.1
(3). Because the only parameter that varies in eq. (3) in different runs is the window,
the coefficient   permits analysis of the effects of: (1) window length and (2) the1
changes in the underlying information environment. Benchmark values for   were1
obtained from regression with contemporaneous windows: CAR(bgn, end). 
In association research, it is conventional to use unexpected earnings as an
independent variable. Christie (1987) shows that the deflator should be based on the
market value of an equity. In this study, unexpected earnings are deflated, but not
unexpected disclosure. The reason for this is that disclosure measures are by their
nature comparable as index numbers (see section 7.1.3 above).
Unexpected disclosure was applied as a classificatory variable (detailed in section
8.5.1 below). This was done because disclosure is qualitative by nature. Moreover,
there is no reason to expect that its influence is linear. On the contrary, previous
studies suggest that it is nonlinear (Kanto & Schadewitz, 1995). A disclosure
classification was created by dividing unexpected disclosure into quartiles. After some
experiments and tests it was found that  the two middle quartiles did not essentially
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differ from each other. Therefore, three classes of unexpected purely  voluntary
disclosures (UPVD) were used: (1) Lower quartile, first quartile; (2) Middle quartiles,
second and third quartile; and (3) Upper quartile, fourth quartile.
The main interest is to establish whether unexpected earnings information impacts
more or less strongly when reported together with various levels of unexpected
disclosure. The reason for applying unexpected purely voluntary disclosure, instead
of all disclosed items, is fairly clear. It is only logical that firm-specific items are
better reflected in the index in which the firm itself has most jurisdiction (see section
7.1.1 above). When an unexpected event occurs in a firm, it should be best reflected
in the organization’s voluntary disclosure. Purely voluntary items were selected
because, as chapter 7 indicates, mandatory developments could exercise some
influence over voluntary reporting. It can be expected that this influence is least when
purely voluntary items are employed. Of course, one reason for including disclosure
into the study is to obtain further insight into the low returns-earnings relationship
reported in prior research (see Lev, 1989). 
The first three CAR windows were: (bgn, end), (bgn, -30), and (bgn, -15). The impact
of unexpected disclosure was not known in any of these. Rather, they measure the
impact of all communication other than that represented by the forthcoming income
statement. A firm’s disclosure behavior before the event can be studied by comparing
regression coefficients between separate disclosure quartiles. 
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The equations where the window includes the interim report announcement indicate
what reactions the interim reports themselves provoke in the markets. The cumulation
periods are: (bgn, 0), (bgn, 15), and (bgn, 30).
8.4.  Association between share price, unexpected earnings, and unexpected  
        disclosures with short and intermediate return periods 
This subsection focuses on the direct reactions to disclosure around the event. This
short return window approach provides additional evidence about how the actual
announcement is received by investors. This subsection should provide additional
understanding to section 8.3, where long return windows were applied to determine
the degree of association between returns and independent variables.
In order to control for the potential effects of share-related uncertainty, a proxy for
price variability was applied. In this case, it was the standard deviation of returns
during business days (-30, 30) around the event. A similar kind of variable is applied
by Greenstein and Sami (1994).
   
By comparing the regressions with several different window definitions it is possible
to deduce information about the association between returns, earnings, and price
variability relative to the event (for the use of varying return cumulation periods in the
vicinity of the event, see e.g. Ball & Kothari, 1991; Bernard & Thomas, 1989,  1990;
Brown, Clinch, & Foster, 1992). Because unexpected disclosure was applied as a
classificatory variable, it is possible to compare the effects of different levels of
disclosure on the information content of earnings. The model is presented below:
CAR(d1,d2)it 01UEit2SDRit it,
SPREAD(d)it 01UEit2SDRit it,
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   (4) 
   (5) 
where
 CAR(d1, d2) = cumulative abnormal returns in an arithmetic (additive) form, CARit
for stock i at event t. Expected returns are based on the market
model. Cumulation starts on date d1 and ends on date d2. A
negative/positive sign for the day indicates a pre/post-event day.
 = intercept, 0
 = regression coefficient of the unexpected earnings UE,1
 = regression coefficient of the standard deviation of returns SDR2
during the (-30, 30) business day period around the event, and
  = n.i.d. errors for stock i at event t.it
Ue  is defined as: [interim earnings after financial items (t’) - interim earnings afterit
financial items (corresponding period, t’-1)] / market value of equity at the beginning
of interim reporting period (t’). In the notation i refers to the stock, t to the event, and
t’ to the year. 
The bid-ask spread (SPREAD) around the event was studied using the model:
where
SPREAD(d) = bid-ask spread at day d for stock i at event t [see eq. (6) below]. Ait
negative/positive sign for d indicates a pre/post-event day. 
 = intercept, 0
 =  regression coefficient of the unexpected earnings UE,1
 = regression coefficient of the standard deviation of returns SDR2
during the (-30, 30) business day period around the event, and 
  = n.i.d. errors for stock i at event t.it
SPREAD(d)it 100[A(d)itB(d)it]/[(A(d)itB(d)it)/2],
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   (6) 
The SPREAD for eq. (5) above is computed as follows:
where
SPREAD(d) = bid-ask spread at day d for stock i at event t. A negative/positiveit
sign for d indicates a pre/post-event day.
A(d) = closing ask price at day d for stock i at event t, andit
B(d) = closing bid price at day d for stock i at event t.it
The following sections report the empirical results.   
8.5.  Implications of disclosure 
8.5.1. Share price responses to unexpected earnings and unexpected
disclosures with long return windows
This section reports the results of the association part of the study, with its long return
periods. Section 8.5.2 discusses the results obtained with short and intermediate
periods. Table 3 below summarizes the results based on regressions of unexpected
earnings and variations in returns on CAR, using eq. (3), in different disclosure
classes. In table 3, the separate columns contain the regression results for the lower,
middle, and upper unexpected disclosure quartiles. The rows contain the respective
cumulation period for abnormal returns. Also, results with heteroscedasticity-
corrected t values (White, 1980) were computed. The results of those regressions are
reported in appendix H-1 and are essentially the same as those in the main body of
this text. The forecasts of expected disclosure were obtained from the combined
model, consisting of: (1) the model reported in the determinants part of this study as
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shown in table 2 in section 7.3.2 and (2) a random walk forecast of disclosure. The
reason for including a random walk component in the forecasting model is the
incremental significance of the random walk forecast in the estimation of expected
disclosure compared to the forecast based solely on the determinants model. A random
walk is applied because of its potential to resemble an actual comparison of two
consecutive interim reports. 
Both the determinants part and the random walk part of the combined model have
equal weights. The original disclosure forecasting model gives approximately the
same weight to the determinants part and the random walk part of the model. A
combined model with equal weights is intuitively appealing. Therefore, a test was
performed to see whether these parts of the combined model can be assigned exactly
equal weights. The test was passed. Consequently, disclosure was forecasted using the
combined model, with identical weights assigned to the determinants component and
the random walk component. 
For the combined model, the model reported in the determinants part was estimated
separately for each interim report. The random walk forecast for current disclosure
was the previous purely voluntary disclosure score for a particular firm’s interim
report.
The regressions were performed according to disclosure quartiles. The second and
third disclosure quartiles were pooled. The combination of quarters two and three was
based on the F tests performed separately for each of the windows presented in table
3. The F test for the pooling of quartiles two and three was clearly passed five times
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out of six. The unexpected disclosure class boundaries were as follows: (1) lower
quartile, UPVD < -.04212; (2) middle quartiles, -.04212   UPVD < .04460; and (3)
upper quartile, .04460   UPVD. 
The cross-tabulation between UPVD and UE, with   (9), is 16.24. See appendix I for2
details of this. The probability of the value is 6.2%, indicating that there might be a
slight interaction between UPVD and UE. This is due to the fairly large number of
observations at the cross-tabulation of the first unexpected disclosure quartile and the
second unexpected earnings quartile. Correspondingly, at the cross-tabulation of the
fourth unexpected disclosure quartile and the second unexpected earnings quartile, the
number of observations is fairly small. In the rest of the cells, the UE observations
were fairly evenly distributed across the UPVD quartiles.
The results in table 3 indicate that the markets seem to expect a certain level of
disclosure. Table 3 shows that unexpected earnings are most strongly associated with
the CAR when the market’s expectations are matched by the actual level of disclosure
as they are in the middle quartiles. This outcome suggests that a firm’s management
can enhance its earnings information by preparing interim reports that contain the
expected level of disclosure. Recently, Frost and Kinney (1996) have observed
substantial variations in earnings/stock returns correlations in different domicile and
disclosure groups.
When disclosure conforms with expected disclosure (middle quartiles), the
coefficients of the SDR variables are insignificant in all of the six window definitions.
The interpretation of this is that factors other than return-related uncertainty explain
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the CAR when actual disclosure matches expectations. On a practical level, this result
suggests that it is beneficial for a firm to disclose in a consistent manner over time and
also to provide an adequate amount and quality of disclosure compared to other
similar firms.
In contrast to the middle quartiles, both the UE and SDR variables in the lower
quartile have statistically significant coefficients. The significant UE coefficients are
positive, whilst those for SDR are negative. The regression results suggest that in an
unexpected low disclosure situation both variables, UE and SDR, explain the behavior
of CAR. In the middle quartiles the UE variable alone explains CAR. In the lower and
middle disclosure quartiles, the intercept indicates statistical significance, at least
below the 5% level, in all but one of the regressions. In this set of models, economic
factors other than those identified in the models seem to exert a significant influence.
One of these factors is the fact that the markets interpret the event itself as good news.
The three return windows ending before the event indicate that there is an association
between returns and earnings prior to the event. These are: (bgn, end), (bgn, -30), and
(bgn, -15). Besides the positive and significant coefficient of the UE variable, the
coefficient of the SDR variable is also significant but negative before the event in the
lower disclosure quartile. This result suggests that anticipation of the forthcoming
interim report’s content differs between the lower and middle quartiles - the share
price uncertainty variable in the model, SDR, affects the behavior of CAR before the
event solely in the lower quartile.  
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The results in the upper quartile are different to those obtained in the lower and
middle quartiles. In the upper quartile, the model is significant only for the cumulation
period  (bgn, 0). The variable with a negative and significant coefficient in that model
is SDR. The standard deviation of the returns  is  negatively  related to  the  CAR
(bgn, 0) in the upper quartile. The  knowledge that an event is forthcoming seems in
itself be construed as good news in the upper quartile, too. This is indicated by the
intercept, which is positive and significant for the periods (bgn, -30) and (bgn, -15).
In this context, it should be mentioned that although the tests are performed separately
for each cumulation period, they are to some degree interdependent. This is due to the
method of computation of CAR: the starting day of each cumulation is always the
beginning day of the interim reporting period (bgn). This dependency is not a major
problem in this research, however, because the focus in this part of the study is on the
measurement of the general association. By fixing the starting day as the bgn, it is
possible to compare the regression results in the knowledge that the only change
affecting the results is the end day of the cumulation (d).
In the next section, the results for the short and intermediate return periods are
interpreted.
8.5.2.  Share price responses to unexpected earnings and unexpected
  disclosures with short and intermediate return windows
In this part of the study the main interest is in the direct implications of the event for
the share price. In order to capture these effects, both short and intermediate return
cumulation periods around the event were applied using eq. (4) above. Section 8.5.2.1
presents the results for short window cumulations beginning before, at, and after the
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event. Section 8.5.2.2 contains the results for intermediate windows - enveloping, pre-
and post-event. The unexpected disclosure quartiles employed were the same as those
in section 8.5.1.
8.5.2.1.  Short windows beginning before, at, and after the event  
Table 4 below contains the major results for the short and intermediate windows.
There are 17 investigation periods reported in the table. The results with intermediate
return windows are in panel A and with short return windows are in panel B. Also,
heteroscedasticity-corrected t values (White, 1980) were computed and the results are
reported in appendix H-2. These results are essentially the same as those in table 4. 
First the results for periods beginning at the event are presented. These are: (0, 0)
through (0, 5) and (0, 15). This sequence is long enough to show the effect of market
assimilation of new information. CAR(0, 15) is included in order to show the time by
which the main  impact of the event has been discounted in prices. In the middle
quartiles, in contrast to the lower and upper quartiles, the model is significant as early
as the event day. The positive coefficient of the UE variable is statistically significant
at the 5% level. This outcome strongly supports the view that the markets can quickly
revise their pre-event expectations of earnings information when other disclosed
information besides earnings matches expectations. In order to confirm the conclusion
based on the event day result, a regression was run for the preceding day (-1) alone.
The outcome was that no statistically significant results, either for the model or for the
individual coefficients, were found in any of the disclosure quartiles. This
demonstrates that one day before the event the markets have not fully anticipated the
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information content of the interim report. This outcome also gives additional evidence
that the event days used in this study are defined precisely.
In this context, it is important to consider cases where shares do not trade on the event
day. In general, the number of incidences of nontrading shares at the event was
approximately the same as that on the pre- and post-event days around the event. Only
a minor increase in the number of traded shares can be identified at and after the
event. About one fifth of the shares were not traded at or around the event. In order to
keep results as closely based on factual data as possible, no assumptions were made
to substitute the nontrading cases. Booth, Kallunki, and Martikainen (1996) and
Maynes and Rumsey (1993) measure unexpected returns around events when
securities do not trade daily.
Another conclusion based on the middle quartile results is that new information from
the event will gradually be discounted in prices after the event. For periods (0, 1)
through (0, 4) the statistical significance of the whole model and the UE coefficient is
below 0.1% level. The decreasing impact of the event in the course of the days
following the event is evident in the values of the regression coefficients. In the
middle quartiles, the highest value is obtained for the regression coefficient of UE
when CAR is (0, 2). After that day, the UE coefficients start to decrease. This
indicates that the effect of UE on abnormal returns is negative as early as day three.
An exception is the cumulation period (0, 4), when there is a temporal increase in the
UE coefficient. Unfortunately no normative explanation was found for this anomaly.
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In the upper quartile, the model is also statistically significant in the majority of cases
for short periods at and after the event. In addition, several relevant observations can
be made when comparing the results of the middle and upper quartiles for the periods
(0, 0) through (0, 5). First, in the upper quartile the model is significant for the period
(0, 1). This is one day later than in the middle quartiles. These results indicate that the
markets take longer to react to unexpected high disclosure (upper quartile) than to
react to expected level of disclosure (middle quartiles). A discussion of the possible
reasons for this is presented in the following. Second, in the upper quartile, the
coefficients of the UE and SDR variables are not significant before the period (0, 3).
The model can explain the behavior of CAR(0, 3) fairly well, because the adjusted R2
is a highly significant 37.9%. 
In the cumulation periods (0, 4) and (0, 5), only the coefficient for the UE variable is
significant in the upper quartile. A comparison of the results of the middle and upper
quartiles reveals that the new event-based information is discounted in prices with a
delay and in the upper quartile within fewer days vis-à-vis the middle quartiles. This
result shows that the new information of the event has a more decisive impact on the
market when the disclosed material is as expected (middle quartiles) than it is when
the markets are surprised by the level of disclosure, as they are in either the lower or
the upper quartiles. Therefore it can be concluded that when the level of disclosure is
as expected the communication of earnings to the market is assisted. The findings
obtained with the short periods underline the importance for firms of following a
consistent and predictable disclosure practice in order to avoid causing the markets
any surprises in their communication. When disclosure is below expectations (lower
quartile), even the earnings information has a low impact on the CAR. 
Empirical evidence182
The markets can also be surprised by disclosure that exceeds expectations (upper
quartile). In such cases the markets seem to react with a delay to the new information
announced in the event. There can be at least two possible, complementary
explanations for the delayed market response in the upper quartile. First, it might
demand additional time and effort from market participants to analyze and make
investment decisions based on an unexpectedly high degree of disclosure compared to
a situation where disclosure is as expected (middle quartiles). Second, it is also
possible that some specific reasons have induced the extended disclosure. In
particular, if a firm’s management considers earnings information to be insufficient to
present a true and complete view of the firm’s affairs, it may try to mitigate this
information problem by extending disclosure to be more thorough and detailed. It
could be that earnings figures are not an equally suitable indicator of a firm’s
performance in different disclosure quartiles. These potential variations in the ability
of earnings to measure performance may also influence a firm’s managers’ disclosure
behavior. One example supporting this view is the fairly frequent statements in interim
reports that earnings figures are affected by seasonal variations. 
The last three rows in panel B indicate the market response to short windows
beginning after the event. The (6, 10) row clearly shows that the majority of the new
information revealed in the interim reports has been completely discounted in prices
during the previous six days. The (6, 10) row includes no statistically significant
coefficients and the model is also insignificant.
The following row, (11, 15), shows a very similar pattern to the (6, 10) row. However,
a difference between periods (6, 10) and (11, 15) can be perceived in the upper
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quartile. The model and all its coefficients, apart from the intercept, are statistically
significant in the (11, 15) period. This outcome can be partly explained as an
overreaction to the information revealed in the event (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985). The
signs of the coefficients are opposite to those in the statistically significant regressions
in the upper quartile immediately after the event, thus supporting the view. 
The bottom row in panel B, (16, 20), further confirms that the event-related
information has already been discounted in prices. The model and all its parameters
are statistically insignificant in the  lower and upper disclosure quartiles. However, in
the middle quartiles the coefficient of the UE variable and the model are significant at
the 5% level. A possible explanation for the results for the middle quartiles is that the
cumulation period (16, 20) reflects the association between returns and earnings, as
discussed in section 8.2, above (Collins & Kothari, 1989). 
An association is likely to be recognized in the middle quartiles, because firms in that
disclosure group do not give the market any major surprises. A level of disclosure
matching the market’s expectations is probably partly a consequence of the fairly
stable business conditions in which many of the firms in the middle group operate. A
similar pattern of association is found in the middle, but not in the lower and upper
quartiles, of the intermediate period (0, 20) in panel A. These short window results in
the middle quartiles prepare the observer for a similar set of results in the intermediate
windows, which are reported in the next subsection: 8.5.2.2.   
The following is offered as an explanation for the middle quartiles. There appears to
be an association between returns and earnings, most clearly reflected in table 4 in the
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(0, 0) through (0, 5) and (16, 20) windows. After the information release to the
market, in the middle quartiles, the markets return to their normal behavior some days
after the event. The former may be characterized as a reaction period, which is
followed by a neutral period. The whole market then reverts to an association period
until another event begins the process again. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that a set of analyses was systematically performed in
order to establish how applicable the use of OLS is and how valid the results are in
this context. The tests [White test (White, 1980), Jarque-Bera test (Jarque & Bera,
1987), and RESET test (Ramsey, 1969)] were run for the period (0, 5). That particular
period is one of the most critical in the interpretation of the results. As in chapter 7,
diagnostic tests with insignificant results are deliberately not reported here. 
The White test indicated that the results are not affected by heteroscedasticity.
However, another version of the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979)
suggested the existence of some type of heteroscedasticity in the upper quartile. After
an adjustment for heteroscedasticity, the model was rerun. Both the fit and the
statistical significance of the original and the adjusted model were essentially the
same. This indicates that although the heteroscedasticity is statistically significant, it
does not appear to be a serious problem. 
The normality of the residuals was examined by means of the Jarque-Bera test. In the
upper quartile the residuals were clearly normally distributed. The test values obtained
for the other quartiles were: (1) lower quartile,   (2)=108.37, p=.000; and (2) middle2
quartiles,   (2)=92.44, p=.000. The test values for the lower and middle quartiles2
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show that the normality assumptions in respect of residuals are seriously violated in
those disclosure groups. Further analysis of the data is presented later in the text.
The potential nonlinear relationship between the dependent and the independent
variables was studied using the RESET test. The low F value indicated that the
present linear model is valid for the lower and middle quartiles. However, there was
a potential slight nonlinearity between the dependent and the independent variables in
the upper quartile, with its higher F value: F(3, 59)=2.66, p=.056. However, due to the
relatively low level of significance of the F value, the potential nonlinearity should not
have any material influence on the results. 
In order to study the effect of potential outliers, a screening of the data was
performed. The observations with the highest and lowest error residuals in the extreme
disclosure quartiles and the two highest and two lowest error residuals in the pooled
middle disclosure quartiles were eliminated.
The values in the White test with the screened data indicate that there is no
heteroscedasticity in any of the disclosure quartiles. Conversely, another version of
the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979) recognizes some sort of
heteroscedasticity in the upper quartile (see text above for more details). 
As regards the normality of the error residuals, the Jarque-Bera test was clearly passed
in the middle and upper quartiles with the screened data. The results indicate that the
deviation from normality in the middle quartiles with untrimmed data is due to a small
number of outliers. But in the lower quartile the test value of   (2)=8.03, p=.0182
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suggests the existence of nonnormality even with the trimmed data. Further
investigations show that in the lower quartile screening eliminates high kurtosis, but
skewness remains. The essential results, however, are substantially the same and
therefore the original results, without trimmed data, are reported.
Finally, the RESET test for nonlinearity was clearly passed in the lower and middle
quartiles, also with the screened data. However, the test value for the upper disclosure
quartile was F(3, 57)=2.56, p=.064. This suggests the existence of slight nonlinearity
between the dependent and independent variables. Due to the insignificant F value,
the potential nonlinearity is not considered to have any material influence on the
results. 
Together with the nonnormal outliers, influential observations were also examined.
Some of the possible outliers were also identified as influential observations.
However, no influential observations were found in the main body of the data. It
should be also stated that two extreme values of the SDR variable were classified as
outliers: (1) Corum (1988) and (2) Bakers’ Wholesale, Inc. (1990). The criterion for
excluding these two SDR values was that the values deviate by factors of ten from the
other SDR values. A third outlier was the UE value for Stromsdal (1992). This value
was extremely large, due to the very small deflator in its UE computation. All these
three observations were interpreted as outliers, by the classical definition. They were,
therefore, excluded in the final runs.
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8.5.2.2.  Intermediate windows for enveloping, pre- and post-event periods     
Panel A in table 4 above reports the results for the intermediate windows: (-20, 20),
(-20, -1), and (0, 20). The maximum length of the intermediate window was 41
business days, because this span captures all the relevant results for this part of the
study. For example, the statistical significance of the overall model, as well as the
individual coefficients, is about the same for CAR(-20, 20) as it is for the longer
CAR(-30, 30) observations. In order to find out what effect the event has on the CAR,
both pre-event and post-event cumulations, in addition to the enveloping period, were
performed: (-20, -1) and (0, 20).
The results for the window (-20, 20) indicate that by focusing only on the 41 business
day period, the model’s ability to explain CAR is low. However, the model with the
post-event  period, (0, 20), shows statistical significance in the middle disclosure
quartiles. More specifically, the model, the intercept, and coefficient of the UE
variable are statistically significant at the 5% level. The significance of the UE
coefficient suggests that the event causes a higher association between unexpected
earnings and CAR when the reported disclosure conforms with expectations (middle
quartiles) than in the lower and upper quartiles. The significance of the intercept in the
middle quartiles, but not in the extreme quartiles, for the period (-20, -1) indicates that
the event itself is considered by the markets to be good news. The result is in line with
the view of the financial analyst interviewed (see section 7.1.3.1). The analyst stressed
in the interview, which was conducted during the construction phase of the disclosure
scoresheet, the essential importance of being aware of the precise event day in order
to prepare accordingly.
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8.5.3.  Bid-ask spread, unexpected earnings, and unexpected disclosures with
    short return windows
This section discusses some findings for the bid-ask spread [see eq. (5) above].
Overall the results obtained for the bid-ask spread are weak. No statistically
significant coefficients for the model in eq. (5) were obtained. The runs were
performed separately for the disclosure quartiles presented in section 8.5.1. 
One potential reason for the statistically insignificant results with the spread model
might be differences in the trading patterns of HSE-listed firms. For this reason, the
spread model in eq. (5) was performed also separately for firms listed solely on the
HSE and for firms listed both on the HSE and one or more other exchanges. However,
these additional runs did not provide any systematic or normative evidence that
unexpected disclosure affects the bid-ask spread. Prior research in Finland has also
reported weak results for spread. The bid-ask spread is one of the liquidity measures
that Hedvall (1994) uses to study potential differences in liquidity before and after the
introduction of the HETI automated trading system on the HSE. Hedvall provides
more detail of the operation of HETI (op. cit., pp. 4-5). One reason for the low
statistical significance obtained with the spread variable is probably the relatively low
trading volume on the HSE. More generally, the thinness of a capital market very
likely explain some of the difference in results compared to those obtained in the U.S.
institutional environment (Bradbury, 1992, p. 144).   
8.5.4.  The main implications of disclosure in brief
Finally, some of the main findings related to the implications of the information in
interim reports are summarized briefly. The results with the long return windows,
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reported in table 3 above, imply that when disclosure is as expected (middle quartiles)
there is a positive association between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected
earnings (statistical significance at the 0.1% level). The coefficient of the standard
deviation of returns is statistically insignificant in the middle quartiles. In the lower
quartile, the coefficients of UE and SDR are both statistically significant at the 5%
level in most cases. 
The short and intermediate periods reported in table 4 above give additional evidence
of the way in which interim reports are used by the market. The short periods (panel
B) beginning at the event, (0, 0) through (0, 5), show the principal finding - the degree
of unexpected disclosure affects the communication of the earnings information
content to the market. When the disclosures do not contain any surprises for the
market, the coefficient of the UE variable is clearly both more frequently and more
highly statistically significant than it is in the lower or upper disclosure quartiles.
Furthermore, the model is more frequently statistically significant in the middle
quartiles than it is in the lower or upper disclosure quartiles.

Part three
Conclusions
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9.  Summary and discussion 
9.1.  Summary of the study
This study examines both the qualitative and quantitative information contained in
interim reports. Interim financial reporting only became mandatory in Finland in the
calendar year 1986 (HSE Cooperative, 1988, p. 18). This unusual situation makes the
Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE) especially suited to the investigation of the
determinants and implications of interim reporting in present-day conditions, as
suggested by Burton (1981, p. 83).
The data for the database constructed in this study were extracted from interim reports
published by the firms listed on the HSE in the calendar years 1985 through 1993. The
finance and insurance sectors were excluded, due to their widely varying formats,
both intra- and inter-company. Two types of interim report-specific disclosure indices
were designed and applied. Special care was taken in the construction of the indices
in order to make them as impartial as possible. Furthermore, the measures of
disclosure were established from the original interim reports in an effort to minimize
the influence of any perceptive bias. In the theoretical part of the study, it was
hypothesized that the level of disclosure is a function of a firm’s: (1) governance
structure, (2) business risk, (3) market risk, (4) capital structure, (5) stock valuation,
(6) growth, (7) growth potential, (8) size, and (9) market maturity. The variables were
defined, as far as possible, to be consistent with prior research. There were some new
variables and some changes in definition were made necessary in order to add to
current  understanding. The  variables of the determinants of disclosure were mainly
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 expected to reflect the information asymmetry between managers and a firm’s outside
interest groups (Healy & Palepu, 1993).
The consequences of disclosure for the stock markets were studied in the implications
part of the work. The focus was on unexpected purely voluntary disclosure, in order
to capture that portion of disclosure over which a firm’s management can exercise a
lot of discretion. The consequences were examined by applying both long and short
research periods in the vicinity of the event. The effects of interim reports on the
market were measured by abnormal returns and bid-ask spreads. 
9.1.1.  Determinants of the information in interim reports
The overall disclosure in interim reports includes both the mandatory portion and
items that are reported voluntarily. The results show that overall disclosure is directly
related to the quantitative measures of: (1) business risk, (2) growth potential, and (3)
firm size. Moreover, during the nine-year research period, 1985 through 1993, the
development of the quality of interim reports was rapid, paralleling the expansion of
accounting and market regulation. This explains the test results for the dichotomy
market maturity variable.
An interesting finding is that a firm’s growth potential seems to decrease the overall
level of disclosure in interim reports. One possible explanation for this is that growth
potential is in itself an indicator of a firm’s performance. In certain business sectors,
firm-specific information may be so valuable that firms are not willing to disclose it
in their interim reports. It should also be mentioned that (1) governance structure, (2)
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market risk, (3) capital structure, (4) stock valuation, and (5) firm growth do not help
explain the overall level of disclosure. 
Recent literature indicates the importance of voluntary disclosure (Healy & Palepu,
1995, pp. 138-139). Therefore voluntary disclosure was studied in addition to overall
disclosure. The development of interim reporting legislation during the research
period was considerable. This made it possible to examine the impact of increased
regulation on the voluntary elements reported in interim reports. Another reason for
investigating the voluntary portion of disclosure is its potential to reflect relevant firm-
or industry-specific information that may not be contained in the regulated parts of the
disclosure. In order to approximate the voluntary disclosure as closely as possible,
items that were entirely voluntary during the research period were investigated. This
led to the construction of a disclosure index for purely voluntary items. 
Most of the determinants of purely voluntary disclosure in interim reports were the
same as those for the overall disclosure. Just as the year is a statistically significant
determinant of overall disclosure, it is also an important explanatory variable for the
degree of purely voluntary disclosure. This indicates that firms are willing to submit
voluntary information, besides mandatory items, in their interim reports. 
The number of shareholders is one of the measures of the governance structure. It is
a significant determinant of the voluntary, but not of the overall, disclosure model.
This confirms that voluntary reporting is required to fulfill the various information
needs of shareholders. Moreover, the size of corporate shareholdings seems to be
negatively related to voluntary disclosure. This result suggests that especially in cases
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where other corporates hold a large number of a firm’s shares, alternative
communication means are used to augment interim reports. The thinness of a capital
market might encourage firms increasingly to use indirect channels of corporate
communication, as stated in Bradbury (1992).   
9.1.2.  Implications of the information in interim reports
The principal finding in the implications part of the study is that the degree of
disclosure assists in the communication of earnings information to the market. In the
middle quartiles, after the market has digested the transmission of the interim report
information, it returns to its normal behavior pattern some days after the event. This
may be characterized as a reaction period. This is followed by a neutral period. The
whole market then reverts to an association period until another event begins the
process again. 
In addition,  the bid-ask spread is not statistically significantly related to the disclosure
in the vicinity of the event. One possible reason for this is the thinness of trading in
the HSE. In general, both the determinants part and the implications part support the
stated hypotheses. Furthermore, the major results are in line with those of prior
studies. 
9.1.3.  Organization of the research report
The present work follows the classical structure of a research report. It is divided into
four main parts: (1) Preliminaries, chapter 1; (2) Theory and institutional setting,
chapters 2 through 5; (3) Empirical evidence, chapters 6 through 8; and (4)
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Conclusions, chapter 9. Supplementary material is provided in appendices A through
J.
The first section of the study, Preliminaries, sets the stage for the research. It contains
chapter 1 only. Special emphasis is placed on the reasons for studying a firm’s
business communication behavior, applying interim reports as the data source. 
Part one, Theory and institutional setting, lays the theoretical foundation and
describes the  institutional regime of the study. Chapter 2 discusses current issues in
the communication of corporate affairs to the capital markets. Chapter 3 contains a
review of prior research. Firstly this review summarizes current knowledge related to
interim reports. The second portion of the survey covers major developments in
disclosure index studies over the past 30 years. The review begins with the pioneering
work by Cerf (1961) and ends with the latest available disclosure studies. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the institutional setting. The rationale for including this
chapter is to help the reader compare somewhat divergent institutional settings. The
chapter begins with an international overview of interim reporting practices. Then the
development of interim reporting regulation and legislation in Finland, the U.S.A., and
Sweden is presented. The reason for including the U.S.A. is that the majority of
academic literature available to the author is based on U.S. data. This makes a brief
outline of the institutional setting in the United States a useful benchmark for
subsequent analyses and contrasts. The interested reader can compare institutional
settings and evaluate how the results may be influenced by these differences. Sweden
is included because, besides its geographical proximity to Finland: (1) the economies
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of the two countries are closely related, (2) there is a tradition of collaboration
between Finland and Sweden in the area of regulation and legislation, and (3) relevant
prior research is available (Martikainen, Yli-Olli, & Gunasekaran, 1991).
Chapter 5 derives the research hypotheses. The last part of the chapter outlines the
structure  of the empirical investigation. 
Part two, Empirical evidence, details the data collection and preparation phases and
the subsequent statistical analyses. Chapter 6 describes the collection of the
accounting data and the stock market data in sections 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. 
Chapter 7 familiarizes the reader with the determinants part of the study. Special care
is taken to detail the development of the disclosure index applied in sections 7.1.1 and
beyond.
Chapter 8 contains the implications part of the study. The construction of the
hypothesis is described in section 8.1. The methods applied in this part of the work are
presented in section 8.2. Section 8.5 reports the implications results when both long
and short return measurement periods (windows) are used.
Part three, Conclusions, summarizes the work and offers suggestions for further
research. This is accomplished in chapter 9.  
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9.2.  Conclusions from the determinants perspective
Some prior studies of the determinants of disclosure have been criticized for their
questionable use of the theory of agency and monitoring (Ball & Foster, 1982;
Schipper, 1981). Models of agency and monitoring are relatively abstract. On the
other hand, the richness of detail present in actual disclosure makes it necessary to
explain disclosure behavior in a way that takes the institutional structure into account
more comprehensively than agency and monitoring theory can. 
In this study, the hypotheses are derived to gain insight into the actual determinants of
disclosures in interim reports. Accordingly, in chapter 5, disclosure is defined as a
function of the firm’s: (1) governance structure, (2) business risk, (3) market risk, (4)
capital structure, (5) stock valuation, (6) growth, (7) growth potential, (8) size, and (9)
market maturity. The filter used in the selection of independent variables is their
potential ability to provide indications of the need for disclosure. Prior literature is
reviewed extensively to identify these variables.
In the following the results obtained in the determinants part of the study are
presented briefly. The text is organized according to the variables comprising the
theoretical disclosure function presented above.
The results for governance structure show that the greater the proportion of shares
owned by other corporates, the lower the level of voluntary disclosure in interim
reports. This indicates that means of communication other than interim reports are
employed when other firms constitute significant shareholders. In such situations, the
firm in question may also have a seat on the board, through which information can be
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garnered. This is especially true when such ownership is combined with active
participation in the firm’s management. Information based solely on interim reports
may be out of date or not specific enough for management purposes.  
   
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the governance structure
variable indicates that the greater the number of shareholders, the higher the level of
voluntary disclosure in interim reports. This finding confirms the existence of a
positive relationship between disclosure and the number of shareholders, as reported
by Cerf (1961).
Priebjrivat (1992) suggests that the greater the number of shareholders, the greater the
heterogeneity in their information needs. He finds that the higher the concentration of
shares, the lower the level of disclosure. In the present study, within the institutional
owners group, ownership by firms is the variable that is most negatively correlated
with the number of shareholders. This confirms that a low number of owners is
correlated with ownership by firms. This relationship is also in line with the stated
hypothesis that firms where owners exert strong control will disclose less than firms
with strong management control.
Both the number of shareholders and the percentage of ownership by firms are
significant in the purely voluntary disclosure regression. This suggests that ownership
by firms and the number of shareholders reflect separate aspects of governance. 
The results for the business risk variables show that business risk increases disclosure
in both the general and in the purely voluntary elements of interim reports. The results
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suggest that the higher the standard deviation of the percentage change in net sales or
in the net investments/total assets ratio, the higher the level of disclosure. This is as
hypothesized, but is in contrast to the findings of Garsombke (1979), who reports that
variations in annual earnings are not related to disclosure. 
In terms of market risk, the hypothesis is that the higher the risk, the higher is also the
level of disclosure. Measures of market risk do not have statistically significant
coefficients in the present study. This outcome strongly supports the view that market
risk, as measured by market model beta, is not related to the level of disclosure in
interim reports. This finding bears out results reported by others (Firth, 1984;
Garsombke, 1979; Priebjrivat, 1992). 
Prior research into capital structure indicates that, in general, a firm’s need for capital
is correlated to increased disclosure (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Priebjrivat, 1992;
Spero, 1979). Imhoff (1992) finds that high accounting quality, as judged by
professional analysts, is related to low debt-to-equity ratios. In this study, on the other
hand, the capital structure variables are not related to disclosure, as hypothesized. This
outcome suggests that in Finland more direct communication links, such as debt
contracts, connect the firm to its lenders. On the equity side, it could be that, when a
firm issues shares, it is the public offering prospectus that is the vehicle by which the
firm communicates its application of capital, rather than the interim report.
Two additional reasons why the results obtained in this study contradict those of some
prior studies may be that others have applied: (1) annual reports or (2) overall
disclosure quality instead of: (1) interim reports and (2) strictly voluntary disclosure.
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The next disclosure determinant is hypothesized to be stock valuation. The
supposition is that if securities are mispriced, managers will seek to inform the
markets of the mispricing. However, no statistically significant results are obtained for
the variables approximating possible mispricing. The coefficients of the stock
valuation variables may be insignificant because of the relatively long windows. The
125 business day window could be too wide to capture the relationship between share
prices and disclosure. The low relationship between share valuation and disclosure
might also be due to potential differences in the  assessment of information between
accountants, financial analysts, and other users of disclosed information (Benjamin &
Stanga, 1977; Chandra, 1974; Firth, 1979a; Havunen & Yli-Olli, 1986; Lee &
Tweedie, 1975a, 1975b, 1976; Wallace, 1988).      
Although this study does not find any evidence for a direct relationship between share
valuation and disclosure, some studies report evidence of a connection between share
price volatility and disclosure. Singhvi and Desai (1971) find that firms that disclose
inadequate information tend to be repaid in the form of increased volatility in their
stock prices. Conversely, Priebjrivat (1992) finds no relationship between the level  of
disclosure and return variance. He supposes this to be related to the emerging nature
of the particular host market studied: the Securities Exchange of Thailand.
Some prior studies report a positive relationship between disclosure and profitability
(Cerf, 1961; Healy, Palepu, & Sweeney, 1995; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Singhvi &
Desai, 1971; Williams, 1992). Accordingly, disclosure is hypothesized in this study
to be positively related to a firm’s: (1)  growth and (2) growth potential. Contrary to
the hypothesis of the present study, growth potential, as measured by the profit/net
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sales ratio, has a negative coefficient both in the overall and the purely voluntary
models of disclosure behavior. The unexpected results obtained in this study can be
explained by the emphasis placed on the analysis portion of interim reports. It seems
that, especially in times when a firm is facing difficulties in its operations, extended
analysis is introduced into the disclosures. This explanation is line with the finding of
the present study that high growth potential is related to low disclosure. Another
argument might be that managers believe a high profit/net sales ratio is adequate
evidence of the firm’s performance.
The eighth property hypothesized to be positively related to disclosure is firm size. In
accordance with the findings of prior research, shown in appendix A, this study finds
that the size variable has a positive and statistically highly significant coefficient in
both the overall and purely voluntary disclosure models.
Developments in regulation took place during the research period, 1985-93.
Furthermore, the growth of the HSE has been rapid, especially in the second half of
the 1980s. Thus, yearly dichotomy variables were included in the model in order to
capture developments designated as market maturity. The results obtained show that
the year is an important factor in the explanation of disclosure. This finding is
consistent with several prior studies shown in appendix A. Some evidence from
Finland is presented by Tuominen (1991), and further evidence is provided in this
research. 
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9.3.  Conclusions from the implications perspective
The implications part of this research investigates the effect that unexpected purely
voluntary disclosure in interim reports has on the market. The use of unexpected
disclosure eliminates distortions caused by the influence of the determinants of
disclosure. In order to extend the findings of prior research, particularly in returns-
earnings studies, the influence of disclosure in the context of earnings is analyzed.
The major linkage between the determinants and implications parts of this research is
that the determinants derived from the voluntary disclosure model are included in the
computation of expected disclosure.
The principal finding in the implications part of the study is that the degree of
unexpected disclosure assists in the communication of earnings information to the
market. This outcome is especially evident when short return windows are applied.
When longer return windows are used, as in the association approach, the implications
of disclosure and earnings for the market are not so obvious. In general, the results
obtained from the association approach give additional evidence of the rather low
returns-earnings association reported by Lev (1989) and other literature cited there.
However, when the disclosure level corresponds with expectations, the unexpected
earnings variable receives a higher degree of statistical significance than it does for
either unexpected low or unexpected high levels of disclosure. This result indicates
the importance of disclosure in general, and it also shows the necessity of defining the
return windows appropriately.
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To summarize, it can be said that determinants derived from firms’ own activities
were better able to explain disclosure than variables derived from financial market
data. This finding also indicates that special care should be taken if the direction of the
relationship between disclosure and the independent variable is defined ex ante.
Hypotheses about the relationship between disclosure and independent variables
implicitly assume that disclosure is prepared for certain purposes. Consequently,
actual relationships between disclosure and independent variables can provide insight
into the different functions of disclosure. This line of reasoning supports the view
presented in Burton (1981) and in Schipper (1981).
The implications part of the research shows that disclosed information other than
earnings is relevant to the market. In particular, when the disclosure does not contain
any major surprises to the market it assists the communication of earnings
information.  
9.4.  Managerial aspects
One of the key functions of communication by management is to ensure that the true
value of a firm’s various operations is reflected in its share price. Users should be able
to fully comprehend the information that management discloses. The means to
communicate to outsiders the underlying workings of a modern corporation and its
decision-making are not always readily available. Furthermore, the information itself
has become a crucial competitive factor. Therefore firms may sometimes be cautious,
even reluctant, to expand their disclosure of information. On the other hand,
competitive capital markets require increasingly detailed information in order to
attract investors to a firm. Research performed in this area has several important
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implications for corporate disclosure practice. Management surely formulates and
enacts the disclosure policy. Lev (1992, p. 28) states the following:
Given that without an active, long-term disclosure strategy, there is no
assurance that the full value of the firm’s other activities will be fully
reflected in a timely manner in the various markets in which it operates, the
need for a disclosure strategy arises. A disclosure strategy should be of
particular interest to top management, since disclosure is among the few
corporate activities practiced directly by executives, as contrasted with most
other activities which are delegated to subordinates.  
This need has also been recognized by firms themselves. An indication of this can be
found in the communication manual of an HSE-listed firm, Huhtamäki Oy
(Huhtamäki, 1993, p. 2):
Professionally managed external communications provide essential support
to all key activities, such as the recruitment of qualified individuals, the
marketing of innovative, value-added products, and the procurement of
financial resources. In emergency situations, a company’s credibility is
largely measured by how well its crisis communications are handled. 
Openness, however, has two kinds of limitations: those imposed by law and
statutory procedures, and those dictated by company policy and
commercially motivated self-restraint. Every employee should have a basic
understanding of these constraints.   
The above quotations illustrate some of the key dimensions in which business
communication can have an important impact. On the other hand, poor external
communications may result in the markets having serious difficulties in
comprehending a firm’s true value. Some important aspects that have to be taken into
Conclusions 207
account in firm-to-outsiders communication are discussed in the following. Business
communication can also influence the composition of analysts monitoring a firm. A
discussion of that issue concludes this subsection.
First, a firm’s external communication has to be managed. A long-term disclosure
strategy is essential if the value of the various operations of a firm is to be translated
effectively into prices. Recent studies, including the present one, have found that
information disclosed concurrently with earnings has incremental information value
for the market. There are even findings showing that disclosure scores are higher for
firms with a weaker relation between stock returns and earnings. Evidence shows that
earnings figures should be supplemented with additional disclosures. The markets
need to know the quality of the earnings reported: the permanence of earnings is
important information for the investment community. Investors’ awareness of the
communication process as such is also important. Information on when a firm will
publish an accounting report is essential because the markets form estimates of the
content of forthcoming accounting reports, such as an interim report.   
Second, the investment community needs to be able to monitor a firm’s development
over time. A long-term disclosure strategy will help in that effort. It should be possible
to make comparisons between the current and previous years’ information. The
implications part of this research indicates the importance of consistent disclosure
quality in interim reports. As regards income statements and balance sheets, it is fairly
straightforward to make comparisons with figures for previous years even in the
current reporting  practice. It is also important for managers to make  sector-specific
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information available to investors since the characteristics of different business sectors
can be very distinct.
Third, disclosures are a possible medium whereby corporations can articulate their
long-term strategy and managers their opinion of how well they have succeeded in
implementing that strategy. The firm’s outlook in the light of the implementation of
its strategy could also be discussed via the medium of disclosures. Additional
disclosures should also allow comparisons and analyses of a corporation’s main
performance indicators to be made. That would help the investment community to
have a deeper insight to the firm and its operations. It would also be easier to analyze
a firm’s future prospects. This, in turn, would decrease the uncertainty faced by
investors in the firm’s shares. This could make for a lower risk premium, making the
firm’s shares a more attractive investment.
Fourth, a firm’s disclosure policy can also affect the degree to which the investment
community searches information from secondary sources. Information based on
secondary sources, rather than a firm’s own announcements, could be less accurate
and may only refer to part of the firm. In contrast, the information in interim and
annual reports applies to the whole firm. Analyses could then be performed in a firm
context.
By releasing an adequate amount of information of the appropriate quality a firm can
encourage investors to use primary sources of information published by the firm itself.
Functioning investor relations advance the cause of communication and consequently
reduce the possibility of misunderstandings. Inadequate or even incorrectly construed
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information can have harmful consequences for a firm. The modern technology used
in communications also speeds up the dissemination of incorrect information. In
practice it is important to designate authority to make public statements on behalf of
a firm to specified persons.  
Fifth, proper primary communication could also help to ensure that all market
participants receive information concurrently with others. That would reduce possible
problems of trading on privileged information. The credibility of accounting reports
is enhanced if financial decisions are taken that are in line with the statements issued
to investors.
Finally, a firm’s disclosure practices can also influence what analysts monitor the firm
and the quality of their earnings forecasts. More informative disclosure policies may
attract large institutional investors. Good quality disclosure helps to build up
confidence in a firm as an attractive investment. Another reason why analysts may be
inclined  to monitor firms that disclose well is the potentially improved accuracy of
their earnings forecasts for those firms. That may, in turn, cause analysts to avoid
firms with low quality disclosures. This is because analysts are not willing to
jeopardize their reputation by releasing potentially misleading earnings forecasts.
9.5.  Legislative aspects
The findings reported in this paper indicate that legislation has an impact on the level
of disclosure in interim reports. It is especially important to note that the regulation of
earnings alone is not sufficient. Other items also need to be regulated to some extent.
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An interesting finding is that legislation and regulation also have an impact on purely
voluntary disclosure in interim reports. 
Despite the positive impacts which regulatory developments have had for the markets,
there still seems to be a somewhat short-term view of the use of interim reports. When
short measurement periods are employed, the coefficient of the unexpected earnings
variable in the middle quartiles has almost always a much higher value than
coefficients associated with longer return measurement periods. More research is
needed to provide further understanding of: (1) how markets use disclosed information
and (2) what information is useful in long-run decision making.    
9.6.  Suggestions for further research and concluding note
Several possible avenues suggest themselves for further research into business
communication as practiced in interim reports. In order to avoid prolonging this last
section, only a few suggestions for further research are made. The technical details
associated with such research are not elaborated upon here. 
A combination of the traditional returns-earnings approach with empirical disclosure
data would add significantly to current knowledge of the use of accounting
information. As indicated in this study, the degree of disclosure affects the
communication of the earnings information content to the market. This principal
finding could be built upon in several ways. Theoretically, a current share price can
be expressed in terms of discounted earnings. Therefore it could be argued that
information other than earnings strengthens the information content of the earnings 
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numbers. However, to date there have only been  limited theoretical developments in
the area of disclosure.  
More research is needed to gain further understanding of how markets use earnings
and disclosures. One area of research would be to study whether the disclosure of a
specific information item has a different impact when disclosed in various disclosure
contexts. Current research offers only limited information on this point. Furthermore,
it would be interesting to examine whether there is an association between the quality
of disclosure and the composition of the analysts monitoring the firm. The database
compiled in this study also provides the opportunity to study whether the market
implications of various interim reporting periods deviate from each others.
Similarly, additional research is called for to better understand whether different
business sectors would benefit from different kinds of disclosure. Currently, Finnish
legislation assumes that similar disclosure is appropriate for different types of
businesses, excluding the finance and insurance sectors. It is also important to see
disclosure as part of a firm’s overall communications effort. 
In conclusion, an interim report-specific disclosure index for both overall and purely
voluntary disclosure in interim reports is constructed in this study. The major
determinants of the information disclosed in interim reports are presented. This is
achieved by analyzing: (1) total interim reports, including both mandatory and
voluntary disclosures; and (2) all the subsets of interim reports, containing purely
voluntary disclosures. The major determinants of disclosure, besides the year in which
an interim report is published, are found to be: (1) business risk, (2) growth potential,
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and (3) firm size. Furthermore, the implications of the information disclosed in interim
reports are investigated. It is found that besides earnings, other information disclosed
also enhances the value of earnings information to the market, in particular when the
level of disclosure is as expected.
A
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Appendix A.  Annotated bibliography of empirical research on corporate disclosures
Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Cerf (1961) 258 NYSE, 113 other Regression 31 weighted A positive relation between disclosure and: (1) asset size,        
exchanges, 156 OTC items, based (2) number of stockholders, and (3) profitability exists
firms - annual reports on literature 
(July 1, 1956 - June 30, and professional
1957) analysts
Copeland & Fredericks 200 NYSE listing Rank 6 specific indices, A positive relation between materiality and disclosure
 (1968) applications (1964) correlations 1 for each of 6  exists. This relation, however, is statistically insignificant.
specific purposes  
for listing a stock
Singhvi (1968) 100 Fortune 500 firms, Classification 32 items, based on Firms publish a narrower range of financial information in 
50 OTC firms - 10-Ks,  and tabulation judgement, 4 their annual reports than they divulge to the SEC
annual reports (April 1,  professional analysts
1965 - March 31, 1966)  
Singhvi & Desai 100 NYSE, 55 OTC Regression 34 weighted items, Firms disclosing inadequate information tend to be:(1) small,
(1971) firms - annual reports based on interviews (2) free from listing requirements, (3)audited by a small CPA 
(April 1, 1965 - with experts and firm, and (4) less profitable. In addition, they tend to have  
March 31, 1966) literature more volatility in their stock prices.
Baker & Haslem 1,623 individual investors Arithmetic mean, 33 items, based Individual investors use many items, especially to assist in the 
(1973) - questionnaire Standard deviation on pretested anticipation process 
  (undated) questionnaire
Choi (1973a) 72 firms that are Matched pairs 36 unweighted and Entry to the European capital market is related to
Eurobond participants weighted items, improvements in disclosure
- annual reports based on investor 
(participants prior decision framework  
to July 1971) and literature
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Buzby (1974) 44 NYSE and AMEX, Rank correlations 38 weighted items, The correlation between the relative importance of the items       
and 44 OTC firms based on literature and the extent of their disclosure is low
- annual reports and professional
    (June 30, 1970 - analysts  
  June 30, 1971)
Chandra (1974) 600 CPAs and  Pairwise 58 items, based on The value of information in equity investment decisions
400 CFAs comparison literature, annual differs between accountants and financial analysts
- questionnaire of ratings reports, professional 
   (undated) analysts, accountants
Barrett (1975) 103 firms, located in Comparison of 17 unweighted and The overall extent and quality of American annual report
U.S.A. (15), Japan (15), disclosure indices weighted items, disclosure is not better than that of British firms. In specific
U.K. (15), France (15), and subindices based on literature disclosure areas there are also differences between countries.
Germany (15), Sweden (15), and judgment
and the Netherlands (13)
- annual reports 
   (1963-72)
Buzby (1975) see Buzby (1974) above Matched pairs 39 weighted items, A positive relation between disclosure in annual reports and
based on literature  the size of company’s assets exists. Disclosure and listing  
and professional status are not related. 
financial analysts
  
 Barrett (1976) see Barrett (1975) above Disclosure 17 unweighted and The extent of disclosure  improves  throughout 1963-72. 
scores and weighted items, There is a wide variance between the disclosure of American 
 frequencies based on literature and British firms, on the one hand, and the level of disclosure  
 of disclosed and judgment of firms from the other five countries, on the other. These 
items results reinforce the view that the quality of disclosure and  
 the degree of efficiency of national markets are related. 
Stanga (1976) 80 Fortune 1,000 Disclosure 79 weighted items, Many disclosure deficiencies are reported. Firm size, among  
firms - annual reports scores and based on literature, large industrial firms, is not an important factor in explaining
(October 31, 1972 - frequencies of recent annual reports, disclosure. Industrial sector is related to the extent of 
September 30, 1973) disclosed items questionnaire to CFAs disclosure.
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix A (continued)
Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Barrett (1977) see Barrett (1975) above Disclosure 17 unweighted and The extent of financial disclosure in the annual reports of
scores and weighted items, U.S. firms is greater on average (but not uniformly in specific
frequencies based on literature categories of disclosure)  than firms in Japan, Sweden, the 
of disclosed and judgment Netherlands, Germany, and France
items
Benjamin & Stanga 600 commercial bank Differences in 79 items, based on For 51 of the 79 items, commercial bank officers, who make 
(1977) loan officers, 600 CFAs rankings literature and recent term loan decisions, and financial analysts, who make share
- questionnaire annual reports investment decisions, value information differently
  (undated)
Chenhall & Juchau 1,025 active individual Disclosure 37 items, previous Risk-averse investors and those preferring high dividends  
(1977) investors - questionnaire scores in literature and value information on: (1) expected future dividend yields, (2)  
(1975)  different investor Accounting Standards past dividend yield, and (3) ease of transfer of old shares.  
populations Steering Committee Investors accepting high risk and low dividends value 
information on: (1) leverage and (2) budgeted statements of 
performance and position.
Firth (1978) 750 respondents: Differences in 75 items, based on Finance directors and auditors have somewhat similar views.           
                      250 financial directors,   rankings literature, recent Financial analysts and bank loan officers have somewhat    
250 auditors, 120 financial   annual reports, and similar views. However, users (analysts, officers) attach 
analysts, and 130 loan discussions with higher importance to directors’ disclosures than do preparers
officers - questionnaire users (directors, auditors).
(undated)
Firth (1979a) 100 manufacturing firms Actual disclosure 48 weighted Disclosure levels are very low. Two major reasons are 
(every 10th of the Times vs. analysts’ items, based  postulated: (1) preparers of annual reports are unaware of the
1,000 largest firms) ranking on literature   importance of some items for users and (2) the confidential 
- annual reports (1976) and questionnaire nature of some information.
(120 professional   
financial analysts)
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Firth (1979b) 40 nonlisted manufacturing Disclosure scores 48 weighted Firms with stock market listings and large firms tend to make
firms, 40 listed firms, and in different groups items, based greater disclosures in their annual reports. The firms auditing
100 listed manufacturing on literature the books of the sample firms do not affect the level of
firms - annual reports (1976) and questionnaire disclosure.
(120 financial 
 analysts)
Garsombke (1979) 100 NYSE firms Regression 34 weighted items, Disclosure and risk are not causally related. Disclosure is an
- annual reports identical with Singhvi  insignificant variable in explaining firm risk.
  (April 1, 1965 - & Desai (1971) 
   March 31, 1966)
Spero (1979) 60 firms: France (20), Regression Replication of The firm’s need for capital explained voluntary disclosure.
U.K. (20), and Sweden (20) some previous Furthermore, disclosure increased in each sample country
- annual reports indices adjusted during the research period 1964-72.
  (1964/1967/1970/1972) for voluntary disclosure
and 3 author’s own 
Firth (1980) 6 different samples Differences in 48 unweighted and Small firms (but not large ones) increased their disclosure  
of manufacturing firms disclosure scores weighted items, when raising new finance on the stock market 
(3 issuing groups and based on literature and
3 nonissuing groups) experts’ weightings  
- annual reports 
  (1972-73)
Nair & Frank  38 countries - 233 Factor and 6 classification The groupings of countries by disclosure practices are 
(1980) accounting principles discriminant categories for different from groupings based on measurement practices.  
and reporting practices  analyses principles and  Also the underlying environmental variables most closely
(1973). 46 countries practices (1973),  associated with the practices are different. The results 
- 264 principles and 7 classification have implications for: (1) the comparability of financial
   practices (1975). categories for statements and (2) accounting harmonization.
principles and 
  practices (1975)
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Amernic & Maiocco 60 Canadian firms Differences in 42 weighted items, Significant and consistent increases in the mean disclosure 
(1981) - annual reports disclosure scores, based on literature score are detected over the period examined. There is a
  (1967/1972/1977) ANOVA and judgment detectable industry effect related to disclosure in 1972. 1977 
may also contain this relation. Canadian firms’ cross-listing 
on a U.S. exchange is linked to improved disclosure.
Kahl & Belkaoui 70 commercial banks Disclosure 30 weighted items, Differences exist in disclosure adequacy, internationally. U.S.
(1981) from 18 countries scores and based on literature, banks are leaders in the extent of disclosure. A positive
- annual reports disclosure judgment, professors, correlation exists between size and disclosure. There is a low 
  (1975) consensus and CFAs consensus between producers and users on the ten disclosure 
items.
McNally, Eng, & 103 New Zealand Differences in 41 weighted items, Stockbrokers and financial editors perceive the voluntary
Hasseldine (1982) Stock Exchange disclosure scores based on literature, disclosure of a wide variety of items of information to be
firms - annual reports recent annual reports, important. There is divergence between actual disclosure and 
(1979) and pilot-test by the degree of disclosure perceived by external users to be
stockbrokers desirable. Size is related to voluntary disclosure.
Firth (1984) see Firth (1979a) above Regression 48 weighted items, No significant association between the amount of disclosure  
based on literature  and the level of stock market risk exists
and questionnaire
(120 financial analysts)
Firer & Meth (1986) 36 Johannesburg Differences in 49 weighted items, Emphasis is placed by investment analysts on: (1) predictive  
Stock Exchange disclosure scores based on literature, information items, (2) the low importance attached to   
firms - annual reports annual reports, and inflation-related items, and (3) the high importance attached  
(1979-83) questionnaire for to a statement of transactions in foreign currency. Low level  
investment analysts of correlation between South African investment analysts and  
and financial directors U.K. counterparts was found. 
Chow & Wong-Boren 52 Mexican Stock Regression 24 unweighted and Large firms disclose more voluntarily than do small firms
(1987) Exchange firms weighted items,   
- annual reports based on experts’  
  (1982) review and literature
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Wallace (1988) 1,200 persons: Disclosure 109 items, based on The major finding of the study was the lack of consensus
300 chartered scores and literature, regulation, between accountants as a user-group and all other user-groups   
accountants, 200 consensus and degree of
investors, 100 senior among user- controversy surrounding 
civil servants, 200 groups the issue
managers, 200 financial
analysts, and 200 
other professionals
- questionnaire (1986)
Cooke (1989b) 90 firms: 38 unlisted, Regression 224 unweighted Listing status and size explain the extent of disclosure
33 listed on the Swedish items, based 
Stock Exchange, 19 on literature,
listed on both the  institutional 
Swedish and at least 1 recommendations,
foreign stock exchange law, and practicing 
- annual reports (1985) accountants
Cooke (1989c) see Cooke (1989b) above Regression 146 unweighted Listing status and size are major explanatory variables for
items, based on  voluntary disclosure. In addition, firms categorized as 
institutional trading disclose less voluntary information than other 
recommendations, industries.
literature, and
practicing accountants
Gray & Roberts 212 British multinational Interviews and 34 items,  Stock market pressures appear to dominate political 
(1989) firms - questionnaire disclosure  questionnaire pressures in encouraging voluntary disclosures. Indirect 
(1984) rankings costs of competitive disadvantage are important in 
disclosure policy decisions.
Gibbins, Richardson, & 11 disclosing firms’ Interviews and Inventory according  Two-dimensional internal preference for managing  
Waterhouse (1990) and 9 external several types of the communication disclosures is developed. The first dimension results in
organizations’ topical disclosures medium and the uncritical acceptance of rules and norms, the second
members topic results in a propensity to seek firm-specific advantage
(1985-86) in how disclosures are made and interpreted.
(continued on next page)
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Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Tuominen (1991) 72 publicly listed firms Discriminant 223 items, based Over time, disclosure policy has become more comprehensive
and firms on the broker analysis, latent on literature and and diversified
list on the Finnish stock structure analysis, regulation
market - annual reports and principal 
(1976/1980/1984) component analysis
Imhoff (1992) 185 firms identified Regression Analysts’ rating Firms with relative high (low) accounting quality are those 
using 1982 edition with more (less) predictable earnings, more (less) accurate 
of the Financial Analysts earnings forecasts, smaller (larger) annual earnings forecast
Federation’s (FAF) revisions after first-quarter results, lower (higher) likelihood
Corporate Information of bad-news annual earnings, larger (smaller) size, and 
Committee Report lower (higher) debt-to-equity ratios
Priebjrivat (1992) 63 firms operating Regression 27 unweighted and Level of disclosure is not related to capital costs as measured
in the Securities weighted items, by beta and return variance. Voluntary disclosure is related
Exchange of Thailand based on literature, to: (1) size, (2) ownership structure, (3) capital structure, and
- annual reports (1989) regulation, judgment, (4) audit firm (local/international). Overall, the results with
annual reports, and  unweighted and weighted indices are substantially equivalent.
financial analysts
Susanto (1992) 98 Jakarta Stock Regression 30 weighted items, Nationality (domestic/foreign) of a firm, new regulations, and 
Exchange-listed based on literature, size are related to disclosure
firms - annual   questionnaire, and
reports (1990) interviews
Williams (1992) 316 firms in Regression 43 weighted items, Size and profitability are significantly and positively related 
13 countries based on literature to disclosure. Results also indicate that nationality is an  
- annual reports important determinant of disclosure.
(the most recent annual 
report requested 
on February 1990)
Giner Inchausti 138 Valencia Stock  Regression, 50 unweighted items, Size, auditing firm, and listing status are related to disclosure
(1993, April) Exchange-listed firms panel data based on literature
- annual reports (1989-91) analyses and regulation 
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Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Lang & Lundholm  751 firms rated at least Regression Analyst ratings Disclosure scores are higher for firms that perform well, for  
(1993)  once in the 5 FAF of disclosure larger firms, for firms with a weaker relation between annual  
Reports (1985-89) categories stock returns and earnings, and for firms that issue securities
Price (1993) 2,533 firm/year Regression, Disclosure quality Management responds to institutional ownership with high 
observations simultaneous evaluations published quality disclosure
obtained from equations by the Association
Compustat (disclosure for Investment 
and CRSP quality Management and
(1984-91) endogenous/ Research (AIMR)
exogenous)
Welker (1993) 2,596 firm/year Regression, Disclosure quality Disclosure quality reduces information asymmetry and, hence, 
observations simultaneous evaluations published the cost of equity capital
(1981-90) equations by the AIMR
(disclosure
quality  
endogenous/
exogenous)
Gray, Meek, & 116 U.S., 64 U.K., and ANOVA 128 unweighted items, The result show that there are significant differences in 
Roberts (1994, April) 100 Continental based on an analysis  financial reporting between internationally listed and domestic 
European of international trends, listed firms
multinational firms actual reporting 
- annual reports practices, and literature
   (1989)
Raffournier 161 Swiss listed Regression 30 unweighted items, Disclosure is related to size and degree of internationalization
(1994, April) firms - annual reports based on EC of a firm 
(1991) directives
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
Study Sample number Methods Index Findings
- source (dates)
Sutley (1994) 116 winning and 123 Content analysis, Disclosure quality Content analysis of Financial Post booklets indicates that the 
nonwinning annual regression evaluation published concepts of disclosure, informativeness, and usefulness to
reports in the Financial by Financial Post investors were important in a judge’s ranking. Changes in 
Post annual report winners’ stock prices are less correlated with 
award program contemporaneous changes in earnings in the award year than 
(1982-87) those of nonwinners. In addition, winners have larger increase 
in return variability during the announcement week of annual 
report than nonwinners.
Healy, Palepu, & 90 firms with Regression, Disclosure quality Increased disclosure appears to be effective in helping 
Sweeney (1995) sustained increases control groups evaluations published investors to value short-term earnings growth. In addition, a
in disclosure ratings by the AIMR high level of disclosure appears to create additional consensus 
(1980-90)  among investors leading to increased liquidity for the firm’s 
 stocks.
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Appendix B.  D
etailed sources of accounting data
The follow
ing prim
ary data sources w
ere used in collating the accounting data:
1.
K
auppalehti
 n
ew
spapers, all issues for the years 1985-87. For 1985 the data are
tak
en
 
 from
 the actual new
spapers and for 1986-87 the data are o
n
 m
icrofilm
. For
m
o
re
 recent tim
e periods, the K
A
U
PPIS database, w
hich is based on K
auppalehti
,
 is
av
ailable. The event days w
ere system
atically searched by applying an open search
w
ith o
sa
vu
*
*
 as an
 entry w
ord. 
2.
H
elsingin Sanom
at
 n
ew
sp
apers. Interim
 report announcem
ents for 1985 (database
in the H
elsinki School of Econom
ics and Business and database in the U
niversity of
O
ulu).
3
.
H
SE
 files
 co
vering
 register
 n
u
m
b
er 30042 = osavuosikatsaus [interim report] from
1985, 1986, and 1987.
4
.
The card files of the H
SE for 1985, 1986, and 1987.
5
.
The H
SE filing program
 lists using o
sav
u
o
sikatsaus [interim report] as
 the entry
w
o
rd
.
 Th
e
 filing program
 co
v
ers the years 1988 through 1993. The run dates of the
lists
 w
e
re: (1) 1988, date: 9.11.1990; (2) 1989, date: 6.6.1990; (3) 1.1. -
 3.10.1990,
d
ate:
 3
.10
.1990; (4) 4.10. -
 16.11.1990, date: 16.11.1990; (5) 14.11. -
 31.12.1990,
d
ate: 16.1.1991; (6) 1991, date: 23.4.1992; (7) 1992, date: 8.1.1993; (8) 1.1. -
31.10.1993, date: 1.11.1993; and (9) 1.11. - 31.12.1993, date: 21.1.1994.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
.
Th
e
 H
SE filing program
 lists using ennakkotieto osavuosikatsaus [announcement
of
 th
e
 ev
ent day of an interim
 report] as the entry word. This search was used to
co
ntrol
 th
e
 info
rm
atio
n
 in
 th
e o
sav
u
o
sikatsaus list. The run dates of the lists w
ere: (1)
1988, date: 1.11.1993; (2) 1989, date: 1.11.1993; (3) 1990, dates: 11.10.1991,
1.11.1993; (4) 1991, date: 1.11.1993; (5) 1992, date: 1.11.1993; and (6) 1993, date:
1.11.1993. 
7
.
Firm
s
 w
e
re
 requested to send a
 copy of their interim
 report w
hen an incom
plete
an
n
o
u
n
cem
ent of their report w
as given in K
auppalehti in 1985.
(continued on next page)
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A
ppendix B (continued)
8
.
So
m
e
 d
etails of interim
 reports w
ere also requested by telephone directly from
firm
s
.
 Those calls are docum
ented o
n
 the data collection form
. In
 cases w
here an
inte
rim
 report w
as published but not av
ailable in the H
SE, the report w
as requested
directly from
 the com
pany. The m
ajor reco
rds for m
issing data and the follow
-up
m
easu
res
 are dated: 18.10.1993 (14 pages), 7.11.1993 (four pages), and 23.2.1994
(one page).
9
.
N
ew
 listings
 and
 d
eletio
n
s
 fro
m
 th
e
 Stock Exchange list w
ere ascertained from
 the
an
n
u
al reports of the H
SE (Helsinki Stock Exchange, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990,
1991,
 1992,
 1993). For 1993, the changes to the official list w
ere received directly
fro
m
 th
e
 H
SE
.
 The exact dates of the above changes w
ere obtained from
 the H
SE. In
addition, the listings w
ere cross-checked using K
auppalehti
.
 
 
 
10. A
nnual reports of the firm
s. 
Appendices
226
Appendix C.  D
ata schedule for disclosure scoresheet
Interim
 report-specific disclosure scoresheet
D
ate of entry: 
Firm
: 
Interim
 report
 (reporting period in months/reporting year):
 
A
.  M
anagem
ent report 
A.1.  M
anagem
ent overview
 
1.
 
 R
eview
 of operations for the reporting period 
 
 
 
 
 
 freq
u
en
cies
 of
 item
s
0.0 review
 n
ot disclosed
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
0.5 review
 w
ith few
 com
m
ents
144
1.0 review
 w
ith an analytical discussion
425
573
2.
 
 Com
petitive position and m
arket share
0.0 item
s not disclosed
113
0.5 item
s w
ith few
 com
m
ents
249
1.0 item
s w
ith an analytical discussion
211
573
3.
 
 Earnings per share (EPS)
0.0 EPS not disclosed
427
0.5 disclosed present value of EPS  
137
1.0 disclosed anticipated value of EPS for rem
ainder of the year 
 
 
 
 9
573
4.
 
 N
um
ber of em
ployees
0.0 figures not disclosed
180
1.0 figures disclosed
393
573
(continued on next page)
Appendices
227
A
ppendix C (continued)
5.
 
 Subsequent events
 
0.0 events not disclosed
310
0.5 events w
ith few
 com
m
ents
201
1.0 events w
ith an analytical presentation
 
 62
573
6.
 
 O
utlook for the rem
ainder of the operating year 
0.0 outlook not disclosed 
 
 46
0.5 outlook w
ith few
 com
m
ents
403
1.0 outlook w
ith an analytical presentation
124
573
A.2.  Investm
ents and finance
7. 
 Presentation of anticipated investm
ents    
0.0 no inform
ation on anticipated investm
ents
315
0.5 anticipated investm
ents disclosed w
ith few
 com
m
ents
134
1.0 anticipated investm
ents disclosed w
ith a thorough presentation or 
 
 
 
 
 
 explicitly stated that anticipated investm
ents w
ill be sm
all in size
124
573
8.
 
 M
anagem
ent discussion of financial position 
0.0 financial position not disclosed 
 
 95
0.5 financial position w
ith few
 com
m
ents
277
1.0 financial position w
ith an analytical discussion
201
573
9.
 
 Presentation of anticipated capital structure
0.0 anticipated capital structure not disclosed
412
0.5 anticipated capital structure w
ith few
 com
m
ents
 
 71
1.0 anticipated capital structure w
ith an analytical discussion
 
 90
573
(continued on next page)
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A
ppendix C (continued)
B.  Inform
ation in financial statem
ents
 
B.1.  Information in general
10.
 A
ccounting standards applied
0.0 no inform
ation about accounting standards
 
 11
0.5 inform
ation according to Finnish accounting standards  
 
 
 
 
 
 o
r acco
rding to other international accounting standards 
501
1.0 inform
ation according to both Finnish and  
 
 
 
 
 
 so
m
e international accounting standards 
 
 61
 
573
11.
 Incom
e statem
ent (voluntary components)
0.0 only m
andatory com
ponents disclosed
 
 91
0.5 at least tw
o voluntary incom
e statem
ent com
ponents disclosed
280
1.0 all m
ajor income statement components disclosed
202
573
12.
 B
alance sheet
0.0 balance sheet not disclosed
430
0.5 at least the sum
 of total assets disclosed
 
 59
1.0 all m
ajor balance sheet components disclosed
 
 84
573
B.2.  Business segm
ent information
13. B
reakdow
n of turnover or net sales by business segm
ent 
X
    only one business segm
ent
 
 17
0.0 several business segm
ents, segm
ental com
ponents not disclosed
122
1.0 several business segm
ents, segm
ental com
ponents disclosed
434
573
(continued on next page)
Appendices
229
A
ppendix C (continued)
14.
 B
reakdow
n of incom
e by business segm
ent
X
    only one business segm
ent
 
 17
0.0 several business segm
ents, segm
ental incom
e not disclosed
515
1.0 several business segm
ents, segm
ental incom
e disclosed
 
 41
573
B.3.  G
eographical information
15.
 B
reakdow
n of turnover or net sales by geographical area
X
   dom
estic turnover only
113
0.0 several areas, not disclosed
290
0.5 several areas, disclosed by dom
estic and foreign 
118
1.0 several areas, disclosed by areas
 
 52
573
16.
 B
reakdow
n of incom
e by geographical area
X
   dom
estic incom
e only
113
0.0 several areas, not disclosed
459
0.5 several areas, disclosed by dom
estic and foreign 
 
 
 
 1
1.0 several areas, disclosed by areas
 
 
 
 0
573
B.4.  D
isclosure and analysis of components related to financial
statem
ents
17.
 Turnover or net sales 
0.0 no inform
ation on the com
ponent
 
 
 
 1
0.5 com
ponent disclosed w
ith few
 com
m
ents
212
1.0 com
ponent disclosed w
ith an analytical discussion
360
573
(continued on next page)
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A
ppendix C (continued)
18.
 R
esearch and developm
ent (R&D)
0.0 no inform
ation on R&
D
370
0.5 R&
D
 disclosed w
ith few
 com
m
ents
157
1.0 R&
D
 disclosed w
ith a reasonable explanation or 
 
 
 
 
 
 explicitly stated that R&
D
 has m
inor im
portance
 
 46
573
19.
 D
epreciations of property, plant, and equipm
ent
0.0 depreciations not disclosed
488
0.5 depreciations disclosed w
ith few
 com
m
ents
 
 69
1.0 depreciations disclosed w
ith a thorough explanation
 
 16
573
20.
 R
esult after financing item
s 
0.0 no inform
ation on the com
ponent
142
0.5 com
ponent disclosed w
ith few
 com
m
ents
306
1.0 com
ponent disclosed w
ith an analytical discussion
125
573
21.
 O
ther incom
e and expenses 
X
   other incom
e and expenses of m
inor im
portance
172
0.0 no inform
ation on other incom
e and expenses
214
0.5 other incom
e and expenses w
ith few
 com
m
ents
117
1.0 other incom
e and expenses w
ith a thorough explanation
 
 70
573
22.
 R
esult before appropriations and taxes 
0.0 com
ponent disclosed w
ithout com
m
ents
 
 46
0.5 com
ponent disclosed w
ith few
 com
m
ents
351
1.0 com
ponent disclosed w
ith an analytical discussion
176
573
(continued on next page)
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A
ppendix C (continued)
23.
 Inventories and valuation  
0.0 no inform
ation on inventories
433
0.5 inventories w
ith few
 com
m
ents on valuation 
135
1.0 inventories w
ith a thorough explanation of valuation or 
 
 
 
 
 
 explicitly stated that inventories are of m
inor im
portance              
 
 
 
 5
573
24.
 O
rder book and the order backlog 
0.0 no inform
ation on orders 
235
0.5 order book m
entioned w
ith few
 com
m
ents
209
1.0 order book and order backlog m
entioned w
ith a thorough
 
 
 
 
 
 presentation or explicitly stated that orders are of m
inor im
portance
129
573
25.
 Leasing contracts 
0.0 no inform
ation on leasing contracts
498
0.5 leasing contracts w
ith few
 com
m
ents
 
 54
1.0 leasing contracts w
ith a thorough presentation or 
 
 
 
 
 
 explicitly stated that leasing contracts are of m
inor im
portance  
 
 21
573
26. Com
m
itm
ents and contingencies 
0.0 no inform
ation on com
m
itm
ents and contingencies
282
0.5 com
m
itm
ents and contingencies w
ith few
 com
m
ents
228
1.0 com
m
itm
ents and contingencies w
ith a thorough explanation  
 
 
 
 
 
 o
r explicitly stated that no com
m
itm
ents and contingencies
 
 63
573
Sp
e
cified criteria for interpretation of a
 particular scoresheet item
 o
r
 interim
report
1
.
 
 Th
e
 D
IV
O
LPU
R
 ind
ex
 tracks
 item
s
 th
at
 are
 purely v
oluntary throughout the w
hole
research period of 1985-93. The item
 num
bers in the disclosure scoresheet fulfilling
these v
oluntary criteria are: 2
 through 16, 18, 19, and 23. The specific classification
(continued on next page)
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A
ppendix C (continued)
of
 various item
s or interim
 reports in certain years is given in statem
ents 2 through 5
below
.
2
.
 
 In
 1985 there w
ere no m
andatory reports or item
s. A
ll interim
 reports published
in 1985 w
ere classified as voluntary.   
3
.
 
 B
etw
ee
n
 1.1.1986 and 31.12.1987, the follow
ing index item
 num
bers w
ere
e
x
clud
ed
 fro
m
 the com
pilation of the v
oluntary disclosure index: 1
,
 17, 21, 22, and
24
.
 W
h
en
 a
 firm
 published m
ore than one interim
 report, the other interim
 report(s)
for other period(s) was (were) classified as voluntary.  
4
.
 
 B
etw
ee
n
 1.1.1988 and 31.12.1989, the follow
ing index item
 num
bers w
ere
e
x
clud
ed from
 the com
pilation of the v
oluntary disclosure index: 1
,
 17, 20, 21, 22,
a
nd
 24
.
 W
h
en
 a
 firm
 published m
ore than one interim
 report, the other interim
report(s) for other period(s) was (were) classified as voluntary. 
5
.
 
 B
etw
ee
n
 1.1.1990 and 31.12.1993, the follow
ing index item
 num
bers w
ere
e
x
clud
ed from
 the voluntary disclosure index: 1
,
 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26.
B
etw
ee
n
 1990 and 1993, H
SE-listed firm
s w
ere given the option of
 publishing: (1)
o
n
e
 six-m
onth report or (2) two interim reports covering equal periods. In practice,
this m
ean
s: (1) one six-month interim report or (2) two interim reports, the first
co
vering
 th
e
 first
 fo
u
r
 m
o
nth
s
 of
 the operating period, the second covering the second
fo
u
r
 
m
o
nths of
 the operating period. Interim
 reports exceeding these frequency
requirem
ents are classified as voluntary.   
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Appendix D
.  Elim
ination of correlated variables
B
efo
re a
 v
ariable w
as included in the regression m
odel for the determ
inants of
disclosure, a
 co
ntrol w
as undertaken for correlations w
ith the other variables in that
p
a
rtic
ular group (Rawlings, 1988, pp. 244-245). The highest correlations are as
follow
s: 
-CH
G
PRO
FI (percentage change in profit after financial items)
 and CG
N
ETPRO
(percentage change in profit after the financial items/net sales
 ratio), .99; 
-SCG
N
ETPR
 (standard deviation of the percentage change in profit after the
fin
a
n
cial item
s/net 
sales
 
ratio) 
and SCG
PRO
FI (standard deviation of the
percentage change in profit after financial items), .99; 
-CH
G
N
ETS
 (percentage change in net sales) and ANNNETSP (percentage change
in annual net sales), .86; 
-
LA
N
PERSO
 (n
u
m
ber of personnel) and LANNETRE (a
n
n
u
al net sales), .86; and 
-SCG
N
ETS
 (standard deviation of the percentage change in net sales) and
SA
N
N
ETSP (standard deviation of the percentage change in annual net sales),
.73.
A
ppendix J gives the com
plete correlation m
atrix for the variables. 
D
u
e to the high 
co
rrelation, one of the 
v
ariables w
as alw
ays elim
inated. The
co
rrelation is not m
erely statistical -
 it points to the underlying econom
ic situation.
B
asically, the correlated pairs represent very sim
ilar attributes. The criterion for
selecting
 b
etw
een
 CH
G
PRO
FI
 and
 CG
N
ETPRO
 w
as to u
se the co
m
putationally m
o
re
attractive
 variable:
 CH
G
PRO
FI. The use of CH
G
PRO
FI m
akes SCG
N
ETPR, and not
SCG
PRO
FI, the com
putationally easier m
easure of business risk. 
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O
n
e
 m
ajor guideline in selecting between correlated variables was to use as m
u
ch
inte
rim
 
report inform
ation as possible instead of annual inform
ation. Therefore
C
H
G
N
ETS and SCG
N
ETS w
ere u
sed in
 place of
 the annual variables A
N
N
N
ETSP
and SA
N
N
ETSP. 
Fin
ally
,
 LA
N
PERSO
 w
as
 selected
 fo
r
 fu
rth
er
 an
aly
sis
 in
stead of LA
N
N
ETRE because
it
 w
as
 co
n
sid
ered
 to
 be less am
biguous than LA
N
N
ETRE. In particular, LA
N
PERSO
w
as applied because it is im
m
u
n
e to
 changes in m
oney value, is less affected by year-
end adjustments than LANNETRE, and because the values
 for LA
N
PERSO
 w
ere
m
o
re readily available than for LA
N
N
ETRE.
F
o
r
 
th
e
 
above reasons, the variables CG
N
ETPRO
, SCG
PRO
FI, A
N
N
N
ETSP,
LA
N
N
ETRE, and SA
N
N
ETSP w
ere ex
cluded from
 further analysis. This left: (1)
CH
G
PRO
FI, (2) SCGNETPR, (3) CHGNETS, (4) LANPERSO, and (5) SCGNETS.
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Appendix E.  Reporting lags in business days, 1985 through 1993
 Lag 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1985    1986     1987    1988     1989    1990    1991    1992    1993 
a
A
verage
 33.9
36.9
34.5
35.1
34.8
36.3
36.5
33.4
33.5
M
inim
um
 15
17
13
14
13
23
24
14
19
M
axim
um
 62
68
60
63
79
45
45
43
46
 N
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45        50     
53
60
75
82
70
73
69
 Lag
 is defined as the num
ber of days from
 the end of the reporting period through
athe announcem
ent date.
 The total num
ber of data available for the com
putation of the
reporting lag is 577.   
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Appendix F.  Descriptive statistics of variables used
         Variable      N       Minimum        Q     Median         Q      Maximum     Mean      Variance    Skewness    Kurtosis    Jarque-Bera1     3
DIALL 573 .05769 .30769 .40385 .48077 .71154 .39580 .01438 -.18833 -.36433 6.55635
DIVOLPUR 573 .05555 .27777 .36111 .44444 .69444 .35259 .01401 -.13558 -.40221 5.61782
LHOLNU 587 .69315 8.00970 8.85367 9.76629 11.54248 8.84618 1.91558 -.78112 3.09008 293.23593
FIRMS 567 .00000 13.10000 29.50000 51.20000 99.80000 34.19788 712.21160 .59950 -.59050 42.20096
SCGNETS 595 .01147 .10729 .16507 .21439 8.59526 .37354 1.47573 6.36501 39.99604 43,676.39090
SNIQKPOP 547 .83897 4.10468 5.84546 8.59250 28.80975 7.46467 33.99134 2.00003 4.25611 777.53585
ANNBETA 573 -.38400 .39800 .63200 .95200 2.27700 .67888 .15120 .51394 .26959 26.95970
ANNDEBTS 468 -16.60000 1.10000 1.70000 2.70000 30.60000 2.25620 9.49412 3.94130 42.88086 37,067.61650
ISSRATIO 411 -.25786 .00000 .00000 .26437 10.45455 .28341 .61602 7.02665 73.96508 97,070.12120
POSBCAR 440 -1.01700 -.17000 .01150 .16750 .80200 .00723 .07230 -.01872 .96678 17.16115
CHGNETS 562 -.81494 -.00772 .08462 .18542 29.94937 .19012 1.81470 19.80492 428.95870 4,345,536.340
NIQKPOP 451 -23.90900 4.66100 7.61600 13.03600 60.11600 9.00037 85.29732 1.38837 7.65450 1,245.91819
PROFNETP 533 -.24065 .00313 .03054 .06339 .41325 .03436 .00522 .52341 4.22711 421.16565
LANPERSO 589 3.73767 7.32449 8.38275 9.26407 10.70522 8.22995 1.85969 -.64778 .12253 41.56088
UPVD 255 -.22609 -.04213 .00662 .04460 .25000 .00645 .00531 .20663 .84211 9.34929
    UE 450 -9.70642 -.25882 .07740 .37180 50.08152 .10026 8.04893 12.12394 216.08620 886,522.6034
SDR 507 .02800 .24500 .52400 1.12000 10.84600 .90713 1.28357 3.39831 17.73971 7,623.82986
For detailed variable definitions, see sections 6.1.4, 7.1.1, 8.2, and 8.4 in the text.
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Appendix G
.  Analyses for multicollinearity in the final regressions
Appendix G
-1.  Analysis of the DIALL regression
 (table 1 in the text)
 
 D
ependent v
ariable
 
 
 
 
 
 
 R
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 V
IF 
2
 FIRM
S
.397
1.66
 SCG
N
ETS
.302
1.43
 SN
IQKPOP
.278
1.38
 A
N
N
BETA
 
.414
1.71
 ISSRA
TIO
 
.173
1.21 
 PO
SBCA
R
 
.128
1.15 
 CH
G
N
ETS 
 
.424
1.74
 PRO
FN
ETP
 
.404
1.68
 LA
N
PERSO
 
.508
2.03
D
IA
LL
=
index of all interim
 reports including both m
andatory and 
v
oluntary disclosures, and
V
IF
=
 
v
ariance inflation factor: 1 / (1 - R
). 2
All variables in regressions:
FIRM
S
=
percentage of corporate ow
nership,
SCG
N
ETS
=
standard deviation of percentage change in net sales,
SN
IQKPOP
=
 
standard deviation of net investm
ents/total assets ratio,
A
N
N
BETA
=
 
m
arket m
odel beta,
ISSRA
TIO
=
 
ratio of change in equity/equity before the change,
PO
SBCA
R
=
 post-event cum
ulative abnorm
al return (CAR) at business day 
140. Expected returns are based on the m
arket m
odel.    
CH
G
N
ETS
=
 percentage change in net sales,
PRO
FN
ETP
=
 profit/net sales ratio, and
LA
N
PERSO
=
 
n
atural logarithm
 of the num
ber of personnel.
Th
e
 variables
 FIRM
S
,
 SCG
N
ETS
,
 SN
IQ
K
PO
P, A
N
N
BETA
, ISSRA
TIO
, PO
SBCA
R,
CH
G
N
ETS, PRO
FN
ETP, and LA
N
PERSO
 are regressed one by
 o
n
e in
 m
ultiple
regressions on the other independent variables.
The above results quite strongly support the view
 that serious m
ulticollinearity does
n
ot
 exist
 am
o
ng
 th
e
 independent v
ariables. The highest R
,
 50.80%
, is obtained w
hen
2
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th
e dependent variable is LA
N
PERSO
. Fo
r the rest of
 the regressions in the table
above, the R
 is below
 50.00%
. In
 other w
o
rds, m
ulticollinearity has only a
 sm
all
2
influence o
n
 the results. A
lso, the variance inflation factor (VIF), a
 m
easu
re of
collinearity, indicates that there is no overall collinearity problem
 in the current
sam
ple
.
 R
aw
lings (1988) suggests VIF>10 as a guideline for serious collinearity (op.
cit., p. 277). All VIFs are clearly below 10 in this set of observations.
Appendix G
-2.  Analysis of the DIVOLPUR regression
 (table 2 in the text)
 D
ependent variable
 
 
 R
 V
IF 
2
 LH
O
LN
U
.442
1.79
 FIRM
S
.321
1.47
 SCG
N
ETS
.100
1.11
 SN
IQKPOP
.297
1.42
 A
N
N
BETA
 
.458
1.85
 A
N
N
D
EBTS
 
.338
1.51 
 PO
SBCA
R
 
.130
1.15 
 N
IQKPOP 
 
.144
1.17
 PRO
FN
ETP
 
.532
2.14
 LA
N
PERSO
 
.519
2.08
D
IV
O
LPU
R
=
ind
ex
 of
 all
 interim
 reports containing purely voluntary disclosures
o
nly, and
V
IF
=
 
v
ariance inflation factor: 1 / (1 - R
). 
2
All variables in regressions:
LH
O
LN
U
=
n
atural logarithm
 of the num
ber of shareholders,
FIRM
S
=
percentage of corporate ow
nership,
SCG
N
ETS
=
standard deviation of percentage change in net sales,
SN
IQKPOP
=
 
standard deviation of net investm
ents/total assets ratio,
A
N
N
BETA
=
 
m
arket m
odel beta,
A
N
N
D
EBTS
=
debt/equity ratio,
PO
SBCA
R
=
 p
o
st
-event
 cu
m
ulative abnorm
al return (CAR) at business day 140.
Expected returns are based on the m
arket m
odel.
N
IQKPOP
=
n
et investm
ents/total assets ratio,
(for other table footnotes see next page)
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PRO
FN
ETP
=
 profit/net sales ratio, and 
LA
N
PERSO
=
 
n
atural logarithm
 of the num
ber of personnel.  
The 
v
ariables 
LH
O
LN
U
, 
FIRM
S, 
SCG
N
ETS, 
SN
IQKPOP, 
A
N
N
BETA
,
A
N
N
D
EB
TS, PO
SBCA
R, N
IQKPOP, PRO
FN
ETP, and LA
N
PERSO
 are regressed
o
n
e by one in m
ultiple regressions on the other independent variables.
Th
e
 
ab
o
v
e 
results show
 that there is
 
n
ot serious 
m
ulticollinearity 
am
o
ng the
ind
ep
e
nd
e
nt v
ariables. The highest R
,
 53.20%
, is obtained w
hen the dependent
2
v
ariable is PRO
FN
ETP. In eight regressions out of ten, the R
 is below
 50.00%
. See
2
appendix G
-1 above for m
ore details and a discussion.
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Appendix H.  Heteroscedasticity-corrected results for the implications part 
Appendix H-1.  White-adjusted regressions of unexpected earnings and variations in returns on CAR with long
 measurement windows
                                                        Disclosure quartile: unexpected purely voluntary disclosure (UPVD)
CAR(bgn, d)                     Lower quartile                          Middle quartiles                                     Upper quartileb c
    d               A         UE       SDR      Adj. R          A            UE        SDR      Adj. R          A           UE              SDR        Adj. R0 0 02 2 2
end .080 .046 -.036    0.0% .091 .040 .005b   2.3%.139 .060 -.125 30.2%
-30 -.018 .030 .014a   1.1.150 .048 -.100 29.0 .126 .096  12.4 .110
-15 -.019 .041 .010b   3.5.138 .055 -.110 29.4 .122  12.6.109 .101
   0 .437 .693 .026  2.5 -.030 -.614    0.4 2.402 .257  -2.332a2.306
  8.0
 15 -.032 .081 .038 .000b   1.2.140 .062 -.148 31.7 .138  15.1.120
 30 -.043 -.081 .046 .074b  -1.9.149 .121 .134.064 -.167 31.2  13.1
a: n = 63; b: n = 64; and c: n = 127.
CAR(bgn, d) = cumulative abnormal returns starting from the beginning day of the interim reporting period bgn and ending  on day
d. Expected returns are based on the market model. A negative/positive sign for a day indicates a
  pre/post-event day. End refers to the end day of the interim reporting period. 
A = intercept,0
(for other table footnotes see next page)
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Appendix H-1 (continued)
UE = unexpected earnings where the forecast is based on a seasonal random walk model. UE is deflated by the market
value of the equity at the beginning of interim reporting period.
SDR = standard deviation of returns during the 61 business days: (-30, 30). 
The unexpected disclosure class boundaries are as follows: (1) lower quartile, UPVD < -.04212; (2) middle quartiles, -.04212   UPVD
< .04460; and (3) upper quartile, .04460   UPVD. Boldface (italic boldface) designates statistical significance at the 5% (0.1%) level.
In the Adj. R  columns this notation indicates statistical significance of the F test.2
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Appendix H-2.  White-adjusted regressions of unexpected earnings and variations in returns on CAR with short and intermediate
  measurement windows
                                                          Disclosure quartile: unexpected purely voluntary disclosure (UPVD)
    CAR            Lower quartile                                      Middle quartiles                     Upper quartileb c
  (d1, d2)             B           UE       SDR     Adj. R        B             UE         SDR       Adj. R        B            UE           SDR             Adj. R0 0 02 2 2
Panel A: Intermediate periods - Enveloping, pre- and post-event
(-20, 20)   2.710  1.733 -.656  3.0% 1.273 -.280    0.2% 3.053 -.656 -1.063a  -2.6%4.540
(-20, -1 )   1.090  1.041 -.635  6.1 -.720 -.763    1.5 2.922 .358 -1.906a   2.22.771
(   0, 20)   1.620    .692 -.022 -1.2 .483 .131 -1.014 .844a   3.31.770 1.993    4.9
Panel B: Short periods - Beginning before, at, and after the event
(-20,-16)  .807 .430 -1.485 .622   -.295   3.0% .636   -.054 .089a   -3.2%
  7.3% -.663
(-15,-11)  .483 .772  1.413 .351 .130    .330  -0.4 .883   -.139 -.613a   -0.3
  7.6
(-10,  -6) -.315 -.360 .181   2.3 -.060   -.640 1.001    .183 -.837a    3.4.792   3.6
(  -5,  -1)  .115 .200 -.744   3.9 -.127   -.159  -1.2 .402    .368 -.545a    4.31.006
   (0,   0) -.461 .341 .123   3.7 -.155    .127 .361   -.140   -.383a   -1.3.608   5.1
   (0,   1)  .107 .481 -.662 .611   -.478 .617    .233 -1.070a15.6 1.648    6.817.9
   (0,   2) -.565 .130 -.488 -1.6 .834   -.327 .592    .372 -.740a    6.21.909 17.2
   (0,   3) -.366 .103 -.182 -2.8 .672 -1.570a1.296 1.478   -.758  1.46112.6  37.9
   (0,   4) -.305 -.051 -1.007 -1.2   -.563 .691  1.145  -1.024a1.253 1.673 13.1  20.1
   (0,   5) -.159 .124 -.419 -2.2 .944   -.423 .175    .897 -.717a1.067   4.3  12.5
   (0, 15)  .644 .584 .525 -1.7 1.386   -.239   0.7 .197 -1.174 .370a    3.8.932
 (  6, 10)  .605 .037 .260 -2.9 -.102 -.439    .228   0.2 .438 -.928  -.330b    3.1
 (11, 15)  .199 .423 .684  0.8 .544 .303   -.044  -0.8 -.437 -1.145  1.422b  23.3
 (16, 20)  .976 .108 -.547 -1.1 .383  1.061   .722 -.208  .143 .508b   -2.1
  5.2
(for table footnotes see next page)
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Appendix H-2 (continued)
a: n = 63; b: n = 64; and c: n = 127. 
CAR(d1, d2) = cumulative abnormal returns, starting from day d1 and ending on day d2. Expected returns are based on the market
model. A negative/positive sign for a day indicates pre/post-event day.
B = intercept, 0
UE = unexpected earnings (forecast based on seasonal random walk model), and 
SDR = standard deviation of returns during the 61 business days: (-30, 30).
The unexpected disclosure class boundaries are as follows: (1) lower quartile, UPVD < -.04212; (2) middle quartiles, -.04212   UPVD <
.04460; and (3) upper quartile, .04460   UPVD. Boldface (italic boldface) designates statistical significance at the 5% (0.1%) level. In the
Adj. R  columns this notation indicates statistical significance of the F test.2
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Appendix I.
C
ro
ss
-tabulation
 
of
 
u
n
expected purely voluntary disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(U
PVD)
 a
nd unexpected earnings
 (U
E)
U
nexpected earnings       U
nexpected voluntary disclosure quartile    Total 
quartile 
 First       
 Second      Third        Fourth
 
First
 
 
 
 
 frequency
15
15
18
15
 63
 
 
 ro
w
 percentage
23.81
23.81
28.57
23.81
Second
 
 
 
 frequency
25 
17
14
8
 64
 
 
 
 ro
w
 percentage
39.06
26.56
21.88
12.50
Third
 
 
 
 frequency
14
13
17
20
 64
 
 
 
 ro
w
 percentage
21.88
20.31
26.56
31.25
Fourth
 
 
 
 frequency
10
19
14
21
 64
 
 
 
 ro
w
 percentage
15.63
29.69
21.88
32.81
Total
64
64
63
64
 255
percentage
25.10
25.10
24.71
25.10
100.00
 (9)=16.24, p
=
.062.
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Appendix J.  Correlation m
atrix for the variables
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